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Today the concept of biological altruism (BA) is widely used within biological research, 
particularly evolutionary biology, sociobiology, and eusociality research (Cronin 1991; 
Dugatkin 2002; Lehmann and Keller 2006; Wilson and Wilson 2007; Ratnieks et al. 2011). 
Although there remains some debate over definitional issues (West et al. 2008; Wilson 2008a), 
the concept of BA is generally defined as a trait that causes its bearer to benefit others at a cost 
to itself, whereby the costs and benefits are measured as fitness consequences (Okasha 2013). 
This renders the concept of BA different to the common-sense notion of altruism, or what is 
often referred to as psychological altruism, which is necessarily to do with the intentions behind 
the behaviour (Sober 1994). In other words, all that is required for an individual to be altruistic 
(in the psychological sense) is that they behave with the intention to do well for another, despite 
the consequences. Whereas, for an individual to be considered biologically altruistic, they must 
exhibit a trait that causes them to benefit the fitness of others at cost to their own fitness. Thus, 
psychological altruism is a concept that is necessarily to do with the intentions behind 
behaviour, and BA is a concept that is necessarily to do with the fitness consequences of 
behaviour (Sober 1988). 
 
 However, the focus on fitness consequences, particularly the cost to the bearer, renders 
the concept of BA problematic and, even, paradoxical for evolutionary theory. A reason for 
this is, if natural selection typically leads to traits that increase the fitness of their bearers, how 
can a trait that causes a fitness cost to its bearer evolve? According to natural selection, a trait 
that reduces the fitness of its bearer should not be selected for. So why then, has the concept of 
BA become so widely used within biology? The answer to this question is that researchers 
believe that there are examples of BA in nature. The following are commonly conceived of as 
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examples of BA; alarm calling in vervet monkeys (Cercopithecus aethiops), food sharing in 
vampire bats (Desmodus rotundus), the non-reproductive “worker” castes of eusocial insect 
colonies (i.e. ants, bees, termites, and wasps), and more (see Dugatkin 1997; Okasha 2013). 
However, it is debatable whether some of the often-cited examples are really instances of BA, 
this is because, for example, the cost of the trait is either short-term or only slight. This is clear 
in the case of food sharing in vampire bats. Food sharing regularly occurs in groups of vampire 
bats. Females will share food with nest mates that have failed to feed in the recent past. This is 
often considered as an example of BA because the female that shares food is benefitting another 
(the shared food ensures the survival of the bat that failed to feed) at a cost to herself by 
reducing her nutrition (Dugatkin 1997: 113-114; Okasha 2013). However, when studied in 
more detail this behaviour no longer appears to be a case of BA. It has been shown that vampire 
bats can recognise each other and that they typically share food with those that have given them 
food in the past. Thus, the food sharing behaviour appears to be an example of mutualism rather 
than BA; vampire bats risk the short-term costs of sharing their food in order to gain the 
potential benefit of receiving food in the future, if or when they fail to feed (Dugatkin 1997: 
113-114). 
 
 Unlike the example of food sharing, since the inception of the concept, the non-
reproductive castes of eusocial insects are widely considered as the strongest examples of BA. 
Eusociality is defined as colonies consisting of overlapping generations (more than one), 
cooperative brood care, and a reproductive division of labour where non-reproductive workers 
help the reproductive members (Wilson and Hölldobler 2005: 13367; Sherman et al. 1995; 
Crespi and Yanega 1995). The key aspect of eusociality is the reproductive division of labour; 
some members of the colony never reproduce but still cooperate for the colony. Thus, many 
authors consider the non-reproductive workers as an example of extreme BA — the workers 
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cooperate for the colony at an extreme lifetime cost of never reproducing, or even self-
sacrificing their life in the defence of the colony. The concept of BA was first introduced by J. 
B. S. Haldane (1932), and he argued that it is likely only possible in eusocial insects precisely 
due to their reproductive division of labour (Huxley 1942: 482). In other words, any behaviour 
of the workers that benefits the colony, even at a cost to the worker, can evolve due to the 
success of the reproductives (Haldane 1932: 207-210). 
 
 But authors rarely applied the concept of BA to eusocial insects after Haldane 
introduced it. Instead there were alternative concepts already in use. For example, the colonies-
as-individuals argument and the concept of the superorganism were popular; many authors 
argued that eusocial colonies were higher-level individuals and consequently the non-
reproductive workers were simply parts of this emergent whole, rather than being evolutionary 
individuals in their own right (Wheeler 1928; Emerson 1952). Another alternative was the 
concept of dominance, it was argued that the reproductive division of labour evolved due to 
the queen dominating some of her offspring into becoming non-reproductive workers (Free 
1955; Free et al. 1969). It was not until the 1960s that the concept of BA was widely applied 
to eusocial insects, due to W. D. Hamilton (1964a, 1964b) and his theory of kin selection. 
 
 Hamilton became interested in the concept of BA in his undergraduate studies, and he 
devoted his PhD thesis to providing an explanation for the evolution of the trait within the 
framework of the Modern Synthesis (Hamilton 1996: 11-30; Segerstrale 2013: 45-77). 
Hamilton (1996: 20) considered the non-reproductive castes of eusocial insects as some of the 
strongest examples of BA. To explain the evolution of BA, Hamilton (1964a, 1964b) developed 
his theory of kin selection via inclusive fitness, according to which BA can evolve via selection 
of close relatives. Specifically, even though BA causes a cost to the fitness of its bearer if the 
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benefits are directed to close relatives, who are likely to share the same genes, then the trait 
can evolve through the success of close kin — hence the term kin selection. Hamilton (1964b, 
1972) conceptualised the evolution of eusociality as the evolution of BA, and used the theory 
of kin selection to explain its evolution. 
 
 Kin selection was considered a groundbreaking theory for evolutionary biology and has 
since become an integral part of evolutionary theory (West et al. 2008). It is even considered 
as one of the most important developments in evolutionary biology since Darwin’s theory of 
natural selection (Queller 2001; Alonso and Schuck-Paim 2002). As a result, kin selection 
became the mainstream theory used to explain the evolution of eusocial insects in post-
Hamiltonian eusociality research (Bourke and Franks 1995; Foster et al. 2006; Abbot et al. 
2011). More importantly, the majority of authors followed Hamilton in conceptualising the 
evolution of eusociality as the evolution of BA (Starr 1979; Gadagkar 1990; Queller and 
Strassmann 1998; Wilson and Hölldobler 2005; Foster et al. 2006; Wilson 2008b; Ratnieks and 
Helanterä 2009; Abbot et al. 2011; Shimoji et al. 2018). For example, Ratnieks and Helanterä 
have pointed out that: 
 
The altruism of [eusocial] worker insects is often referred to as a Darwinian puzzle or 
paradox. How can natural selection, which normally favours the evolution of traits that 
increase an organism’s reproduction, favour the reverse — foregoing reproduction. (Ratnieks 
and Helanterä 2009: 3170. Emphasis added). 
 
The use of the concept of BA is so widespread in post-Hamiltonian eusociality research that it 
has resulted in an apparent conceptual monism for the description of the behaviour of the non-
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reproductive castes. Which, in turn, has led to the view that BA is a fundamental problem for 
eusociality research; i.e. the evolution of eusociality necessarily requires the evolution of BA. 
 
 Recently, J. H. Hunt (2007: 183-187) has challenged the claim that the concept of BA 
is a fundamental problem for eusociality research. He argued that, in fact, the widespread use 
of BA has impeded eusociality research because it has led to important biological factors to be 
ignored, e.g. phenotypic plasticity. Moreover, Hunt argued that BA is just one of multiple ways 
to conceptualise the non-reproductive castes, which is supported by the fact that the concept 
did not become widespread until after Hamilton introduced his theory of kin selection. On the 
other hand, F. L. W. Ratnieks and colleagues (2011), have argued that the concept of BA is a 
fundamental problem for eusociality research, but this went relatively unnoticed until the 
important work of J. B. S. Haldane (1932), Hamilton (1964a, 1964b, 1972), J. Maynard Smith 
(1964), and more. 
 
Thesis objectives and methods 
 
The aim of this thesis is to provide a critical analysis of the use of the concept of BA within 
eusociality research from a historical and philosophical perspective. Specifically, I will assess 
the following questions: 
 
A. Is the concept of BA a correct description of the behaviour of the non-reproductive 
castes in eusocial insect colonies? 




To do so, firstly, I will review the history and current state-of-the-art of the concept of BA and 
its use within eusociality research. Specifically, I will assess when and why the concept became 
so widespread within eusociality research, as well as the effect it has had on the field. In the 
first three chapters, I will challenge the following three common-place claims from the 
literature about the concept of BA and eusociality research: 
 
(1) That BA is a fundamental issue in eusociality research 
(2) That BA has been a fundamental issue in eusociality research since Darwin 
(3) That Darwin discussed and/or developed the concept of BA and its associated 
paradox 
 
Claim (1) represents the current mainstream view that the evolution of eusociality necessarily 
requires the evolution of BA. I will challenge the philosophical and empirical groundings for 
this claim, in chapter 3, in order to assess whether the concept of BA is a correct description of 
the behaviour of the worker castes. But before that, in chapters 1 and 2, it will be helpful to 
address the history of the concept in chapters 1 and 2. Claims (2) and (3) are historical claims 
that are often employed in order to justify claim (1), thus challenging this claims will 
undermine the historical grounding for the current widespread use of the concept of BA in 
eusociality research. Moreover, by assessing the history of the use of BA within eusociality 
research I will also assess whether the widespread use of the concept has been problematic for 
the field. For example, whether the mainstream conceptualisation of the evolution of 
eusociality as the evolution of BA led to the decline of viable alternatives, such as parental 
manipulation theory, or the superorganism. 
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 Furthermore, the concept of BA primarily an evolutionary concept; it denotes a trait 
that causes a fitness cost to the bearer and fitness benefits to individuals it interacts with. It is 
a concept that suited the gene-centrism of the Modern Synthesis. In other words, the fact that 
BA could potentially describe a set of behaviours that appear to be contrary to the logic of 
natural selection, in terms of fitness consequences, was appealing to authors. The concept 
became widely used due to the success of kin selection theory. The widespread use of the 
concept of BA, in turn, led to the prominence of evolutionary approaches to the study of 
eusociality; the debate between kin selection and group selection as the best explanation for 
the evolution of BA in eusocial insects. However, whilst the evolutionary aspects of eusocial 
insect colonies are important (e.g. the transition from selection of reproductives to selection of 
colonies) the physiological/ontogenetic aspects are as equally important. For example, the 
relations and interactions between the members of the colony are important to understand the 
proximate causes for the functional integration that enables colony selection. Therefore, the 
aim of this thesis is not to argue against evolutionary approaches to the study of eusociality. 
Instead, the aim of the thesis is to provide an argument against the current widespread use of 
the concept of BA within the field. 
 
 Consequently, finally in chapters 4 and 5, I will assess in more detail the colonies-as-
individuals arguments, namely the superorganism.  I will argue that the superorganism, which 
was once very prevalent in the field, saw a radical decline due to the widespread use of the 
concept of BA. It has seen a recent resurgence due to the emergence of new group selection 
and research into the evolutionary derived (or complex) eusocial species. But currently the 
superorganism is also approached from an evolutionary perspective only — group selection is 
used to assess whether colony selection occurs within a species. In other words, authors argue 
that if a colony is the unit of selection then it is an evolutionary individual; i.e. a superorganism. 
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This is due to the prevalence of evolutionary approaches, i.e. kin selection and group selection, 
in eusociality research in general. However, the superorganism was originally also used from 
a physiological perspective. I will, therefore, develop an organizational approach — namely, 
the hierarchical-organizational approach — for the explanation of the functional/ontological 
aspects of colony organization, with the aim of providing further evidence against the 
widespread use of the concept of BA. Specifically, by using representative case studies of three 
eusocial insect species, I aim to show that there is no evidence that the behaviour of the workers 
is a case of BA. 
 
 Eusociality was once thought to be limited to insects, such as ants, bees, termites and 
wasps, but it has recently been discovered in a few other species such as naked mole rats and 
some shrimp (Duffy 1996; Wilson and Hölldobler 2005). However, I will focus on eusocial 
insects because, not only is eusociality much more prevalent in insects (Wilson 2008b), they 
have historically been the primary focus of eusociality research. 
 
Overview of chapters 
 
I will begin, in chapter 1 — Altruism and eusocial insects: a brief history, by reviewing the 
history of the concept of BA and eusociality research. The aim of this chapter is to trace the 
history of the concept of BA and to assess when and why this concept became so widespread 
within eusociality research. In other words, I will critically assess claim (2), ultimately arguing 
that it is incorrect. In section 1, I will review the history of the concept of BA. I will show that 
it was developed in 1932 by Haldane but I will argue that its associated paradox did not become 
apparent until the 1960s, due to the levels of selection debate. In section 2, I review the history 
of the concept of BA within eusociality research. I will argue that the concept did not become 
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widely used until the 1960s as a result of the groundbreaking theory of kin selection developed 
by Hamilton. I will assess why Hamilton applied kin selection theory to eusocial insects. I will 
argue that he applied kin selection to eusocial insects because he rejected the colonies-as-
individuals argument, which was previously prevalent. I argue that Hamilton rejected the 
colonies-as-individuals argument because he already considered eusocial insects as examples 
of BA. I will argue that Hamilton applied the concept of BA to eusocial insects due to the 
Sturtevant-Hamilton problem of sterility. I argue that the concept of BA became so widespread 
within eusociality research due, in part, to a lack of re-assessment of the Sturtevant-Hamilton 
problem of sterility. I do so by comparing the use of the concept of BA in pre- and post-
Hamiltonian eusociality research. I conclude by arguing that the widespread use of the concept 
of BA is problematic for eusociality research for multiple reasons, which I explore in later 
chapters. Mainly, it led to a conceptual monism and lack of research into alternatives (chapters 
3, 4, and 5), some of which were prevalent prior to Hamilton. Moreover, it has led to inaccurate 
historiographies of the field (chapter 2), and multiple definitions of the concept in use (chapter 
5), both of which reinforce the widespread use of the concept. 
 
 In chapter 2 — Biological altruism: history justified by theory, theory justified by 
history, I will critically assess claim (3) — that Darwin discussed and/or developed the concept 
of BA. I will argue that, not only is this claim inaccurate, but that it is the result of the current 
widespread use of the concept of BA. I begin, in section 1, by reviewing Darwin’s argument 
for the evolution of morality in The Descent of Man, and his treatment of the evolution of 
eusociality in On the Origin of Species, both of which are typically cited by authors who argue 
for claim (3). I argue that Darwin’s concept of morality is not the same as the concept of BA. 
More importantly, Darwin’s “special difficulty” with eusocial insects was not the concept of 
BA; instead, this “special difficulty” referred to the problem of how individuals that do not 
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reproduce (the worker castes) evolved physiological and behavioural traits that are different to 
the reproductive castes. Thus, I will argue that Darwin did not discuss or develop the concept 
of BA (even under an alternative name). I then assess why claim (3) emerged, and argue that 
it was a result of the current conceptual monism of BA. In other words, because of the current 
mainstream view that evolution of BA is necessary for eusociality to evolve, many authors 
typically view the history of eusociality research from the same perspective. To further support 
this argument, in section 2, I will argue that Darwin’s solution to the “special difficulty” and 
his argument for the evolution of eusociality are also invoked by authors in the current debate 
over the evolution of eusociality. Specifically, some authors have claimed that Darwin argued 
for group selection, whereas others have claimed that it was an early version of kin selection 
via worker BA. However, I argue that, not only are both interpretations inaccurate, but that 
they have the effect of adding historical weight to current theoretical perspectives. 
Consequently, I conclude that, within post-Hamiltonian eusociality research, current 
theoretical perspectives have affected historical claims on the concept of BA and, in turn, the 
resulting inaccurate historical claims have been used by researchers in order to justify their 
current theoretical perspectives. 
 
 In chapter 3 — Evolutionary theories of eusociality: is BA fundamental?, I will assess 
the current role of BA in eusociality research. Specifically, I will assess claim (1) — that BA 
is a fundamental problem for eusociality research. In section 1, I address some definitional 
issues with the concept of BA. I will argue that the focus on the explanatory models of BA (kin 
selection and group selection), and a lack of focus on the concept itself, has led to multiple 
definitions in use. Firstly, I argue the “weak BA” (the definition preferred in group selection 
models) is not true BA because it defines the fitness consequences relatively — with respect 
to the focal individual’s group. Even though weak BA reduces the fitness of its bearer within 
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its group, it can only evolve by increasing the absolute fitness of its bearer (via group selection), 
thus it is a form of mutualism rather than true BA. Secondly, I argue that the mainstream 
definition, preferred by kin selection theorists, is potentially vacuous because it defines BA in 
terms of fitness consequences alone: a trait that causes negative selection to the focal individual 
and positive selection to individual(s) that it interacts with. However, I argue that other traits, 
particularly coercion, could also fit this definition; coercion could cause negative selection on 
the focal individual and positive selection to another (i.e. the coercer). Therefore, I will propose 
a definition of BA with the added clause that the cause of the fitness consequences must derive 
from a trait possessed by the focal individual. In section 2, I will review the mainstream theories 
for the evolution of eusociality, kin selection and group selection (MLS2), and the role of BA 
within them. Specifically, I will examine whether the concept of BA (according to the 
definition I propose) is necessarily required by either of the theories to explain eusociality. 
Additionally, I will assess if there is any evidence to support the application of BA to 
eusociality. I will argue that only kin selection is applicable with the concept of BA, whereas 
group selection is only compatible with weak BA. But, I will highlight that there is a lack of 
empirical evidence to support the application of BA to the non-reproductive castes, in fact, 
recent evidence supports the alternative claim that offspring are coerced into the non-
reproductive worker castes via parental manipulation. Thus, I will argue, similarly to Hunt, that 
the concept of BA is not a fundamental problem for eusociality research, contrary to claim (1). 
Moreover, that in fact, current evidence suggests that it is an incorrect description of the non-
reproductive castes. 
 
 In chapter 4 — The superorganism: from the past to the present, I will assess in more 
detail an alternative to the concept of BA, namely the superorganism argument. Specifically, I 
will review the history and current state-of-the-art of the superorganism concept. Due to certain 
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organizational properties — such as the reproductive division of labour, extreme cooperation, 
polymorphism, etc. — eusocial insect colonies have long been considered as biological 
individuals in their own right. I will highlight how the concept of the superorganism was 
originally approached from an evolutionary and a physiological perspective. In other words, it 
was used to argue that eusocial insect colonies are higher-level biological individuals in the 
fullest sense of the term. I will then assess the decline of the concept in the 1960s, highlighting 
the prominent role of kin selection and the concept of BA in its decline. I will then introduce 
the notion on eusociality complexity spectrum. This is the notion that there is qualitative 
differences in colony organization across eusocial insects; whereby in the large colonies of the 
most complex species (typically the evolutionary derived species), colony organization and 
cohesiveness are the result of a network of interactions among the members. I then argue that 
research into complex eusocial insects, as well as the emergence of new group selection, led to 
the revival of the superorganism in post-Hamiltonian eusociality research. However, the 
concept is currently understood using an evolutionary perspective of biological individuality. 
Consequently, today the concept is used to denote colonies that are units of selection; i.e.  
evolutionary superorganisms. Finally, I will assess why the superorganism is no approached 
from a physiological perspective of biological individuality, as was done so historically. I will 
argue that this is the result of the problem of hierarchy. It is often presupposed that top-down 
hierarchical control does not occur in the large colonies of the most complex eusocial insect 
species. Thus, this led to the mainstream view that colony cohesiveness is the result of flat self-
organization in complex species. As a result, current explanatory approaches that focus on the 
physiological and proximate causes for colony cohesiveness (i.e. the actual organization) are 
centred around the concept of self-organization — which I will refer to as the self-organization 
(SO) approach. Finally, I will conclude that whilst the evolutionary notion of the 
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superorganism is useful, particularly for an etiological perspective, it cannot assess the 
organizational differences across colonies of different species. 
 
 Consequently, in chapter 5 — Revising the superorganism: the hierarchical-
organizational approach to complex eusociality, I will argue the presupposition that 
hierarchical control does not occur in the large colonies of complex eusocial insects needs to 
be reassessed. I argue that this claim should be assessed theoretically and empirically rather 
than assumed a priori. To do so I will develop an alternative organizational approach (the 
hierarchical-organizational approach) that assesses if there is hierarchical organization within 
complex colonies, that “modulates” (i.e. regulates and controls on) the self-organized dynamics 
within the colony system; i.e. this approach will be able to assess if colony organization is the 
result of self-organization only or also and mainly due to hierarchical regulation and control. I 
will also argue that this approach would be better suited to assess the issue of whether complex 
eusocial insect colonies should be considered biological individuals or not. This is because if 
there are colonies with hierarchical organization then an argument can be made that the colony 
is in “control” rather than the insects that instantiate it, i.e. the colony organization is not solely 
the result of self-organization but a higher-level organization that exerts top-down control on 
its parts. In other words, if there is evidence of hierarchical-organization within colonies of 
eusocial insects, then this would be evidence for the superorganism from a physiological-like 
perspective, as well as an evolutionary perspective of biological individuality. In section 1, I 
review a recent physiological approach to colony individuality, namely the “social 
physiological” approach. I argue that whilst the “social physiology” approach is interesting, it 
may not be suitable for assessing the different types of individuality at the colony level across 
eusocial insects because it focuses primarily at the genetic level. Consequently, I further 
develop the hierarchical-organizational approach in order to assess the types of colony 
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individuality across species of eusocial insects. In section 2, I apply this approach to three 
representative case studies from across the eusocial insect complexity spectrum: Megalopta 
genalis, Vespula vulgaris, and Apis mellifera. Finally, in section 3, I assess the different types 
of colony individuality, if applicable, in the three case studies. I conclude that it is likely that 
colonies of the most simple eusocial insect species (e.g. M. genalis), that exhibit facultative 
eusociality, are not superorganisms in any sense. Colonies of species in the mid-range of the 
complexity spectrum (e.g. V. vulgaris), are likely to be evolutionary superorganisms because 
they are units of selection, but not physiological-like superorganisms because they exhibit only 
a minimal form of hierarchical-organization. But colonies of the most complex species (e.g. A. 
mellifera) are likely to be superorganisms in the fullest sense, i.e. evolutionary and 
physiological-like individuals, due to their hierarchical-organization. In section 4, I will 
highlight how the superorganism argument provides a further evidence against the claim that 
the non-reproductive castes in eusocial insects are example of BA. 
 
 Finally, in the conclusions, I will summarise how I addressed the main research 
questions within the thesis: has the widespread use of BA been problematic for eusociality 
research? Is BA the correct description of the non-reproductive castes? I will show that the 
widespread use of BA has been problematic for eusociality research. Firstly, because the 
widespread use of BA led to inaccurate historiographies of the concept. Many authors have 
often viewed the history of eusociality research to be centred around the problem of BA, due 
to the current conceptual monism of BA in post-Hamiltonian eusociality research. I argued that 
this is not only a problem of historical accuracy, the claim that BA has been a fundamental 
problem for eusociality research since Darwin had the effect of reinforcing the current 
widespread use of the concept. Moreover, the widespread use of the concept of BA, and the 
subsequent inaccurate historiographies of eusociality research, led to a lack of focus on possible 
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alternatives. Alternatives such as the superorganism, coercion, parental manipulation, 
phenotypic plasticity, etc. should receive more attention by current researchers. The conceptual 
monism of BA was also problematic because it resulted in multiple definitions of the concept 
in use. Because of the view that BA was necessarily required for the evolution of eusociality, 
authors typically altered the concept to fit their theoretical models rather than seeking 
alternatives. Not only has the widespread use of the concept of BA been problematic for 
eusociality research, I will conclude that it is likely to be an incorrect description of the 
behaviour of the non-reproductive castes. I argue that only kin selection is compatible with the 
concept of BA that I proposed; group selection is only compatible with weak BA, which is a 
form of mutualism, not BA. However, I argue that there is a lack of evidence that eusociality 
evolved due to worker BA. Recent evidence supports the parental manipulation perspective; 
that eusociality evolved due to parental coercion. Furthermore, based on the findings in chapter 
5 – where I developed the hierarchical-organizational approach (HO) to assess the development 
and maintenance of the actual organization within colonies – I will argue that it is clear that 
members of the colony develop into the non-reproductive worker role due to coercion and 
hierarchical control; they do not do so because of a trait that they possess (i.e. BA) that causes 
them to attempt to increase their inclusive fitness by becoming non-reproductive workers. 
Finally, I will address some implications of this thesis. 
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Biological altruism (BA) is generally understood as a trait that causes an individual to benefit 
others at a cost to itself, whereby the costs and benefits are measured in terms of fitness 
consequences (Okasha 2013). Today, the concept of BA is widely used within evolutionary 
biology, sociobiology and particularly eusociality research. Eusociality is defined as colonies 
consisting of overlapping generations (more than one), cooperative brood care, and a 
reproductive division of labour where non-reproductive workers help the reproductive 
members (Wilson and Hölldobler 2005: 13367; Sherman et al. 1995; Crespi and Yanega 1995). 
It is commonly argued that the non-reproductive castes of eusocial colonies are the most 
extreme examples of biological altruism because they do not reproduce their own offspring, 
but they help others to do so (Gadagkar 1990; Cronin 1991; Hamilton 1996; Lehmann and 
Keller 2006). BA is paradoxical for evolutionary theory, however, because a trait that causes a 
cost to its bearer should not be selected for under natural selection (Gadagkar 1990; Cronin 
1991). Thus, because the worker castes of eusocial colonies typically never reproduce and work 
for the benefit of the reproductives within their colonies, they are often viewed as strong 
examples of this paradox; how did the worker castes evolve if they do not reproduce? The use 
of the concept of BA within eusociality research is so widespread that the evolution of 
eusociality is often equated with the evolution of BA (Hamilton 1972; Starr 1979; Gadagkar 
1990; Queller and Strassmann 1998; Dugatkin 2002; Wilson and Hölldobler 2005; Foster et al. 
2006; Wilson 2008b; Ratnieks et al. 2011). This view has led to three independent but related 
claims, being made within the literature about BA and its role within eusociality research: 
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(1) That BA is a fundamental issue in eusociality research 
(2) That BA has been a fundamental issue in eusociality research since Darwin 
(3) That Darwin discussed and/or developed the concept of BA and its associated 
paradox 
 
Claim (1) is related to the main aim of this thesis — i.e. the challenge the widespread use of 
the concept of BA within eusociality research — and claims (2) and (3) are used to give 
historical weight to claim (1). Consequently, it will be useful to critically explore claims (2) 
and (3) in order to assess the historical groundings for the current widespread use of BA within 
eusociality research. Therefore, in this chapter and the next, I will explore claims (2) and (3) 
in order to provide a stronger argument against claim (1) throughout this thesis. 
 
 The aim of this chapter is to trace the history of the concept of BA and to assess when 
and why this concept became so widespread within eusociality research. In other words, I will 
critically assess claim (2), ultimately arguing that it is incorrect. I will begin, in section 1, by 
providing a history of the concept of BA, when it emerged, and how it differs from the original 
psychological notion of altruism. In doing so, I will also highlight how the concept of altruism, 
within biology, went from a general term used for social behaviour that was interchangeable 
with cooperation and morality to what we know today as biological altruism, which is 
essentially about fitness costs and benefits. I will argue that the BA paradox did not emerge 
until at least the 1960s, due to the debate over the levels at which natural selection can operate 
(the levels of selection debate). It was only after the emergence of this paradox that BA became 
a major problem for evolutionary biology, a problem highlighted by W. D. Hamilton. Then, in 
section 2, I will argue that the widespread use of BA within eusociality research was ultimately 
due to the influence of Hamilton and his groundbreaking theory of kin selection. Firstly, I will 
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assess why Hamilton applied kin selection to eusocial insects, and argue that he did so not just 
because of the debate over the levels of selection, as is commonly claimed, but also because he 
rejected previous ideas of eusocial colonies as a form of biological individuality. Importantly, 
I will show that Hamilton rejected the colonies-as-individuals argument because he already 
viewed the non-reproductive worker castes as examples of BA prior to developing kin 
selection. Thus, I will then assess why Hamilton applied the concept of BA to eusocial insects, 
and I will argue that he did so because of the Sturtevant-Hamilton problem of sterility. Finally, 
I will argue that the concept of BA became so widespread in eusociality research due, in part, 
to an uncritical assessment of the Sturtevant-Hamilton problem of sterility. I will do so by 
comparing the use of the concept of BA in pre- and post-Hamiltonian eusociality research. I 
argue that the widespread use of the concept of BA was problematic because it led to a lack of 
focus on possible alternatives, such as parental manipulation. 
 




The term altruism was coined by the French philosopher August Comte, and his colleagues, in 
the 1830s (Allee et al. 1949). Its meaning then was what is considered today as psychological 
or vernacular altruism, which is the common-sense meaning of the word. Psychological 
altruism, in this sense, denotes unselfish (or disinterested) behaviour or the concern for the well 
being of others (Sober 1988). This meaning of altruism is necessarily related with intentionality 
and not with the outcomes of behaviour, i.e. regardless of the outcome, if someone intended to 
do well for another then that is altruism (Sober 1988). 
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 The concept of altruism was initially rarely used in biology. On the rare occasions that 
it was used, it was intended to mean something like cooperation, i.e. to denote behaviours that 
were social, as opposed to selfish or egoistic behaviours (Geddes and Thompson 1889; Headley 
1900; Wheeler 1911; Patten 1920; Kellogg 1922: 57). This could be because altruism, in the 
original sense from Comte, was about the intention to do good for another and therefore was 
understood from a psychological perspective. But in biology, behaviours were generally 
considered instinctive and not discussed in psychological terms (expect in rare cases, see 
Darwin 1874; Geddes and Thompson 1889; Patten 1920. Or for certain human behaviour, see 
Headley 1900; Kellogg 1922). The concept of altruism did not, therefore, initially gain 
widespread usage within biology. 
 
1.1.2. Biological altruism 
 
When J. B. S. Haldane (1932) talked of sociality his focus was on traits that are beneficial to 
society but costly to the individual that bears them: 
 
It can be shown mathematically that in general qualities which are valuable to society 
but usually shorten the lives of their individual possessors tend to be extinguished by 
natural selection in large societies unless these possess the type of reproductive 
specialisation found in social insects. (Haldane 1932: 130). 
 
In the case of the social insects there is no limit to the devotion and self-sacrifice which 
may be of biological advantage in a neuter. (Haldane 1932: 207-208. Emphasis added). 
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Both of the above quotes highlight why Haldane (1932: 131, 207-210) used the term ‘altruism’: 
because he was specifically referring to an extreme form of cooperation that causes an 
individual to benefit its group/society at a cost to itself, i.e. the extreme ‘self-sacrifice’ of 
individuals for others. In a section entitled ‘Socially Advantageous but individually 
Disadvantageous Characters’, Haldane (1932: 207-210) provided an argument for how such 
“self-sacrificing” altruistic behaviours could evolve under natural selection. However, in 
focusing on this type of extreme cooperation and referring to it as altruism, Haldane 
inadvertently created a concept that was distinct from psychological altruism. Whereas 
psychological altruism is to do with the conscious intentions behind the behaviour, the 
biological altruism (BA) that Haldane developed is about the cost and benefits of instinctive 
behaviour (Sober 1988, 1994; West et al. 2007). 
 
 Additionally, what the quotes above from Haldane show is that, from its beginning, 
eusocial insects were the main example of BA. This is because the worker castes (i.e. non-
reproductive castes) in eusocial colonies help the reproductive ones, but they do not reproduce 
their own offspring. Therefore, they were described by Haldane (1932: 207-210) as being 
completely devoted to the colony at the expense of their own reproductive fitness. However, 
Haldane appeared to imply that this type of “altruism”, in eusocial insects, is not a problem for 
evolution because of the reproductive division of labour: 
 
In a beehive the workers and young queens are samples of the same set of genotypes, so 
any form of behaviour in the former (however suicidal it may be) which is of advantage 
to the hive will promote the survival of the latter, and thus tend to spread through the 
species. (Haldane 1932: 208). 
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In other words, the workers can afford to sacrifice themselves because of the reproductives 
reproducing their kind for them, due to the reproductive division of labour in the colony. Even 
though Haldane used the term ‘same set of genotypes’ here, I do not think he argued that the 
members of the colony are genetically identical, but rather that they are closely related and all 
products of the same reproductives, namely, they share very similar genotypes. 
  
 It is often claimed that Darwin discussed and/or developed the concept of BA (claim 
3), which if true would mean that the concept is much older than Haldane’s work. Firstly, it is 
often claimed that Darwin (1859: 175-180) considered eusocial insects as a serious problem to 
his theory of natural selection because workers do not reproduce but help the reproductive(s) 
to do so — i.e. BA — (Cronin 1991; Ratnieks et al. 2011). However, this claim is incorrect, 
Darwin actually considered eusocial insects as a serious challenge to his theory because of the 
polymorphism that has evolved among the non-reproductive castes (Richards 1981, 1983; Hunt 
2007: 183-187; Ratnieks et al. 2011). In other words, Darwin initially found it difficult to 
explain the fact that, despite not being able to reproduce, workers in some species have evolved 
to be morphologically distinct to the reproductive castes. However, Darwin did not consider 
the fact that some workers do not reproduce to be a serious issue (Richards 1981, 1983; Prete 
1990). Secondly, it is also claimed that Darwin’s (1874: 129-183) discussion of the evolution 
of morality in humans is analogous to the more recent discussion of the evolution of BA 
(Wilson and Wilson 2007). However, this is also an incorrect reading of Darwin; the concept 
of morality employed by Darwin is more similar to psychological altruism rather than 
biological altruism (chapter 2). In the next chapter I will argue in more detail that Darwin did 
not discuss and/or develop the concept of BA. In doing so, I will also explore how such claims 
about Darwin are used in order to add historical weight to current theoretical perspectives. 
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1.1.3. The BA paradox and the levels of selection debate 
 
The concept of BA is, by definition, paradoxical for evolutionary theory (Cronin 1991; Sober 
1994; Alonso and Schuck-Paim 2002; Wilson and Wilson 2007; Chancellor 2015); how can a 
trait that causes a long-term cost to its bearer evolve? The paradoxical nature of BA did not 
become apparent, however, until around the 1960s, as I will now explain. Initially, most non-
individualistic or social behavioural traits were grouped under the broad concept of cooperation 
and not seen as a problem for evolutionary theory (Allee et al. 1949). It has been argued that 
the costs of cooperative traits were not correctly taken into account because many biologists 
held the now outdated good-for-the-species view (Cronin 1991: 174-183). According to this 
view, adaptations are for the benefit of the species as well as the individual (Allee et al. 1949: 
602-605). As a result, potentially costly traits, e.g. BA, are not problematic and can still evolve 
so long as they benefit the species, even if they cause a cost to their bearer. Consequently, many 
traits that are now considered to be examples of BA, such as alarm calling in vervet monkeys 
(and many bird species), or food sharing in vampire bats, etc., were considered as examples of 
regular cooperation (Cronin 1991). As a result, initially the concept of BA was not widely used 
by biologists after its inception. 
 
 Furthermore, when the concept of BA was used, authors employed the theory of (old) 
group selection to argue for its evolution (Sturtevant 1938; Williams and Williams 1957). 
Original proponents of group selection argued that selection between groups can explain the 
evolution of potentially costly cooperative traits (Hamilton 1963; Wilson and Wilson 2007). 
Even though BA causes a cost to its bearer, it also causes its bearer to benefit others. If those 
benefits are directed to the bearer’s group, the group will then collectively benefit from the trait 
(BA) even though it is costly to the individual. Consequently, groups with more altruists will 
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be more successful than groups with less altruists, due to the increased group-benefits in the 
former. In other words, it was argued that even though BA is costly for its individual bearer, it 
is good for the group. 
 
 It is interesting to note at this point that J. B. S. Haldane (1932: 207-210) argued that 
the evolution of his concept of BA is likely only possible in eusocial insects precisely because 
of their reproductive division of labour (Huxley 1942: 482). Haldane explored the possibility 
of BA evolving within groups where all members reproduce, i.e. groups that do not have a 
reproductive division of labour, but seemed to conclude that BA would be unlikely to evolve 
in this scenario: 
 
When we pass to small social groups where every individual is a potential parent, matters 
are complicated. (Haldane 1932: 208) 
 
But it is hard to see how such behaviour [BA] could become congenitally fixed in a 
species which did not practise reproductive specialisation [reproductive division of 
labour]. (Haldane 1932: 131). 
 
Haldane, then, also used group selection to argue for the evolution of BA, but he argued that 
BA would only successfully evolve in specific types of groups — i.e. those with reproductive 
specialisation (e.g. eusocial colonies). 
 
 Thus, initially, the paradoxical nature of BA was not made apparent by authors because 
of 1) the good-for-the-species view, which argued traits evolved for the good of the species as 
well as the good of individuals, and 2) the use of group selection as an argument for the 
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evolution of BA. However, in the 1960s these ideas began to be challenged, and a major debate 
emerged over the levels at which natural selection can operate, i.e. individual versus group 
selection — which is commonly referred to as the levels of selection debate (Cronin 1991; 
Wilson and Wilson 2007; Chancellor 2015). Compelling arguments were made against the 
efficacy of group selection as a cause of evolutionary change (Hamilton 1963; Maynard Smith 
1964; Williams 1966; Wilson and Wilson 2007). For example, it was argued that inter-group 
selection, although theoretically possible, was unlikely to be evolutionary significant because 
intra-group selection (individual selection in the classical sense) operates at a higher tempo and 
would undermine inter-group selection (Hamilton 1963; Wilson and Wilson 2007). As a 
consequence, any form of higher-level selection was widely rejected by biologists (Cronin 
1991; West et al. 2007). This meant that it was no longer possible to explain the evolution of 
BA by appealing to group selection. Consequently, if group selection cannot explain the 
evolution of BA, then this concept becomes a major issue for evolutionary biology: for a trait 
to evolve by natural selection if must confer a fitness benefit (or at least no cost) to the 
individual, so how can a trait that causes a long-term fitness cost to the individual evolve? This 
line of argument was not only applied to BA; cooperative behaviours in general began to be 
considered a problem for evolutionary biology (Cronin 1991). Any behaviour that does not 
directly benefit the individual itself is potentially costly, therefore seems to contradict natural 
selection (Hamilton 1963). 
 
 In response to the initial rejection of group selection, W. D. Hamilton (1963, 1964a, 
1964b, 1972, 1975, 1996) developed his hugely influential inclusive fitness theory, which 
provided an answer to the evolution of cooperation and BA that was based on individual 
selection not group selection. The key observation by Hamilton (1963, 1964a) was that the 
degree of genetic relatedness between full-siblings is on average the same as it is between 
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parent and offspring, i.e. full siblings are just as likely to share specific genes as are parent and 
offspring. Therefore, he argued that individuals may do just as well investing energy and 
resources aiding their siblings (cooperation) as they would by aiding their offspring (parental 
care). This principle is what Hamilton (1964a) referred to as inclusive fitness. Specifically, 
inclusive fitness refers to the sum of an individual’s direct and indirect fitness — where direct 
fitness equals the individual’s success in personal reproduction, and indirect fitness equals ‘the 
component of fitness gained from aiding the reproduction of related individuals’ (West et al. 
2007: 416). Hence the name “kin selection” given to this theory by J. Maynard Smith (1964). 
 
 Hamilton (1964a, 1964b) argued that the evolution of BA can be explained by his 
inclusive fitness model. A main component of the inclusive fitness model is what is now 
referred to as Hamilton’s rule (Birch and Okasha 2015). Hamilton’s rule is defined as rb > c 
— where r equals the coefficient of relatedness, b the benefit to the recipient, and c the cost to 
the focal individual (Birch and Okasha 2015). Following Hamilton’s rule, BA can evolve via 
natural selection if the cost to the focal individual is outweighed by the benefit to close 
relatives; rb > c. In other words, even though BA causes a long-term fitness cost to the focal 
individual, the gene for this trait can evolve in the population if the trait is differentially 
expressed, the benefits are directed at closely related individuals, and furthermore, the benefits 
to the relatives are significantly greater than the cost to the focal individual (for more details 
and different conceptions of the rule see Birch and Okasha 2015). Hamilton’s focus on the 
concept of BA led to more attention being paid to the concept by biologists, as a result, the 
concept of BA became much more widely used within evolutionary biology from the 1960s 
(Barash 1992; Hunt 2007). 
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 The levels of selection debate did not dissipate, however, and it continues to be an 
important debate within evolutionary biology (West et al. 2008; Wilson 2008a; Nowak et al. 
2010; Abbot et al. 2011; Wilson and Nowak 2014; Birch and Okasha 2015). This is because, 
around the 1980s, authors once again argued for higher level selection and new forms of group 
selection (Damuth and Heisler 1988; West et al. 2007; Reeve and Hölldobler 2007; Wilson and 
Wilson 2007; Gardner and Grafen 2009). In the new approach, the idea of group selection 
differed markedly from old group selection. Old group selection argued that when selection 
occurs at the group level, traits evolve for the good of the group, i.e. selection does not occur 
below the level of the group when the group becomes the unit of selection (West et al. 2007). 
Whereas, new group selection was based on the notion of multi-level selection (MLS), i.e. the 
idea that selection occurs at multiple levels simultaneously: e.g. at the levels of the gene, cell, 
cell aggregate, multicellular organism, group, population, etc. MLS is based on the Price 
equation, which divides gene frequency change within a population into within- and between-
group selection dynamics (Wilson and Wilson 2007; West et al. 2008). This idea was used to 
argue that high degrees of cooperation within groups would lead to a higher degree of between-
group selection compared to within-group selection. 
 
 But multi-level selection theory is not only used to argue for group selection, instead 
MLS, in its basic form, is the claim that selection takes place at multiple levels simultaneously. 
Indeed, Hamilton (1975) incorporated MLS into kin selection theory when addressing group 
effects on individual fitness across the entire population, with the use of the Price equation 
(Wilson and Wilson 2007; Wilson 2008a).1 As a result, MLS is generally divided into two 
forms. MLS1 is used to track the effects of group-living on individual fitness, whereas MLS2 
 
1 Hamilton also worked closely with G. Price when the latter developed the Price equation (Hamilton 
1996). 
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is used to argue for group selection by assessing the degree of between-group selection 
compared to within-group selection (Damuth and Heisler 1988). But even though MLS is now 
a mainstream part of evolutionary theory — the Price equation is often used to formalise kin 
selection models — group selection (MLS2) is still a contested idea (West et al. 2008; Wilson 
2008a; Birch and Okasha 2015). Group selection is particularly popular within eusociality 
research, however, due to B. Hölldobler, E. O. Wilson, and colleagues, and their work on 
colony selection within different species (Reeve and Hölldobler 2007; Wilson and Hölldobler 
2009; Hamilton and Fewell 2013; Wilson and Nowak 2014). 
 
 In sum, kin selection and group selection are seen by authors as the only theories 
capable of explaining the evolution of BA (Hamilton 1964a, 1964b; Sober 1988; Okasha 2013). 
Authors initially considered that the only way to explain its evolution was by using old group 
selection, or good-for-the-species, arguments, due to the cost of BA to the individual that bears 
the trait. When old group selection was rejected, Hamilton (1964a, 1964b) provided a 
groundbreaking solution based on individual selection (i.e. kin selection). However, with the 
emergence of MLS and new group selection, a debate has continued between authors over the 
best explanation for the evolution of BA (Nowak et al. 2010; Abbot et al. 2011; Okasha 2013). 
Thus, the levels of selection debate — i.e. kin selection versus group selection (MLS2) — 
continues on in evolutionary theory. 
 
 Importantly, it was not until the emergence of the levels of selection debate in the 1960s 
that the paradoxical nature of BA became apparent. Since then, the main focus has been on 
explaining how such a paradoxical trait could evolve under natural selection, with much less 
focus paid to the concept itself and its application to specific cases; i.e. is it a correct description 
of the behaviour of the non-reproductive castes in eusocial insect colonies? Indeed, because 
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the concept of BA is so widely applied to the non-reproductive castes of eusocial insect 
colonies, authors have had to solve the BA paradox in order to explain the evolution of 
eusociality. As a consequence, kin selection and group selection are the current mainstream 
evolutionary theories of eusociality (Alonso and Schuck-Paim 2002; Hölldobler and Wilson 
2009; Ratnieks et al. 2011; Wilson and Nowak 2014). In the next section I will explore in more 
detail the history behind the widespread use of the concept of BA within eusociality research. 
 
1.2. Hamilton, eusociality and the concept of BA 
 
Today, Hamilton’s kin selection theory is a fundamental element of evolutionary theory 
(Bourke and Franks 1995; West et al. 2008). It is considered as one of the most important 
developments in evolutionary biology since Darwin’s theory of natural selection (Queller 
2001; Alonso and Schuck-Paim 2002). Kin selection theory profoundly changed the study of 
cooperative and social evolution. Indeed, within eusociality research kin selection is the 
mainstream evolutionary theory, and in this respect, Hamilton has left a huge legacy. But, as 
above, group selection is becoming increasingly popular among authors, and the debate 
between kin selection and group selection is ongoing. As a result, any recent, or major, 
historiography of eusociality research focuses on the levels of selection debate (see for 
example: Wilson and Sober 1989; Cronin 1991; Hölldobler and Wilson 2009). Additionally, 
as I will show below, due to the influence of Hamilton’s theory of kin selection, the concept of 
BA has been widely used in eusociality research since around the 1960/70s. This is because 
Hamilton applied the concept of BA to the behaviour of the non-reproductive castes in eusocial 
insects, and used kin selection to explain their evolution. Due to the huge success of kin 
selection, many subsequent authors conceptualised the evolution of eusociality as the evolution 
of BA, following Hamilton. 
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 It is often claimed that Hamilton applied the theory of kin selection and the concept of 
BA to eusociality due to the levels of selection debate (Cronin 1991; Price et al. 2011). In other 
words, because Hamilton developed kin selection due to the rejection of group selection, it is 
assumed that he applied the theory, and the concept of BA, to eusocial insects for the same 
reason; i.e. non-reproductive workers are biologically altruistic, and they evolved because their 
inclusive fitness is better increased by helping the reproductive(s) rather than attempting to be 
solitary reproductives themselves. However, I argue that (i) the reason why Hamilton applied 
kin selection to eusociality and (ii) the reason why he applied the concept of BA to eusociality 
should be investigated independently. This is because conceptualising the evolution of 
eusociality as the evolution of BA is not a necessary consequence of applying kin selection to 
evolutionary studies of eusociality. For instance, coercion and parental manipulation are also 
compatible with kin selection and are viable alternatives that could be applied to the 
reproductive division of labour in eusocial insect colonies; i.e. the non-reproductive castes 
could have evolved due to parental coercion rather than BA. Thus, it cannot be assumed that 
Hamilton applied the concept of BA to eusocial insects because of his principle of inclusive 
fitness. In this section I will assess both (i) and (ii). 
 
1.2.1. Why did Hamilton apply kin selection to eusociality? 
 
W. D. Hamilton (1963, 1964a, 1964b) developed his theory of kin selection as a general theory 
for the evolution of cooperation (including BA) and sociality because of his initial rejection of 
group selection. However, I will now argue that Hamilton applied kin selection to eusociality 
for more specific reasons. Firstly, Hamilton rejected the theories that colonies are like 
individuals, that were so prevalent before the 1960s (as I will show below); secondly, he 
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already considered the non-reproductive worker castes of eusocial insects as examples of BA 
prior to developing kin selection. 
 
In what sense can the self-sacrificing sterile ant be considered to “struggle for existence” 
or to endeavor to maximize the numbers of its descendants? Since the founding of the 
theory of evolution by natural selection, most biologists have evaded this question by 
focusing attention exclusively on the colony as the reproducing unit. (Hamilton 1972: 
193. Emphasis added). 
 
This quote points to the fact that, for the specific case of eusociality, Hamilton argued for kin 
selection because he doubted a previous argument that eusocial insect colonies are biological 
individuals (or at least evolutionary individuals, see Pradeu 2016). The last sentence in the 
quote from Hamilton, above, points to this. By using the term “the reproducing unit” Hamilton 
is referring to the argument, proposed by A. Weismann (1909: 32-36), R. A. Fisher (1930: 180-
187), and others, that I will refer to as the “germ-soma” argument. The claim, using the “germ-
soma” argument, is that in the special case of eusocial insects, the colony is the individual 
under selection due to the reproductive division of labour. In other words, it was argued that 
eusocial colonies are evolutionary individuals because they are units of selection. When 
authors presently make the argument that eusocial colonies are evolutionary individuals, they 
are typically making the claim that colonies are groups that are units of selection using group 
selection (for example see Hölldobler and Wilson 2009). However, unlike these present 
arguments, the “germ-soma” argument was simply the claim that individual selection in the 
classical sense can be applied to the colony (or at least to the reproductives only) because of 
the reproductive division of labour. Thus, I refer to this earlier argument using the term “germ-
soma” in order to distinguish it from the more recent evolutionary approaches to the notion that 
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colonies are like individuals, which are based on group selection and MLS (Hölldobler and 
Wilson 2009; Haber 2013. See also chapters 4 and 5). 
 
 Weismann (1909: 35-36) likened the reproductive division of labour to the germ-soma 
division in multicellular organisms. He argued that worker polymorphism, and other factors of 
eusocial colonies, could evolve because selection affects the “germ-cells” (genomes) of the 
reproductives via the success of the colony. In other words, the non-reproductive castes evolve 
by selection affecting the reproductives in the colony, just as somatic cells evolve via selection 
affecting the germ cells in multicellular organisms (Fisher 1930: 180-187). My claim that the 
“germ-soma” argument is not a form of group selection and is separate from the levels of 
selection debate is further supported by the fact that in R. A. Fisher’s (1958: 49-50, 199-205) 
second edition of The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection, in which he argued against any 
form of group selection or good-for-the-species arguments, he still made the similar argument 
as Weismann that eusocial colonies are a form of biological individual (or at least analogous 
to one) due to the reproductive division of labour: 
 
The selection in this case must act exclusively upon the reproductive insects via the 
prosperity of the society from which they arise; and although the effect of such selection 
may be to modify only the sterile workers, this presents no more difficulty than that a 
selection acting exclusively upon the gametes of a sheep, via the observable 
characteristics of the animal which bears them, should modify the nature of its wool. 
(Fisher 1958: 201). 
 
Indeed, the idea of classifying eusocial insect colonies as some form of biological individuality 
has a long history (see Wheeler 1911, 1928; Emerson 1939: 181), and the argument based on 
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the reproductive division of labour by Weismann and Fisher, above, can be traced back to 
Darwin (1859:175-180).2 It is this line of reasoning that Hamilton challenged when he applied 
his theory of kin selection to eusocial insects: 
 
There is powerful precedent for this [arguing for the colony as a reproducing individual]. 
Darwin himself took this course. He saw only a “minor” difficulty in the evolution of 
sterility, and he passed over it in a few lines as he proceeded to discuss the “great” 
difficulty of how the special aptitudes of the workers could be passed on in latent form 
by their fertile sisters […]. A difficulty over sterility exists, nevertheless […]. Soon 
Mendelian genetics resolved Darwin’s difficulty of latency […]. But the disappearance 
of this problem does not seem to have given greater prominence to the other, and the 
question of how worker sterility comes to be selected continued to receive only 
occasional comment for a long time. (Hamilton 1972: 193. Emphasis added). 
 
Certainly, Hamilton (1972: 193-195) admitted that eusociality represents a major problem for 
evolution by natural selection. But unlike Darwin (1859: 175-180), Hamilton argued that this 
major problem was not how the non-reproductive castes could evolve to be different to the 
reproductive castes when they do not directly reproduce; in fact, he argued that this problem is 
solved by Mendelian genetics, that were not available to Darwin. For Hamilton (1972), the 
major evolutionary problem of eusociality was the evolution of sterility (i.e. the non-
reproductive castes). However, for Hamilton, the prominence of the “germ-soma” argument 
led to the issue of sterility to be obscured. 
 
 
2 I will address the colonies-as-individuals arguments in later chapters (4 and 5) of my thesis. I will 
address Darwin’s argument in chapter 2. 
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 Hamilton was well versed in the biology of eusocial insects (Emlen 2001). He argued 
that aspects such as polygyny (multiple queens), polyandry (multiply-mated queens), and 
worker reproduction, within colonies highlight the problem of the “germ-soma” argument: 
 
If [polygyny, polyandry or worker reproduction] is true of any, we have a difficulty for 
the common view (supported, as we have seen, by Darwin) that selection in social insects 
is entirely an intercolony matter. (Hamilton 1972: 194. Emphasis added). 
 
It is clear from this quote that Hamilton argued that evidence of polyandry, polygyny, or worker 
reproduction in any species of eusocial insects undermines the strength of the “germ-soma” 
argument in general. This is because, as above, the “germ-soma” argument claimed that 
colonies are evolutionary individuals — i.e. individual selection can be applied to eusocial 
insect colonies just as it can be applied to individual organisms. But, for Hamilton, genetic 
homogeneity was important for individuality; i.e. genetic homogeneity would decrease the 
potential for internal competition. Hamilton (1964b: 25) only allowed for a form of colony-
individuality when colonies are made up of clones (or at least a high degree of genetic 
relatedness), because in this case they would be genetically homogenous and the potential for 
conflict is very low, which is highlighted in his argument for multicellular organisms as 
“colonies” formed of clones:3 ‘This is borne out well enough by the behaviour of the clones 
which make up the bodies of multicellular organisms’. But, even though relatedness is high 
within typical eusocial insect colonies they are not genetically homogeneous, rather, the genetic 
relationships are more like that within families; for example, in typical monogynous colonies 
 
3 Indeed, elsewhere, Hamilton (1972: 198-199) even spoke of the concept of the superorganism — 
albeit in brief and without a proper explanation — when he discussed the case of inbreeding within 
long-lived termite colonies, which potentially increases the degree of relatedness almost up to the 
level of multicellular organisms, which could lead to very low conflict among the parts. However, he 
did not expand on the point and did not appear to argue for the superorganism theory. 
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the queen is the mother to all of the colony members and the workers are all full-siblings. 
Furthermore, factors such as polyandry, polygyny, and worker reproduction further reduce 
genetic relatedness within colonies. Therefore, the fact that there are eusocial insect species 
that have evolved, and are maintained, despite features that reduce genetic relatedness, 
convinced Hamilton that something other than colony selection is occurring. In other words, 
because colonies with polyandry, polygyny, or worker reproduction have reduced relatedness, 
they cannot be considered as evolutionary individuals, according to Hamilton (1964b, 1972), 
and therefore, the “germ-soma” argument does not apply to them. Moreover, Hamilton (1972) 
argued that the fact that some species have evolved despite the lack of colony selection (i.e. 
those with reduced genetic relatedness due to polyandry, for example) undermines the “germ-
soma” account for the evolution of eusociality more generally. Specifically, if those species 
with polyandry, etc., can be explained without the need to appeal to colony selection, then 
Hamilton argued that there is no need to appeal to colony selection to explain the evolution of 
any species of eusocial insects. 
 
 Consequently, Hamilton (1964b, 1972) argued that a better solution is to apply kin 
selection theory to the evolutionary studies of eusociality. He argued that kin selection can 
explain the evolution of eusociality better than the “germ-soma” argument can. Broadly, 
Hamilton argued that relatedness was a key factor for the evolution of eusociality, but not the 
only one, the other key factor was the altruistic workers. For instance, Hamilton (1972: 206) 
argued that even though individuals in some species of aphid colonies are clones (and so 
genetically identical), they have not evolved eusociality due to certain aspects of their biology 
(i.e. because they are ‘sedentary sap-feeders’, they have no need for more complex 
behaviour/cooperation). Whereas in eusocial insects, the need for more complex cooperation 
was present from the beginning. For instance, many species require extended parental care, 
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build complex nests, or defend the colony collectively. In termites, there is a high need for 
cooperation because individuals require symbiotic gut-microbiota to digest the cellulose in 
their diets, but every time they moult (undergo ecdysis) they lose their gut microbiota and, 
therefore, rely on other members of their colony to regain them, via trophallaxis (Nalepa 2015). 
There are many more examples like this in all eusocial insect species, thus Hamilton argued 
that because of these factors workers would achieve a higher inclusive fitness by staying in the 
colony and helping rather than not doing so — despite the fact that this will decrease their 
direct fitness. So, for Hamilton (1972), kin selection could explain the existence of cooperation 
and cohesiveness within eusocial colonies in spite of the possible factors that could undermine 
them (polygyny, worker reproduction, etc.), whereas the “germ-soma” explanation could not. 
 
 It is important to note at this point that polyandry and polygyny are now known to only 
be present in evolutionary advanced species that are obligately eusocial, thus they are likely to 
be derived traits that evolved after eusociality evolved within the species (Oldroyd and Fewell 
2007; Crozier 2008; Hughes et al. 2008; Boomsma 2009). Therefore, although these factors 
reduce genetic relatedness within colonies, they are likely not to be factors that cause selection 
against eusociality. Moreover, in certain contexts these factors can actually be beneficial to 
colony cohesion and maintenance; e.g. improved disease resistance (Cremer et al. 2007; 
Wilson 2008b). I will address this further in chapter 3. 
 
 In sum, Hamilton (1972) argued that the use of the “germ-soma” argument led to the 
problem of sterility to be missed, or at least not fully appreciated, because its focus on inter-
colony selection and reliance on the analogy between colonies and organisms. This is important 
for Hamilton because he considered the evolution of non-reproductive castes as the most 
serious evolutionary problem posed by eusocial insects. This is because he believed that the 
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non-reproductive worker castes are examples of BA. Therefore, I argue, that the main reason 
Hamilton rejected the “germ-soma” argument was because he already viewed the non-
reproductive workers of eusocial insect colonies as examples of BA. But why did Hamilton 
apply the concept of BA to eusocial insects? I will explore this in more detail next. 
 
1.2.2. Why did Hamilton apply BA to eusociality? 
 
In the early days I was continually being told that there was no such thing as altruism 
[…]. I badly needed examples, therefore, where both self-sacrifice and the limits to it 
were indisputable. [Eusocial] insects became one of my main examples. (Hamilton 1996: 
20). 
 
Hamilton first became interested in BA during his undergraduate studies and he began his PhD 
with the aim of providing an explanation, within the framework of the Modern Synthesis, for 
the evolution of BA (Hamilton 1996: 11-30; Segerstrale 2013: 45-77). During his 
undergraduate studies Hamilton (1996: 22-23) was heavily influenced by J. B. S. Haldane’s 
(1932) original argument for the concept of BA, as well as work by R. A. Fisher. Indeed, the 
early part of Hamilton’s career was devoted to providing a mathematical explanation for BA 
(Hamilton 1996). The quote above highlights that from an early stage Hamilton considered the 
non-reproductive worker castes of eusocial insects as one of the main examples of BA. In this 




 Sturtevant (1938), like Hamilton, challenged the “germ-soma” explanation for the 
evolutionary origins of eusociality. He argued that the “germ-soma” argument is unable to 
explain the origin of the non-reproductive castes: 
 
The sterile castes of [eusocial insects] have, therefore, developed a character that is 
[unfavourable] by definition. It is sometimes argued that in this special case the rule still 
holds, since here the colony, rather than the individual insect, is the unit in terms of 
natural selection, and it may be supposed that the colony produces more offspring as a 
result of the division of [labour] associated with the sterile castes. It is clear, however, 
that all the social insects have arisen from solitary forms in which the sterile caste was 
absent […]. It follows that evolution must have resulted in an increase of sterile 
individuals. At some point in the history of the race there must have been a change from 
the individual to the colony basis of selection. Unless this change be supposed to have 
been a sharp one and to have been associated from the first with the necessary genetic 
adjustment, there must have been an intermediate stage in which some element other than 
the strict operation of reproductive selection was effective. (Sturtevant 1938: 74. 
Emphasis added). 
 
Thus, as the quote above alludes to, Sturtevant argued that the “germ-soma” theory could not 
explain the origin of eusociality because it cannot explain the evolution of BA in the worker 
castes. 
 
 To see this, it will be useful to analyse Sturtevant’s (1938) argument in more detail. 




(i) Biologically altruistic (i.e. sterile) individuals can be maintained by natural selection 
in eusocial insects because the colony is the unit of selection, but; 
(ii) Eusocial insects evolved from solitary ancestors, so there must have been a switch 
from individual selection to colony selection, however; 




(iv) There must have been an intermediary stage in which there was an increase in sterile 
individuals prior to colony selection. 
 
Thus, according to this argument, the evolution of non-reproductive individuals must have 
occurred in the absence of between-colony selection. Consequently, not only is this an 
argument against the “germ-soma” theory, since the “germ-soma” theory relies on colony 
selection to explain the evolution of the non-reproductive castes; more importantly, it also 
entailed, for Sturtevant, that BA must have existed before the evolution of eusociality. Or, the 
evolution of eusociality required the evolution of BA. This is because Sturtevant (1938) argued 
that the non-reproductive castes of eusocial insects are biologically altruistic because they are 
working for the colony but do not reproduce — i.e. they “give-up” reproduction for the benefit 
of the colony. Sturtevant also claimed that this was not considered to be problematic, because 
the colony is the unit of selection due to the reproductive division of labour; as was argued by 
Haldane (1932: 207-210).4 However, according to the sterility problem, since eusocial insects 
 
4 Authors who argued for the “germ-soma” theory did not explicitly describe the non-reproductive 
castes as altruistic. This is because they viewed the worker castes as parts of a larger whole (the 
colony) and were thus not under direct selection. 
 41 
evolved from solitary ancestors, colony selection must have occurred after the non-
reproductive worker castes evolved. But this posed a problem; namely, how can these 
individuals evolve if they do not reproduce? Under natural selection, traits typically evolve if 
they confer a positive fitness benefit on their bearer, but in this case the workers are not 
reproducing and thus have a trait that causes a negative fitness consequence. And because the 
workers are also helping their parent, they must be biologically altruistic. Accordingly, for 
Sturtevant, this implied that the evolution of eusociality required the evolution of BA. 
 
 As I highlighted above, like Sturtevant, Hamilton considered the major evolutionary 
problem of eusociality to be the evolution of the non-reproductive castes, which he referred to 
as the sterility problem. Indeed, Hamilton (1973: 193) appeared to be heavily influenced by 
Sturtevant’s (1938) sterility argument: ‘Sturtevant […] outlined [the problem of sterility] with 
admirable clarity’. Like Sturtevant, Hamilton argued that the evolution of eusociality required 
the evolution of “sterile” individuals, which he considered a major problem for evolutionary 
theory, because the problem of sterility implies that the evolution of eusociality requires the 
evolution of BA. Thus, both Sturtevant (1938) and Hamilton (1972) conceptualised the 
evolution of eusociality as the evolution of BA, due to the problem of sterility. Sturtevant’s 
(1938) solution to the BA paradox in eusocial insect evolution was that selection operates at 
multiple levels in eusocial insects; at the individual, colony, and at the population level. In 
other words, according to Sturtevant, selection between individual insects, between colonies 
(within a geographical area), and between populations of colonies, led to the evolution of 




The sacrifice of reproductive function by a worker social insect is a case of altruism to 
which [inclusive fitness] can be applied. (Hamilton 1972: 197. Emphasis added). 
 
 However, the Sturtevant-Hamilton problem of sterility does not necessarily entail that 
BA had to be involved in the evolution of eusocial insects. Specifically, BA is not necessarily 
required for the non-reproductive castes to evolve prior to colony level selection (conclusion 
(iv)). For example, the non-reproductive castes could have evolved due to coercion from the 
parent(s) (i.e. parental manipulation; see below and chapter 3), whereby a female coerces some 
of her brood into becoming workers whilst also inhibiting them from reproducing. And in fact, 
in the more evolutionary basal eusocial insect species, that have small colonies (only tens of 
individuals or less), worker reproduction is typically inhibited by the queen via aggression 
(Ronai et al. 2016: 281-282). For example, the queen can physically inhibit the reproductive 
potential of workers by eating worker laid eggs or evicting reproductively active workers. 
Moreover, in the more derived species, worker reproductive potential is inhibited by coercion 
by the colony, via pheromones or policing (Hölldobler and Wilson 2009; Shimoji et al. 2018; 
see also chapter 5). 
 
 Despite this, Hamilton (1964b, 1972) still argued that the worker castes do not 
reproduce (i.e. are “sterile”) because they are altruistic. Later, Hamilton (1996: 361) did admit 
that his enthusiasm for BA led him to under-appreciate the role of parental manipulation, and 
other forms of coercion (e.g. worker policing), in the reproductive division of labour. 
Nevertheless, he still argued that the evolution of non-reproductive worker castes must have 
involved some BA on the part of the workers: ‘Yet I am certain that an “altruistic” willingness 
to be manipulated is also a factor’ (Hamilton 1996: 361). And in fact, Hamilton spent a 
significant period of his life pursuing and developing an explanation for the evolution of BA 
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(Queller 2001; Segerstrale 2013). Consequently, this could have influenced his continued 
enthusiasm for describing eusocial insect workers as altruistic in the twilight of his career, 
despite the increasing evidence for coercion (I will address this recent evidence in chapter 3). 
 
 In post-Hamiltonian eusociality research, however, the main focus has been on the 
levels of selection debate; i.e. the explanatory models of kin selection and MLS (see Cronin 
1991; West et al. 2008; Wilson 2008a; Hölldobler and Wilson 2009; Birch and Okasha 2015). 
In comparison, there was relatively little focus on the concept of BA and its use within 
eusociality research. In particular, the Sturtevant-Hamilton problem of sterility, which inspired 
Hamilton to apply the concept of BA to eusocial insects, has received almost no attention by 
subsequent authors. For example, in their recent monograph, B. Hölldobler and E. O. Wilson 
(2009: 17-18) referenced Sturtevant’s (1938) paper, but instead of discussing how he 
formulated the evolution of sterility/BA in eusocial insects, they focused on his MLS solution 
to the problem. Consequently, the fact that the evolution of the non-reproductive castes, and 
by extension eusociality, does not necessarily require BA, even according to the Sturtevant-
Hamilton problem of sterility, went relatively unnoticed. As a result, alongside the success of 
kin selection, the use of the concept of BA flourished and became widespread in eusociality 
research. To highlight this, I will review the use and role of BA, as well as alternatives to it, in 
pre- and post-Hamiltonian eusociality research. 
 
1.2.3. BA in pre-Hamiltonian eusociality research 
 
Prior to the introduction of kin selection by Hamilton in the 1960s, the concept of BA was 
rarely applied to eusocial insects. As above, when Haldane (1932) developed the concept, he 
argued that eusocial insects are likely to be the only possible example of BA. Sturtevant (1938) 
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used the concept (without specifically using the term “altruism”) to describe eusocial workers. 
The concept of BA was also used to describe eusocial workers (as well as many other examples, 
e.g. cells within multicellular organisms) by W. C. Allee and colleagues (1949: 599, 683-695). 
However, they also supported the good-for-the-species view, i.e. old group selection, and so 
did not consider BA paradoxical. G. C. Williams and D. C. Williams (1957) applied the concept 
— also without using the term “altruism”, but instead, that of “social donor” — to eusocial 
workers in their argument for group selection. However, G. C. Williams (1966) was one of the 
main protagonists of the levels of selection debate, and he later rejected most forms of MLS 
(West et al. 2008). But, apart from these authors, the majority of researchers did not apply the 
concept of BA to eusocial insects. 
 
 I will now review some alternative concepts that were used to explain the non-
reproductive castes in eusocial insects pre-1960s. However, this is not an exhaustive review 
since the field of eusociality research is extremely large. 
 
 Colonies-as-individuals: Many authors argued that eusocial insect colonies are a form 
of biological individual (Weismann 1909; Wheeler 1911, 1928; Fisher 1930; Bodenheimer 
1937; Sturtevant 1938; Richards 1953; for more information, see Emerson 1939). The colonies-
as-individuals perspective included the “germ-soma” argument (see 1.2.1.), which did not 
employ the concept of BA. Another interesting variant of the conception of colonies-as-
individuals was the notion of the superorganism. This was first applied to eusocial insects by 
W. M. Wheeler (1926; 1928). Unlike the “germ-soma” approach, which argued that colonies 
are individuals from an evolutionary perspective (i.e. classical selection operates on colonies 
rather than the individual insects due to the reproductive division of labour), early versions of 
the superorganism approached the colonies-as-individuals view from a physiological 
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perspective (Wheeler 1928; Emerson 1939, 1952). By focusing on the actual organization of 
colonies, the superorganism approach argued that colonies were higher-order individuals with 
analogous properties to prototypical organisms (Wheeler 1928; Emerson 1939, 1952).5 The 
superorganism approach did not describe the behaviour of the non-reproductive castes as BA 
because the non-reproductives were considered parts of the colony superorganism. Wheeler 
(1911: 325), who was the prominent figure in the early superorganism approach, did on 
occasion use the term “altruism”, but he did so to refer to cooperation rather than BA, as it is 
currently understood. Elsewhere, Wheeler (1928: 309-312) also discussed traits that could be 
seen as similar in definition to BA (i.e. socially beneficial traits) but he did not define them as 
individually costly in terms of fitness. Instead, Wheeler (1928: 309-312) argued that eusocial 
insects exhibit “trophic” or “regressive” traits, such as sterility, polymorphism, reduced size, 
and many more, because the colony is an emergent whole, i.e. a superorganism. Thus, in the 
superorganism perspective during this period, the concept of BA was not applied to the non-
reproductive workers because they were considered to be lower-level parts in a higher-level 
biological individual. 
 
 Dominance: Another alternative to the concept of BA was that of dominance. J. B. Free 
(1955), and colleagues (Free et al. 1969), argued that dominance hierarchies exist in eusocial 
insect colonies, with the reproductives at the top, and that this led to the evolution of the 
reproductive division of labour and thus to eusociality. They argued that in smaller, more 
simple, eusocial colonies dominance based on aggression creates and maintains the division of 
labour. For example, the workers are prevented from reproducing by physical aggression from 
the queen, or even more dominant workers (worker policing). If the queen is removed, or when 
 
5 However, today the superorganism argument is typically approached from an evolutionary 
perspective using MLS (Wilson and Sober 1989; Haber 2013). In chapter 4, I will explore in more 
detail historical and present notions of the superorganism. 
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the queen starts to lose her ability to dominate, due to old age for example, the more dominant 
workers will start to oviposit (Free et al. 1969). Hamilton (1964b; 1972) referenced the work 
by Free and colleagues, appealing to it as evidence against the “germ-soma” argument; he 
argued that their work highlighted the type of internal conflict within colonies that would 
undermine the individuality at the colony level. 
 
 But Hamilton did not address the fact that these authors claimed that the workers are 
coerced by the queen rather than giving up reproduction due to BA. For example, in some 
species of bumblebees, during the late stage of the colony life cycle when the queen starts to 
senescence and lose control over workers, the queen and some reproductively active workers 
physically fight over egg production, with both parties eating each other’s eggs or guarding 
comb cells from each other (Free et al. 1969). This shows that workers are not biologically 
altruistic, and given the chance, they will try to oviposit. In other words, the fact that the 
workers do not reproduce could be because of external inhibition by the reproductive rather 
than because of BA. This is not to say that Hamilton is wrong to claim that kin selection can 
explain this queen-worker aggression, but rather that Hamilton could be wrong in applying the 
concept of BA to the workers in this case. But I will expand more on this point in chapter 3. 
 
 Free (1955) argued that physical dominance is only likely to be possible in small 
colonies, whereas in larger colonies with thousands to millions of insects physical dominance 
would be almost impossible, in these latter species dominance is likely to be maintained by 
pheromonal signals. Physical dominance hierarchies, for Free, might be the basis for the 
evolution of eusociality but as organizational complexity (e.g. polymorphic castes) evolved 
within species, such as in honey bees (Apis mellifera), dominance via pheromonal signals 
 47 
would also evolve. Dominance appears to be a forerunner of the “parental manipulation” theory 
proposed by Alexander (1974), below. 
 
 Food sharing: Others argued that eusociality evolved due to the increasing complexity 
of food sharing, or trophallaxis (Nixon and Ribbands 1952; Ribbands 1953). Ribbands (1953) 
argued that trophallaxis creates a social medium — which was first argued for by Wheeler 
(1928) — that is the basis of colony organization. Ribbands (1953) argued that the first worker 
castes, in the evolution of eusociality, could have emerged due to the queen underfeeding a 
subset of her brood. The targeted brood, which were underfed, would develop into smaller/less 
fecund adults, for example, and therefore be inclined to remain in the nest as workers rather 
than disperse and attempt to become solitary reproductives. As eusociality evolved, workers 
themselves could become involved in the control of brood nutrition, i.e. workers could take 
over from the queen in feeding brood differentially according to whether workers or queens 
were required by the colony. Finally, further organizational complexity could have evolved in 
some species via adult-adult worker trophallaxis (for example, Ribbands argued that worker-
worker trophallaxis within colonies allows for an added layer of organizational complexity 
because it enables information about food supplies, among other things, to be shared between 
colony members). Elsewhere, Ribbands (1953: 205) did use the term “altruism”, but he did so 
in order to denote psychological altruism, rather than biological altruism, when he discussed 
the evolution of ethics; he did not apply the concept of BA to eusocial insects. 
 
1.2.4. BA in post-Hamiltonian eusociality research 
 
Thus, the concept of BA was rarely used in eusociality research prior to Hamilton, as I 
highlighted above. But ever since Hamilton (1964a, 1964b, 1972) conceptualised the evolution 
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of eusocial insects as the evolution of BA, and used kin selection to explain their evolution, the 
concept became the mainstream description of the behaviour of non-reproductive castes. 
Consequently, many authors subsequently conceptualised the evolution of eusociality as the 
evolution of BA, as the selected quotes below allude to: 
 
Social insects […] provide the most extreme forms of altruism. (Gadagkar 1990: 113. 
Emphasis added). 
 
The eusocial insects […] exhibit biological altruism. (Bourke and Franks 1995: 37. 
Emphasis added). 
 
Kin-selection has thrived in the explanation of a wide variety of biological phenomena, 
chiefly the evolution of biological altruism as that found in sterile castes of eusocial 
insects. (Alonso and Schuck-Paim 2002: 6843. Emphasis added). 
 
The major features of insect societies that fascinate biologists are the self-sacrificing 
altruism expressed by colony members, the complex division of [labour], and the 
tremendous plasticity demonstrated in the face of changing environments. (Page Jr. and 
Erber 2002: 91. Emphasis added). 
 
Indeed most of the extreme cases of altruism are found within families such as in social 
insects. (Lehmann and Keller 2006: 1370. Emphasis added). 
 
Thus, while only 2% of known insect species are eusocial, these species compose most 
of the insect biomass’… ‘Why, then, has eusociality been so rare? The answer is that it 
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requires collateral altruism, which is [behaviour] benefiting others at the cost of the 
lifetime production of offspring by the altruist. (Wilson 2008b: 17. Emphasis added). 
 
Discussions about caste evolution in termites have been mostly focused on the evolution 
of altruistic help. (Roisin and Korb 2011: 156. Emphasis added). 
 
It has even led to somewhat contradictory statements, such as the following: 
 
[Recent] results show that workers are frequently coerced into acting altruistically. 
Hence, the altruism seen in many modern-day insect societies is not voluntary but 
enforced. (Ratnieks and Wenseelers 2008: 45. Emphasis added). 
 
Recent studies suggest that this reproductive altruism in workers is, to a large extent, a 
trait enforced by worker policing. (Shimoji et al. 2018: 2. Emphasis added). 
 
Kin selection was a groundbreaking theory and came to be widely regarded as a fundamental 
aspect of evolutionary theory (Queller 2001; Alonso and Schuck-Paim 2002; West et al. 2008). 
Consequently, the majority of research focused on working out the theoretical details of kin 
selection, as well as finding empirical support for the theory in the form of sex-ratio conflicts, 
policing, etc. (Queller and Strassmann 1998; Queller 2001 — see also Chapter 5). In 
comparison, relatively little focus was paid to the theoretical and empirical groundings for the 
application of the concept of BA to eusocial insects. In particular, little attention has been paid 
to the reason why Hamilton applied the concept, namely the Sturtevant-Hamilton problem of 
sterility. This is problematic, I argue, because it led to the widespread use of the concept of BA 
within post-Hamiltonian eusociality research. 
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 As I argued above, the Sturtevant-Hamilton problem of sterility does not necessarily 
entail that BA is required for eusociality to evolve, it only entails that the non-reproductive 
castes evolve. This could happen due to the workers being altruistic but, importantly, it could 
also happen due to another cause, such as coercion for example. However, this point has gone 
relatively unnoticed due to the lack of focus on the problem of sterility, as argued for by 
Sturtevant (1938). Moreover, the renewed focus on the problem of sterility by Hamilton 
(1964b, 1972) led to a predominate focus by later researchers on explaining the evolution of 
eusociality from the perspective of the workers. In other words, attempting to explain how 
some individuals evolved to become non-reproductive workers became the key to explaining 
the evolution of eusociality, as the quotes above highlight. Thus, the majority of authors, 
following Hamilton, described the non-reproductives as biologically altruistic and 
conceptualised the evolution of eusociality as the evolution of BA: 
 
The altruism of worker insects is often referred to as a Darwinian puzzle or paradox. How 
can natural selection, which normally favours the evolution of traits that increase an 
organism’s reproduction, favour the reverse — foregoing reproduction. (Ratnieks and 
Helanterä 2009: 3170. Emphasis added). 
 
 It could be argued that despite Hamilton and the problem of sterility, the concept of BA 
would still have become prevalent due to the emergence of the Modern Synthesis and the 
consequent gene-centred approach to evolutionary theory. In other words, individualistic 
approaches, like kin selection, became prevalent due to the rejection of old group selection and 
the resultant levels of selection debate. Thus, more emphasis was placed on explaining the 
evolution of eusociality from the perspective of the individuals within the colony. Colonies-as-
 51 
individuals arguments, such as the superorganism, began to wane around the 1960s, as I 
highlighted above (for more details, see chapter 4). Additionally, the Modern Synthesis led to 
a gene-centred view of evolution around the same period (Cronin 1991; West et al. 2008). 
Consequently, individual traits were typically explained from a genetic perspective, e.g. an 
individual has trait X because of gene x, and this gene evolved because X causes a fitness benefit 
to its bearer. Thus, it could be argued that the worker trait — not reproducing and working for 
the colony — is due to a gene possessed by the workers, namely a gene for BA. Indeed, 
eusociality researchers typically explained the evolution of non-reproductive castes as the 
evolution of a ‘gene for altruism’, i.e. a gene that causes a personal cost to its bearer but also 
causes it bearer to benefit close relatives — who are likely to share the gene — (Hölldobler 
and Wilson 2009: 21-24; Ronai et al. 2016: 255-256). 
 
 Whilst the levels of selection debate, and the gene-centred approaches, undoubtedly 
influenced the popularity of the concept of BA in post-Hamiltonian eusociality research, they 
cannot be the only causes. This should be made clear by the fact that coercion is also compatible 
with such gene-centred approaches. For example, the reproductive division of labour could 
have evolved due to a gene that encodes a trait which enables an individual to coerce some of 
her offspring into becoming non-reproductive workers. However, alternatives such as this were 
not given the same amount of attention that the concept of BA received, I argue, because a lack 
of analysis on the Sturtevant-Hamilton problem of sterility. Which is evidenced by the almost 
universal conceptualisation of the evolution of eusociality as the evolution of BA in post-
Hamiltonian eusociality research. 
 
 Indeed, the use of the concept of BA to describe the non-reproductive castes has rarely 
been questioned since Hamilton’s introduction of kin selection. The exception to this being the 
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theory of parental manipulation (Alexander 1974; Michener and Brothers 1974; Charnov 1978; 
Alonso and Schuck-Paim 2002; Hunt 2007; Kapheim et al. 2015). Parental manipulation was 
first introduced by R. D. Alexander (1974), then again shortly after by C. D. Michener and D. 
J. Brothers (1974). Parental manipulation, according to these authors, argued that eusociality 
could evolve if a reproductive was capable of coercing some of her offspring into becoming 
non-reproductive workers. If the resultant colony was more successful than the non-eusocial 
solitary alternative, then eusociality would be selected for. However, these early approaches 
still employed the concept of BA to describe the trait of the non-reproductive castes. 
 
 Michener and Brothers (1974) argued that it was likely that a mix of parental coercion 
and worker BA led to the evolution of eusocial insects, a view which Hamilton later shared, as 
I highlighted above. A few years later, E. L. Charnov (1978) argued for a version of parental 
manipulation that did not involve BA. Charnov argued parental coercion, but not worker BA, 
would be enough for the evolution of eusociality. He argued that if reproductives developed 
the ability to coerce some of their offspring into becoming non-reproductive workers this 
would be selected for (for more details of Charnov’s argument see chapter 3 — 3.2.1.). And 
more recently some authors have begun to explore the parental manipulation approach again 
(e.g. Alonso and Schuck-Paim 2002; Hunt 2007). In these lines, one study found evidence for 
parental coercion but no evidence for worker BA in a facultative eusocial bee — Megalopta 
genalis — (Kapheim et al. 2015). 
 
 However, apart from the above, authors rarely critically addressed the theoretical and 
empirical grounding for the use of BA in eusociality research. Instead, particularly within the 
debate over the evolution of eusociality, the focus was mainly on the explanatory models and 
the levels of selection debate, i.e. kin selection versus group selection (Cronin 1991; Wilson 
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and Wilson 2007; Hölldobler and Wilson 2009; Okasha 2014). As a result, not only did the use 
of the concept of BA become widespread within the field, but multiple conceptual issues 
emerged that remain unresolved. These issues, which I will address in greater detail in chapter 
3, include problems with defining the costs and benefits (i.e. short vs. long term, and relative 
vs. absolute), and a problem with the current definition that could render the concept vacuous. 
As a consequence, different explanatory models employed and/or defined the concept 
differently. For example, within MLS models the cost and benefits of BA are defined relatively, 
with respect to the group; i.e. BA causes its bearer to have a lower fitness within its group, but 
groups with more BA individuals would do better than predominately selfish groups (Sober 
1988; Wilson and Dugatkin 1992; Kerr et al. 2004; Wilson 2008a). Whereas in kin selection 
accounts the fitness consequences of BA are defined in terms of absolute fitness, i.e. with 
respect to the whole breeding population (West et al. 2007). Additionally, many authors, 
particularly within kin selection models, conceive of BA in terms of fitness consequences 
alone, and apply it to any cooperative traits that cause negative selection on the focal individual 
and positive selection on recipient individual(s) (Ratnieks and Wenseleers 2008; Foster 2009). 
This is due to the definition of BA from Hamilton’s (1964a) seminal papers on kin selection. 
However, this definition is problematic as it could describe multiple traits, such as worker BA 
and parental coercion; both traits would cause negative selection on the workers and positive 
selection on reproductives. Thus, the fitness consequences definition potentially renders the 
concept of BA vacuous. 
 
 In sum, the conceptual issues of BA that I just briefly described, are also factors in the 
continued widespread use of BA in eusociality research. Hamilton applied the concept of BA 
to eusocial insects because of the Sturtevant-Hamilton problem of sterility, and due to the 
success of kin selection and lack of assessment on the sterility problem, the concept of BA 
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became widespread in post-Hamiltonian eusociality research. As a result, the evolution of 
eusociality is almost universally conceptualised as the evolution of BA. Thus, the concept of 
BA became synonymous with the behaviour of the non-reproductive castes of eusocial insects. 
Similarly, the definition of BA was altered by different authors in order to fit their specific 
explanation of eusocial insects, rather than actually questioning the use of the concept of BA 
itself. 
 
 I have argued that the widespread use of the concept of BA to describe the non-
reproductive castes has negatively affected eusociality research. Moreover, I have argued that 
it may not be the correct description of the behaviour of the worker castes. These points will 
be the main focus of the rest of this thesis. For example, in chapter 2, I will argue that the 
uncritical use of the concept of BA also led to poor historiographies of eusociality research; 
many authors (post-Hamilton) have claimed that the BA of eusocial insects has been a problem 
for evolutionary biologists since Darwin, which I will show to be false. In chapter 3, I will 
explore current theories for the evolution of eusociality and the role of BA within them, i.e. 
whether BA is necessarily required by the theory and/or if there is empirical evidence for it. In 
chapter 4, I will show that one of the main alternatives to BA, the superorganism account, 
which was once so prevalent, radically declined in post-Hamiltonian eusociality research. 
Although it saw a revival, due to the emergence of new group selection, it is currently only 
employed from an evolutionary perspective of biological individuality, i.e. colonies as units of 
selection. Finally, in chapter 5, I will propose an organizational approach to the superorganism 
in order to argue that colonies of some species of eusocial insects can be considered as 
superorganisms in a physiological-like sense, as well as an evolutionary sense. I do so in order 
to provide a stronger argument against the current widespread use of BA within eusociality 
research; i.e. if a colony is a physiological-like superorganism then, consequently, the non-
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In this chapter I have argued that the concept of biological altruism, contrary to claim (2), is a 
relatively recent problem for eusociality research (and for evolutionary biology more 
generally). In section 1, I highlighted how the psychological notion of altruism, developed by 
A. Comte in the 1830s, differs from BA; with the former necessarily to do with intentionality 
and the latter with the cost and benefits of behaviour on individual fitness. Even though the 
concept of BA was developed in 1932 by J. B. S. Haldane, it did not emerge as a major problem 
for biology until at least the 1960s. This was primarily due to the levels of selection debate. 
With the initial rejection of any form group selection, BA could no longer be explained by the 
claim that it is beneficial to the group even though it is costly to its bearer. As a response to 
this, W. D. Hamilton developed his hugely influential theory of kin selection and inclusive 
fitness. Kin selection successfully explained how costly cooperation, such as BA, could evolve 
within the framework of the Modern Synthesis. Kin selection fundamentally changed how 
cooperation was studied. However, with the introduction of MLS, group selection ideas re-
emerged around the 1970/80s, and with this a major debate over kin selection versus group 
selection emerged (i.e. the levels of selection debate), which still continues to this day, even 
within eusociality research. 
 
 In section 2, I traced the history of the concept of BA within eusociality research. I have 
argued that the concept of BA did not become widely used until the 1960s, due to Hamilton 
and the groundbreaking theory of kin selection. It is commonly argued that Hamilton applied 
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the theory of kin selection and the concept of BA to eusociality due to the levels of selection 
debate. However, I argued that the reasons why Hamilton applied the theory of kin selection 
and why he applied the concept of BA to eusociality should be assessed independently. I argued 
that Hamilton applied kin selection to eusocial insects because he rejected the colonies-as-
individuals argument and because he already considered eusocial insects as an example of BA. 
I then assessed why Hamilton applied the concept of BA to eusocial insects. I highlighted that 
he did so because of the Sturtevant-Hamilton problem of sterility. Following Sturtevant, 
Hamilton conceptualised the evolution of eusociality as the evolution of BA. However, I 
argued that the Sturtevant-Hamilton problem of sterility does not necessarily entail that BA is 
required in order for eusociality to evolve. But due to a focus on the explanatory models, and 
a lack of re-assessment of the Sturtevant-Hamilton problem of sterility, this point went 
relatively unnoticed in post-Hamiltonian eusociality research, leading to the widespread use of 
the concept of BA. Finally, I argued that prior to Hamilton, the concept of BA was rarely 
applied to eusocial insects, instead alternatives such as the superorganism, dominance, food-
sharing, and more, were in use. Whereas in post-Hamiltonian eusociality research, the 
evolution of eusociality is widely conceptualised as the evolution of BA. 
 
 The widespread use of the concept of BA in post-Hamiltonian eusociality research was 
problematic as it led to a lack of focus on alternatives such as parental manipulation. This is 
problematic because, as I will show in chapter 3, recent evidence supports the fact that 
eusociality evolved due to parental coercion. In addition, I will argue in chapter 3 that a 
prominent focus on the explanatory models, rather than on the concept of BA itself, led to 
multiple definitions of the concept in use. 
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 In the next chapter, I will argue that the widespread use of the concept of BA was also 
problematic because it led to inaccurate historiographies of eusocial research (claims (2) and 
(3)). Not only is this problematic because it is historically inaccurate, but also, because it leads 
to a feedback effect that reinforces the uncritical use of the concept. This is because the claim, 
that BA has been a fundamental problem for eusociality research since Darwin, has the effect 
of adding considerable historical weight to current prominence of the concept. In other words, 
by claiming that one of the founding fathers of modern biology also found the concept of BA 
problematic, specifically with respect to the non-reproductive castes of eusocial insects, adds 
considerable historical weight to the current use of the concept. 
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Chapter 2 — Biological altruism: history justified by theory 




In the previous chapter I highlighted three common claims that are made about the concept of 
BA within eusociality research, namely: 
 
(1) That BA is a fundamental issue in eusociality research 
(2) That BA has been a fundamental issue in eusociality research since Darwin 
(3) That Darwin discussed and/or developed the concept of BA and its associated 
paradox 
 
I argued, in the previous chapter, that claim (2) is inaccurate. I highlighted the history of the 
concept of BA and argued that BA was only considered as a fundamental issue for eusociality 
research from at least the 1960s due to Hamilton and the theory of kin selection. Hamilton 
applied the concept of BA to eusocial insects due to the Sturtevant-Hamilton problem of 
sterility, and explained their evolution using kin selection. Due to the success of kin selection, 
and a lack of re-assessment of the Sturtevant-Hamilton problem of sterility, subsequent authors 
typically conceptualised the evolution of eusociality as the evolution of BA, following 
Hamilton. As a consequence, the use of the concept of BA became widespread in post-
Hamiltonian eusociality research. 
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 In this chapter I will focus on claim (3) and argue that it is also inaccurate. Moreover, 
I will argue that, within post-Hamiltonian eusociality research, current theoretical perspectives 
have affected historical claims on the concept of BA and, in turn, these historical claims have 
been used by researchers in order to justify their current theoretical perspectives. Or in other 
words, historiographies of BA have been affected by the present, but in turn, the present is 
justified, in part, by such historiographies. 
 
 I will begin, in section 2.1., by reviewing claims in the literature that Darwin discussed 
and/or developed the concept of BA and its associated paradox (claim (3)). When authors 
invoke claim (3), they typically do so in reference to Darwin’s argument for the evolution of 
morality in The Descent of Man and his treatment of the evolution of eusocial insects in On the 
Origin of Species. In section 2.1.1., I will assess Darwin’s argument from The Descent of Man 
and argue that his notion of morality is not equivalent to the concept of BA. In 2.1.2., I will 
then show that Darwin did initially consider eusocial insects to be an almost fatal problem for 
his theory of natural selection, but this was not because he considered them to be an example 
of BA, but instead because of the fact that the non-reproductive castes have evolved to be 
different to the reproductives, despite not directly producing their own kind — which he 
referred to as his “special difficulty” (Darwin 1859: 175). In 2.1.3. I will explore the cause of 
the inaccurate historical claims (2) and (3), arguing that these claims likely emerged due to the 
current widespread use of the concept of BA. Consequently, I will show that current theoretical 
perspectives have affected the historiography of eusociality research, and how in turn, this 
inaccurate historiography is used to justify current theoretical perspectives. Specifically, I will 
argue that the current widespread use of the concept of BA within eusociality research is 
supported, in part, by claims that Darwin also applied the concept to eusocial insects. 
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 Finally, in section 2.2., I will argue that Darwin is not only invoked in order to justify 
the current use of the concept of BA, but also by opposing camps in the debate over the 
evolution of eusociality. Specifically, within eusociality research, some authors have claimed 
that Darwin’s solution to his “special difficulty” was group selection, whereas others have 
claimed that Darwin’s solution was an early form of kin selection (and BA). Both camps within 
this debate reference Darwin and interpret his solution through the eyes of the present in order 
to give historical weight to their theoretical perspective. However, I will argue that both 
interpretations are inaccurate; Darwin’s solution was neither group selection or BA via kin 
selection. Instead, Darwin applied classical selection to the reproductives and argued that 
eusocial insects could have evolved due to the ability of reproductives to produce non-
reproductive worker offspring. 
 
2.1. Did Darwin discuss and/or develop the concept of BA? 
 
Although for Darwin the anomaly was not the sterile workers’ altruism, commentators 
today commonly take for granted that it was. (Cronin 1991: 299). 
 
As I have argued in Chapter 1, one of W. D. Hamilton’s major legacies on eusociality research 
was the concept of BA. In pre-Hamiltonian eusociality research the concept of BA was rarely 
used to describe the non-reproductive castes, instead the reproductive division of labour was 
conceptualised and explained in alternative ways — such as the idea of colonies as individuals, 
or dominance, or food sharing. In post-Hamiltonian eusociality research the concept of BA 
became widely used; the evolution of eusociality is almost universally conceptualised as the 
evolution of BA. This is due, in part, to a lack of attention towards the philosophical and 
historical groundings for the application of BA to eusocial insects. For example, a lack of 
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attention has been paid to the reasons why Hamilton applied the concept of BA to eusocial 
insects, namely the Sturtevant-Hamilton problem of sterility, which has contributed to the 
current mainstream view that the evolution of eusociality must require the evolution of BA. 
Additionally, a lack of historical investigation into the origin and emergence of BA within 
eusociality research has led to the claims that BA has been a fundamental problem since Darwin 
(claim (2)). Moreover, the mainstream conceptualisation of the evolution of eusociality as the 
evolution of BA, in post-Hamiltonian research, is further entrenched by claims that Darwin 
developed and/or discussed the concept of BA and its associated paradox — claim (3) — (Hunt 
2007; Ratnieks et al. 2011). For example: 
 
Darwin […] had already applied group selection arguments to explain the evolution of 
altruism in social insects. (Korb and Heinze 2004: 295. Emphasis added). 
 
Darwin did not use the term [altruism], although it was clear that he was talking about 
behaviours that cause individuals to ‘sacrifice themselves for the common good’, as he 
put it in [The Descent of Man]. (Wilson 2008a: 370. Emphasis added). 
 
Moreover, many authors have claimed that eusocial insects posed a major problem to Darwin 
when he was developing his theory of natural selection due to the proposed BA of the non-
reproductive castes: 
 
The altruism of some members of an insect colony raises the question of how it is 
possible for traits to be retained and passed on which decrease the probability that their 
bearers will leave progeny. […] Darwin was aware of this apparent contradiction and 
recognized its importance. […] This question [the evolution of BA], the principal subject 
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of this chapter, can then be said to be as old as the theory of evolution by natural selection. 
(Starr 1979: 36. Emphasis added). 
 
A major goal of sociobiology is to explain the evolution of […] altruistic behaviour 
within the framework of the theory of natural selection. Social insects which provide the 
most extreme forms of altruism and were recognized by Darwin himself […] as posing a 
serious challenge to his theory have quite naturally been the focus of most attention in 
this regard. (Gadagkar 1990: 113. Emphasis added). 
 
How can genetically prescribed selfless behaviour arise by natural selection, which is 
seemingly its antithesis? This problem has vexed biologists since Darwin, who in The 
Origin of Species declared the paradox — in particular displayed by ants — to be the 
most important challenge to his theory. (Nowak et al. 2010: 1057. Emphasis added). 
 
There are many more claims such as these within the literature (see Hunt 2007; Ratnieks et al. 
2011). The majority of which, as like the ones above, are presented more as statements than as 
detailed arguments for what Darwin actually argued, and what he really found problematic 
with eusocial insects. But authors typically make such claims about Darwin in order to add 
historical weight to their application of the concept of BA to eusocial insects (Ratnieks et al. 
2011). In other words, these authors are trying to add legitimacy to the present with appeal to 
the past (Ruse 1980). However, I will argue that the claims that Darwin discussed and/or 
developed the concept of BA are incorrect. I will do so, firstly, by assessing Darwin’s (1874) 
argument for the evolution of morality in The Descent of Man. Secondly, I will address 
Darwin’s (1859) treatment of eusocial insects, and his “special difficulty” with them, from the 
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Origin of Species. Both of these elements of Darwin’s work are often cited by authors when 
making claim (3). 
 
2.1.1. Did Darwin discuss BA in the Descent of Man? 
 
Darwin (1874: 129-133), in the Descent of Man, appeared to discuss the concept of BA in his 
discussion on the evolution of morality and sociality (Cronin 1991; Rosenberg 1992; Wilson 
and Wilson 2007; Wilson 2008a; Sober 2011). Or at least, he discussed traits that appeared to 
match Haldane’s definition of BA, namely; individually costly but socially beneficial: 
 
It must not be forgotten that although a high standard of morality gives but a slight or no 
advantage to each individual man and his children over the other men of the same tribe, 
yet that an increase in the number of well-endowed men and an advancement in the 
standard of morality will certainly give an immense advantage to one tribe over another. 
A tribe including many members who, from possessing in a high degree the spirit of 
patriotism, fidelity, obedience, courage, and sympathy, were always ready to aid one 
another, and to sacrifice themselves for the common good, would be victorious over most 
other tribes; and this would be natural selection. (Darwin 1874: 132. Emphasis added). 
  
What Darwin argued for here is that “morality” (namely, behaviours directed at helping others), 
in early humans, does not result in a direct benefit to the individuals that bear them, but will be 
beneficial to the group. Therefore, at first glance, this appears to fit the definition of BA from 
Haldane; indeed, some authors have made this claim (e.g. Wilson and Wilson 2007). So, it 
could be argued that Darwin was the first to develop the concept of BA, albeit under a different 
name and for the special case of “higher” moral faculties of humans. However, I will show that 
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the concept of morality that Darwin argued for is not the same as BA, instead it is more similar 
to psychological altruism. 
 
 To begin with, although Darwin did speak of the possible costs and benefits of moral 
behaviour, as the above quote alludes to, for him, these are the results of morality, not its 
defining features. For Darwin (1874: 110-112), there is no clear distinction between instinctive 
and moral behaviours. He argued that there is no way to objectively assess the “motives” 
(intentionality) behind any seemingly moralistic behaviour. In other words, Darwin objected a 
previous distinction between instinctive and moral behaviours, namely: behaviours that are 
performed on impulsive reflex (i.e. immediate) are instinctive, whereas behaviours performed 
after deliberation (and that are for the benefit of others) are intentional, and thus moralistic. 
This distinction was based on the idea that moral behaviours are only possible by animals with 
rationality because moral behaviours are not instinctive, but require forethought and intention 
(deliberation). Darwin argued against this view, he claimed that there are cases of behaviours 
in animals — all of which are for the benefit of others and would be classed as moral if 
performed by humans — that appear to be performed after deliberation. Moreover, conversely 
he argued that there are cases of moral behaviours in humans that seem to be performed 
instinctively. Darwin argued, consequently, that instead of a distinction between instinctive 
and moral behaviours there should be a distinction between moral and non-moral animals (i.e. 
capable or not of morality): 
 
As we cannot distinguish between motives, we rank all actions of a certain class as moral, 
if performed by a moral being. A moral being is one who is capable of comparing his 
past and future actions or motives, and of approving or disapproving of them. We have 
no reason to suppose that any of the lower animals have this capacity; therefore, when a 
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Newfoundland dog drags a child out of the water, or a monkey faces danger to rescue its 
comrade, or takes charge of an orphan monkey, we do not call its conduct moral. But in 
the case of man, who alone can with certainty be ranked as a moral being, actions of a 
certain class are called moral, whether performed deliberately, after a struggle with 
opposing motives, or impulsively through instinct, or from the effects of slowly-gained 
habit. (Darwin 1874: 111-112. Emphasis added). 
 
This move allowed Darwin to discuss the concept of morality from an evolutionary perspective. 
This is because instead of needing to explain moral behaviours from a purely psychological 
perspective, which is entailed by the distinction he argued against, Darwin could explain how 
humans evolved to be animals capable of morality. His solution was that the social instincts 
were key, but also the emergence of intelligence: 
 
The following proposition seems to me in a high degree probable — namely, that any 
animal whatever, endowed with well-marked social instincts, the parental and filial 
affections being here included, would inevitably acquire a moral sense or conscience, as 
soon as its intellectual powers had become as well, or nearly as well developed, as in 
man. (Darwin 1874: 98. Emphasis added). 
 
I argue then that for Darwin, even though he rejected a previous definition of morality based 
on instinctive and deliberative behaviours, morality is a concept that is necessarily to do with 
intentionality, as shown by the above quotes. This is because, to be a moral animal, an animal 
must be capable of intentionality in order to reflect and assess upon previous and future 
behaviour. Therefore, it is clear that if Darwin’s concept of morality is at all similar to our 
current understanding of altruism then, by this, we must mean psychological altruism rather 
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than biological altruism. Moreover, that Darwin’s concept of morality is closer to 
psychological altruism rather than BA further highlights why the concept of altruism was not 
widely used in biology prior to Haldane. The concept of altruism, as originally developed by 
Comte, was a psychological one necessarily to do with intentionality. As I highlighted in the 
previous chapter (section 1.1.1.), within biology behaviours were not studied from a 
psychological perspective, they were considered instinctive, therefore the concept of 
(psychological) altruism was not required. It was not until Haldane — with his biological 
notion of altruism defined by costs and benefits of behaviour rather than intentionality — that 
the concept of altruism could be applicable to biological research. 
 
 However, it could be claimed, contrary to my argument, that even though Darwin’s 
concept of morality is closer to psychological altruism than BA, he still discussed traits that 
are socially beneficial but individually costly, i.e. Haldane’s BA, because he argued that there 
are behavioural examples in animals that if performed by humans would be considered moral. 
In other words, if there are examples of behaviours in animals that are for the benefit of others 
and would be considered moral in humans, and if a high degree of morality in humans can be 
costly to individuals (but beneficial to the group, as the above quote above — Darwin 1874: 
132 — shows), then it can be argued that Darwin also implied, possibly indirectly, that there 
are individually costly but socially beneficial traits in animals; i.e. Darwin discussed the 
concept BA too. Although this argument is plausible, it does not stand up after a closer 
inspection of Darwin’s argument. What this counter argument does not take into account is 
that, unlike Haldane, Darwin did not argue for a specific trait that is beneficial to the group but 
costly to the individual. Rather, Darwin discusses the possible costs, or more accurately, the 
possible lack of advantage that are the results of certain instincts. It must be remembered that 
for Darwin (1874: 97-100) the “social instincts” are essential for morality, not only 
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intentionality; he argued that social instincts are the basis from which morality evolved. By 
social instincts Darwin meant cooperative traits that cause individuals to live in social groups: 
 
[But] it is a more probable view that these sensations [of unease/anxiety in individuals 
when separated from their groups] were first developed, in order that those animals which 
would profit by living in society, should be induced to live together, in the same manner 
as the sense of hunger and the pleasure of eating were, no doubt, first acquired in order 
to induce animals to eat. (Darwin 1874: 105). 
 
Social instincts are necessary for the evolution of morality because, as the above quote alludes 
to, these instincts cause individuals to cooperate and live in social groups. Therefore, Darwin 
(1874, chapters 1-5) argued that as early humans evolved greater capacities of intelligence, 
they were able to reflect on these feelings induced by the social instincts and consequently, 
psychological concepts of right and wrong emerged. In other words, humans could reflect on 
these feelings of unease when they do not act for the good of their group, for example, and 
adjust their future behaviour accordingly. 
 
 The important point I am trying to emphasize here is that Darwin did not define social 
instincts according to fitness costs and benefits, but rather he defined them as traits that cause 
their bearers to cooperate for the benefit of their group, or to at least associate together (live 
socially). Any cost or benefit to the individual is just the possible byproduct of these traits. For 
instance, Darwin (1874: 105) argued that these social instincts could have evolved because 
they cause their bearers to cooperate in groups, which if beneficial would lead to those social 
groups outcompeting selfish/solitary individuals. This argument is similar to Darwin’s 
argument for the evolution of morality in humans, which has been interpreted as a group 
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selection argument (Ruse 1980; Rosenberg 1992; Wilson and Wilson 2007; Chancellor 2015). 
However, that Darwin spoke of group selection does not imply that he also discussed BA. 
 
2.1.2. Darwin’s “special difficulty” with eusociality 
 
I will not here enter on these several cases, but will confine myself to one special 
difficulty, which at first appeared to me insuperable, and actually fatal to my whole 
theory. I allude to the neuters or sterile females in insect-communities: for these neuters 
often differ widely in instinct and in structure from both the males and fertile females, 
and yet, from being sterile, they cannot propagate their kind. (Darwin 1859: 175. 
Emphasis added). 
 
The above remarks from Darwin are often quoted by such authors, as above, who claim that 
eusocial insects posed a serious problem for Darwin because of the “altruistic” worker castes. 
However, these remarks from Darwin are often quoted out of context. Darwin did indeed find 
eusocial insects a major stumbling block when developing his theory of natural selection. It 
has even been argued that they played a part in the fact that Darwin did not publish the Origin 
until 1859 even though he started developing his theory in 1838 (Richards 1983; Prete 1990; 
van Wyhe 2007: 193).6 Eusocial insects, particularly honey bees and ants, were studied for 
their colonial organization and their unique traits prior to Darwin. Aspects such as the 
ecological success of eusocial insects, the reproductive division of labour within colonies, the 
ability of honey bees to create almost uniform hexagonal honeycomb cells, the ability of some 
ant species to use workers of other species as their own (the so-called “slave-making” ants), 
 
6 It has been argued that the principle reason Darwin took so long to publish his theory was because 
he wanted to be thorough in his application of it, as well as wanting to finish other, pre-planned, 
works beforehand (van Wyhe 2007). 
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and many more, were well-known phenomena.7 Therefore, any new theory of evolution would 
need to address these well-known and fascinating aspects of eusocial insects. However, at first 
Darwin struggled to explain many aspects of eusocial insects using his theory of natural 
selection (Prete 1990). But by the time he began writing the Origin, Darwin had overcome all 
but one problem that eusocial insects posed to his theory, one that he referred to as the “special 
difficulty”, as in the quote above (Richards 1981: 229, 1983; Prete 1990). 
 
 What most authors refer to when they claim that Darwin discussed BA in the Origin is 
the “special difficulty”. But for Darwin, this “special difficulty” was not BA, nor was it that 
most members of the colony do not reproduce — and that even in some species the worker 
castes evolved to be physically sterile. Instead, the special difficulty for Darwin posed by 
eusocial insects was the fact that, in some species, the non-reproductive castes have evolved to 
be behaviourally and/or morphologically different to the reproductive castes, despite not 
directly reproducing their own kind (Cronin 1991; Ratnieks et al. 2011). Specifically, Darwin 
(1859: 175-180) found the fact that the non-reproductive castes have evolved to be different to 
the reproductives, and that in some cases further physical subcastes have evolved such that 
some colonies have two or more non-reproductive physical subcastes (i.e. soldiers, minor or 
major workers, etc.), to be a major problem for his theory of natural selection. To illustrate this, 
it will be useful to take a more detailed look at Darwin’s discussion of this problem in the 
Origin. 
 
 Sterility in eusocial insects was not overly problematic in Darwin’s opinion. Darwin 
(1859: 175-176) argued that because sterility occasionally occurs in other species then it could 
 
7 The scientific study of eusocial insects dates back to at least the nineteenth century, a prime example 
being the classical work of Kirby and Spence (1818); see also: Richards (1981); Prete (1990). 
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also occur in eusocial insects, and, that it is not problematic that this occurred in the worker 
castes. Darwin argued that it would not be a disadvantage if some eusocial insect colonies 
occasionally produced workers that were sterile but still able to work. In fact, he argued that it 
could even be advantageous: 
 
How the workers have been rendered sterile is a difficulty; but not much greater than that 
of any other striking modification of structure; for it can be shown that some insects and 
other articulate animals in a state of nature occasionally become sterile; and if such 
insects had been social, and had it been profitable to the community that a number should 
have been annually born capable of work, but incapable of procreation, I can see no very 
great difficulty in this being effected by natural selection. (Darwin 1859: 175-176). 
 
Darwin passed over the issue of worker sterility relatively quickly, hence highlighting the fact 
that this was not the “special difficulty”. For Darwin, the main difficulty was to explain how 
the non-reproductive castes could evolve different traits and instincts to the reproductives, 
when they do not reproduce their own kind: 
 
But I must pass over this preliminary difficulty [sterility]. The great difficulty lies in the 
working ants differing widely from both the males and the fertile females in structure 
[…] and in instinct. (Darwin 1859: 176). 
 
But with the working ant we have an insect differing greatly from its parents, yet 
absolutely sterile; so that it could never have transmitted successively acquired 
modifications of structure or instinct to its progeny. It may well be asked how is it 
possible to reconcile this case with the theory of natural selection? (Darwin 1859: 176). 
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In other words, how could the non-reproductive castes evolve to be different from the 
reproductives and to each other (for example soldiers and workers, or different types of worker 
within the same colonies) when they do not produce their own offspring? Darwin struggled 
with this question for a long time. He first came across the problem in the 1840s and only 
managed to come up with his solution — after multiple attempts — once he had already started 
writing the Origin in the mid-1850s (Richards 1981, 1983; Prete 1990). Darwin’s solution was 
that natural selection affects the workers via the reproductives that produce them. I will assess 
in more detail Darwin’s solution to his special difficulty in section 2.2., but the important point 
I want to emphasize here is that Darwin’s (1859: 175-180) “special difficulty” was to do with 
the issue of how polymorphism, and other unique traits, of the non-reproductives castes could 
have evolved despite the fact that they do not reproduce. Hence, the “special difficulty” for 
Darwin was not that the worker castes of eusocial insects do not reproduce, or that they are 
biologically altruistic. Therefore, to claim then, that Darwin discussed and/or developed the 
concept of BA (albeit without using the term altruism), as many authors have done (Cronin 
1991; Rosenberg 1992; Wilson and Wilson 2007; Sober 2011), would be historically 
inaccurate. Indeed, such a claim could be said to be guilty of viewing history through the eyes 
of contemporary ideas, or so-called Whiggish historiography. In other words, these authors are 
imposing a modern concept, which did not exist in Darwin’s time, onto Darwin’s arguments, 
and then subsequently judging his argument based on this. Whilst Whiggish historiography is 
not necessarily an issue in itself, particularly in the history of science (Griffiths 1995), in this 
particular case I have argued that it is problematic. When authors claim that Darwin discussed 
and/or developed BA, they do so in order to add legitimacy to the concept, i.e. if one of the 
founding figures of modern biology discussed BA, then this lends support to the view that the 
concept is of fundamental importance to biology. However, I have already shown in the 
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previous chapter that BA was not considered a fundamental issue for eusociality research until 
around the 1960s. 
 
2.1.3. Why did claims (2) and (3) emerge? 
 
Why then have later authors claimed that Darwin’s “special difficulty” was with the concept 
of BA? Some have argued that this misinterpretation of Darwin traces back to E. O. Wilson 
(1971, 1975b) and two of his seminal books of the 1970s, The Insect Societies and 
Sociobiology, respectively (Hunt 2007; Ratnieks et al. 2011). In his discussion on caste 
determination, Wilson (1971: 146-147) seemed to interpret Darwin’s “special difficulty” to be 
about how the non-reproductive castes could evolve to be different from the reproductives. 
However, later, in his discussion on the evolution of eusociality and social behaviour, Wilson 
(1971: 320, 1975b: 117-118) was less clear about Darwin’s “special difficulty”. For instance, 
Wilson began by quoting Darwin’s claim that eusocial insects presented him with a special 
difficulty — the first sentence from Darwin’s quote at the begging of 2.1.2., above — then 
subsequently framed the problem with the following question: 
 
How, [Darwin] asked, could the worker caste of insect societies have evolved if they are 
sterile and leave no offspring? (Wilson 1971: 320). 
 
Which, incidentally, is very similar to how many authors have framed the BA paradox, as I 
argued in chapter 1 (Gadagkar 1990; Cronin 1991; Nowak et al. 2010). Indeed, Wilson (1971: 
320) actually used the term “paradox” immediately after the quote above. In asking this 
question immediately after quoting Darwin’s “special difficulty” sentence, Wilson is in danger 
of causing the reader to conflate Darwin’s lesser issue of sterility with his greater issue of 
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polymorphism amongst the non-reproductive castes. Moreover, a few sentences later Wilson 
used the concept of BA as if this concept was the problem Darwin referred to as the “special 
difficulty”: 
 
To save his own theory, Darwin introduced the idea of natural selection operating at the 
level of the family […]. With the entire family serving as the unit of selection, it is the 
capacity to generate sterile but altruistic relatives that becomes subject to genetic 
evolution. (Wilson 1971: 320. Emphasis added). 
 
In fact, the claim that Wilson (1971) was the first to make the reference to Darwin’s special 
difficulty (Ratnieks et al. 2011: 482), that prior to 1971 this section of the Origin was rarely 
quoted or referenced (Hunt 2007: 184) is not completely true. Actually, Darwin’s special 
difficulty was referenced a number of times prior to 1971 (Weismann 1893: 313-314, 1909: 
35; Wheeler 1923: 255; Emerson 1939: 196-197, 1960: 309, 328; Allee et al. 1949: 31; 
Richards 1953: 159-160). However, these authors focus more on Darwin’s solution to his great 
difficulty, with some using Darwin to justify their own theory (which I will discuss further, in 
section 2.2. below). M. T. Ghiselin (1969) discussed Darwin’s argument for the evolution of 
eusociality, and sociality in general, within the context of BA. However, Ghiselin (1969: 58) 
used a broad definition of BA that appears to be synonymous with cooperation. Wilson used 
the definition of BA from Hamilton (1964a) with reference to Darwin’s special difficulty. 
Therefore, Wilson appears to be the first to (indirectly) suggest that the concept of BA and its 
associated paradox has been problematic for biology since at least Darwin. It is useful to point 
out here that most authors prior to Wilson, that had argued for the existence of BA in nature, 
did not make reference to Darwin’s “special difficulty” (Haldane 1932; Sturtevant 1938; 
Williams and Williams 1957). 
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 E. O. Wilson has had a huge influence on eusociality research with both his The Insect 
Societies and Sociobiology books being widely referenced (Dugatkin 2006). Wilson (1975b) 
even made the claim that BA is the central problem that sociobiology must solve (Dugatkin 
2002). And in fact, after Wilson (1971) discussed, and quoted, Darwin and his discussion of 
the “special difficulty” of eusocial insects from the Origin, subsequent authors began to make 
the claim (3), above, that Darwin discussed and/or developed the concept of BA (Hunt 2007; 
Ratnieks et al. 2011). But it is unlikely that a few pages from these two books of E. O. Wilson 
could be the only reason why so many authors have subsequently claimed that Darwin 
discussed BA, or, that BA has been a fundamental problem since Darwin. 
 
 The emergence of the claims (2) and (3) is mainly a result of the widespread use of the 
concept of BA after the introduction of kin selection. As I argued in the previous chapter, 
Hamilton applied the concept of BA to eusocial insects due to the Sturtevant-Hamilton problem 
of sterility. This led Hamilton to reject the colonies-as-individuals argument, that was 
previously popular, and apply the theory of kin selection to the evolution of eusociality. The 
groundbreaking success of inclusive fitness and kin selection led to the widespread use of BA 
within eusociality research. Subsequent authors followed Hamilton in conceptualising the 
evolution of eusociality as the evolution of BA. But because the majority of research 
predominately focused on the explanatory models, there was little attention paid to why 
Hamilton applied the concept of BA to eusocial insects; namely the Sturtevant-Hamilton 
problem of sterility. Consequently, the fact that the Sturtevant-Hamilton problem of sterility 
does not entail that the evolution of BA is necessarily required for the evolution of eusociality 
went unnoticed by the majority of authors. In other words the majority of authors in post-
Hamiltonian eusociality research, simply applied the concept of BA to the worker castes 
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following Hamilton. But BA cannot be assumed, it must be argued both theoretically and 
empirically. This is because parental manipulation can also lead to the emergence of non-
reproductive worker castes (Kapheim et al. 2015). But due to the lack of critical attention 
towards the use of the concept of BA, this point was rarely emphasised. For these reasons, the 
use of the concept of BA emerged and remained widespread within post-Hamiltonian 
eusociality research. 
 
 As a result of this mainstream view, many authors in the recent decades have made the 
inaccurate historical claims (2) and (3), above. Specifically, because many authors today 
conceptualise the evolution of eusociality as the evolution of BA, following Hamilton, they 
often view the history of eusociality research as being centred around the problem of BA too 
(Ratnieks et al. 2011). Thus, it is often claimed that BA has been a fundamental issue for 
eusociality research since Darwin (claim (2)), and that Darwin discussed and/or developed the 
concept (claim (3)). But, as I showed in chapter 1, claim (2) is incorrect; BA has only been 
considered a fundamental problem for eusociality research since around the 1960s, due to 
Hamilton and the theory of kin selection. Many authors interpreted Darwin’s “special 
difficulty” with eusocial insects as one to do with BA. Even in cases like that of J. M. Herbers 
(2009), who recognised that Darwin’s “special difficulty” was not with BA, but then went on 
to discuss the “special difficulty” as if it were about the BA paradox since, she argued, 
eusociality researchers have equated the “special difficulty” with the BA paradox. This general 
interpretation of Darwin’s “special difficulty” as if it were to do with the problem of BA is 
likely due, in part, to E. O. Wilson, who seemed to originally argue for claims (2) and (3) (Hunt 




 However, this is not only an important issue for historical accuracy, but also because 
claims (2) and (3) are used to add historical justification for the continued use of BA to describe 
the non-reproductive castes of eusocial insects (Ratnieks et al. 2011). The current theoretical 
perspective has affected recent historiographies on the concept of BA, which in turn, act to 
justify current theoretical explanatory approaches. More specifically, I argue that, due 
primarily to the Sturtevant-Hamilton sterility problem, authors typically only conceptualise the 
evolution of eusociality as the evolution of BA. And subsequently, they view the history of 
evolutionary studies on eusocial insects to be centred around BA. Additionally, they then apply 
these historical claims in their theoretical work as motivation, and historical precedence, of 
conceptualising the evolution of eusociality as the evolution of BA. Here we see an example: 
 
Those on the forefront of evolutionary biology, from Charles Darwin through E. O. 
Wilson and W. D. Hamilton, have found the questions surrounding cooperation and 
altruism in animals to be both fascinating and frustrating. Darwin (1859) found the 
cooperative and altruistic [behaviours] that are typically displayed by sterile caste 
members in the social insects ‘‘one special difficulty, which at first appeared to me to be 
insuperable, and actually fatal to my whole theory,’’ while Wilson described such actions 
as ‘‘the central theoretical problem of sociobiology’’. (Dugatkin 2002: 459. Emphasis 
added). 
 
Thus, claims (2) and (3) act to justify claim (1) — that BA is a fundamental problem for 
eusociality research currently. This is not only the case for the concept of BA. Some authors 
also interpret Darwin’s solution to his “special difficulty” in order to justify their explanatory 
models for the evolution of eusociality. For example, some argue that Darwin’s solution was 
the first form of kin selection (Ghiselin 1974: 216-218; Wilson 1975b: 86; Queller and 
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Strassmann 1998: 166; Cronin 1991; Herbers 2009: 216), whilst others argue that Darwin was 
arguing for group selection (Hölldobler and Wilson 2009: 16-18; Nowak et al. 2010: 1057; 
Chancellor 2015). As with the concept of BA, these historical claims are used to justify current 
theoretical positions with respect to the evolution of eusocial insects. For these reasons, I think 
it is useful to take a brief look into what Darwin actually argued for as his solution to his special 
difficulty of eusocial insects, which I will do in the next section. 
 
2.2. Darwin and eusociality: group selection, kin selection, or something 
else? 
 
[Participants] on both sides of today's debate about the levels of selection […] have 
invoked the past in defence of their own positions and criticism of their opponents’. (Ruse 
1980: 629) 
 
As I have argued throughout this chapter, in post-Hamiltonian eusociality research many 
authors have used Whiggish historiographies to justify their current theoretical/conceptual 
perspectives. This also applies to the debate over the two main explanatory models that are 
used to explain the evolution of eusociality, namely kin selection and group selection (i.e. 
MLS). For instance, B. Hölldobler and E. O. Wilson (2009: 16-48) began their history of 
theoretical explanations for the evolution of eusociality with Darwin and they interpret his 
explanation as group selection, which is the explanatory model that they also favour (see also, 
Wilson and Hölldobler 2005; Reeve and Hölldobler 2007; Wilson 2008b). On the other hand, 
R. H. Crozier (2008) interprets Darwin as the first to argue for kin selection as an explanation 
for the evolution of eusociality, a position Crozier favours. It is therefore important to assess 
what Darwin argued for with respect to the evolution of eusociality. 
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 I will assess Darwin’s solution to the “special difficulty” whilst bearing in mind the 
effect that the widespread use of the concept of BA had on eusociality researchers in the post-
Hamiltonian era. I will argue that Darwin’s solution was neither kin selection nor group 
selection.8 That in fact, Darwin’s explanation was not from the perspective of the non-
reproductive castes but, rather, from the perspective of the reproductives. Thus, I will further 
support the claim that Darwin did not develop or discuss the concept of BA. 
 
 As I have pointed out above, Darwin only found a solution to the “special difficulty” 
— the problem of how the non-reproductive castes could evolve to be different to the 
reproductives, and each other, when they do not reproduce their own kind — after he began to 
write the Origin (Richards 1983; Prete 1990). Darwin began the argument for his solution in 
the following way: 
 
This difficulty, though appearing insuperable, is lessened, or, as I believe, disappears, 
when it is remembered that selection may be applied to the family, as well as the 
individual, and may thus gain the desired end. (Darwin 1859: 177. Emphasis added). 
 
Since Darwin (1859: 177) began his argument by claiming that selection can be ‘applied to the 
family, as well as the individual’, it has been argued (Chancellor 2015) that Darwin’s solution 
to his “special difficulty” is a form of MLS, specifically group selection. G. Chancellor (2015: 
145) considered the quote above to be clear evidence that Darwin argued for group selection 
 
8 I am not here providing an argument of whether Darwin did or did not discuss MLS in general. The 
aim here is to assess what Darwin argued for as the solution to his special difficulty. For a more 
detailed debate on Darwin and the issue of levels of selection see: Cronin 1991; Borrello 2010; 
Chancellor 2015, and references therein. However, I think it is clear that Darwin did argue for group 
selection at least once when he discussed the evolution of morality in humans. 
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to explain eusocial insect evolution. Whereas others (Herbers 2009: 216) have used the above 
quote from Darwin to argue that his solution was kin selection, i.e. that non-reproducing 
individuals can evolve to be different to their reproductive relatives via the success of the latter. 
In other words, even though the worker castes do not reproduce, if they benefit the 
reproductives (and the colony), then the reproductives will be more successful at producing 
offspring that can also produce similar workers. 
 
 However, it is important to note that Darwin did not discuss the “special difficulty” 
with eusocial insects in reference to the debate over the levels of selection, instead he discussed 
this issue whilst trying to argue for his theory of natural selection in general. Moreover, he 
specifically used this “special difficulty” in order to argue against Lamarckism (Hamilton 
1972: 194; Richards 1981) — a point I will return to shortly. Therefore, it is within this context 
that Darwin should be interpreted. Darwin’s treatment of eusocial insects in the Origin can be 
split into two parts; a solution to the “special difficulty” and an explanation for the evolutionary 
origins of eusocial insects. 
 
 It should be noticed that, as opposed to the earlier quote above (Darwin 1859: 177), for 
the solution to the “special difficulty”, Darwin specifically discussed natural selection affecting 
the reproductives rather than the more vague notion of selection being applicable to the family. 
This is because in the former case Darwin just made a general claim that selection can operate 
at multiple levels — which is clear by his later arguments such as in The Descent of Man, see 
footnote 2 above. Indeed, after Darwin (1859: 177) stated that selection can be applied to the 
family he discussed cases of vegetable and cattle breeding. Whereas in the case of eusocial 
insects, for which he provided a detailed explanation, Darwin argued that natural selection 
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could produce non-reproductives that are morphologically different to the reproductive caste 
by affecting the latter only, as is seen in the following quote: 
 
With these facts before me, I believe that natural selection, by acting on the fertile 
parents, could form a species which should regularly produce neuters, either all of large 
size with one form of jaw, or all of small size with jaws having a widely different 
structure; or lastly, and this is our climax of difficulty, one set of workers of one size and 
structure, and simultaneously another set of workers of a different size and structure; — 
a graduated series having been first formed, as in the case of the driver ant, and then the 
extreme forms, from being the most useful to the community, having been produced in 
greater and greater numbers through the natural selection of the parents which generated 
them; until none with an intermediate structure were produced. (Darwin 1859: 179. 
Emphasis added). 
 
 But for the evolutionary origins of eusociality in insects, Darwin’s argument was 
slightly different: 
 
Thus I believe it has been with social insects: a slight modification of structure, or 
instinct, correlated with the sterile condition of certain members of the community, has 
been advantageous to the community: consequently the fertile males and females of the 
same community flourished, and transmitted to their fertile offspring a tendency to 
produce sterile members having the same modification. And I believe that this process 
has been repeated, until that prodigious amount of difference between the fertile and 
sterile females of the same species has been produced. (Darwin 1859: 177). 
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This argument could, and has been, interpreted as group selection. In other words, Darwin 
argued for inter-colony (inter-community) selection (Borrello 2010: 7-12; Chancellor 2015). 
But, I argue, these interpretations are misplaced. What Darwin argued for here was simply 
individual selection amongst the reproductives of the population. Specifically, if some 
reproductives could cause a portion of their offspring to be sterile — or more appropriately, to 
be non-reproductive workers — and, therefore an incipient eusocial colony with a reproductive 
division of labour. If this was beneficial to the reproductives in producing more fertile 
offspring, then the reproductives that can produce such incipient colonies, by coercing some of 
her offspring into becoming non-reproductive offspring, would be more fit than solitary 
reproductives that cannot. Natural selection would then lead to an increase in such incipient 
colonies with reproductive division of labour in these species. To interpret Darwin from the 
perspective of the levels of selection debate misses the subtlety of this argument for the 
evolution of eusociality. This is important because Darwin’s argument could directly affect 
current theoretical perspectives on the evolution of eusociality, which I will argue for below. 
 
 As mentioned above, Darwin used the example of the eusocial insects, specifically his 
“special difficulty” with them, in order to argue against Lamarckism.9 For Darwin, the 
evolution of sterility (i.e. the non-reproductive caste) was an essential element for such 
complex cooperation in eusocial insects if natural selection is true: 
 
As ants work by inherited instincts and by inherited tools or weapons, and not by acquired 
knowledge and manufactured instruments, a perfect division of labour could be effected 
 
9 Although it is unclear exactly what Darwin meant by Lamarckism; R. W. Burkhardt Jr. (2013) 
argued that Darwin also allowed for the inheritance of acquired characters/traits in the theory of 
natural selection. However, the point here is not to debate over Darwin’s interpretation of Lamarck 
but, instead, to emphasize that Darwin did not discuss the “special difficulty” in the context of the 
levels of selection debate. 
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with them only by the workers being sterile; for had they been fertile, they would have 
intercrossed, and their instincts and structure would have become blended. (Darwin 1859: 
180). 
 
For no amount of exercise, or habit, or volition, in the utterly sterile members of a 
community could possibly affect the structure or instincts of the fertile members, which 
alone leave descendants. I am surprised that no one has advanced this demonstrative case 
of neuter insects, against the well-known doctrine of Lamarck. (Darwin 1859: 180. 
Emphasis added). 
 
What Darwin argued for in the quotes above is that, unlike humans or other higher animals, 
behavioural and physiological specialisation of the workers in eusocial insects could only occur 
under natural selection if the workers do not reproduce. This is because their specialisation is 
dependent primarily on inheritance rather than being acquired via learning or culture.10 
Therefore, I argue, Darwin did not consider the workers to be “visible” to natural selection, i.e. 
the non-reproductive castes are not under direct individual selection and therefore do not have 
unique personal fitness values — they depend on the colony for their survival. Darwin turned 
his “special difficulty” with the eusocial insects, which he initially thought of as fatal to his 
theory of natural selection, to his advantage as he considered it strong evidence against 
alternative theories of evolution, specifically Lamarckism. 
 
 It is important to note that Darwin’s explanation for the evolution of eusocial insects is 
similar to the “germ-soma” theory by Weismann, Fisher, et al., that was so prevalent in pre-
 
10 Darwin (1873: 417) did not discount that individual workers could adapt their behaviour or that 
some could have more “sagacity” than others, however he argued that this sagacity, as well as their 
behavioural repertoire, is also ultimately dependent on selection of the reproductives. 
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Hamiltonian eusociality research, as shown in chapter 1. Indeed, Weismann (1893: 313-314) 
summarised Darwin’s explanation as selection favouring reproductives that produce “sterile” 
workers, and that those colonies with sterile workers would do better than those without. 
Similarly, O. W. Richards (1953: 159-160), argued that the non-reproduction (or sterility) of 
worker castes was not a problem for Darwin because natural selection affects colonies via the 
reproductives. In other words, the special traits of the non-reproductive castes can evolve by 
natural selection affecting the reproductive castes. For example, if a reproductive can produce 
a colony formed of two types of non-reproductive caste (e.g. workers and soldiers), and if these 
colonies do better than ones with only one type of non-reproductive caste, then selection will 
favour those reproductive that can produce colonies with two types of non-reproductive caste. 
 
 Whether or not Darwin’s explanation is supported by current empirical data is 
unimportant for the current point under consideration. What is important is that it is a mistake 
to view Darwin’s explanation through the perspective of the levels of selection debate, or the 
BA paradox, because these issues were not the focus of Darwin’s argument. Darwin’s 
explanation for the evolution of eusociality was in two parts. The first aspect of his explanation 
was that, in the evolutionary origins of eusociality, reproductives that produced non-
reproductive workers, and thus colonies, were more fit than those that did not. The second 
aspect, which dealt specifically with the “special difficulty”, was that the non-reproductive 
castes can evolve special traits by selection affecting the reproductives that produce them. But 
Darwin’s explanation was neither group selection nor kin selection via worker BA, as many 
authors have argued (see above). Instead, Darwin was simply applying classical selection to 
the reproductives producing a colony. Natural selection affects colonies (and therefore the non-
reproductive castes) via the reproductives, and this is what I argue Darwin meant by natural 
selection being applied to communities in eusocial insects. 
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 More importantly, this shows that 1) Darwin took the perspective of the reproductives 
rather than the perspective of the workers, and 2) he did not consider workers as biologically 
altruistic. 
 
 As shown in Chapter 1, Hamilton appeared to be aware that Darwin’s “special 
difficulty” was not BA. However, Hamilton (1972) argued that because Darwin was not aware 
of Mendelian genetics, he was also unaware that colonies are not genetically homogeneous and 
unaware therefore, of possible genetic conflict within colonies. Hamilton argued that this is 
why Darwin did not consider the evolution of the non-reproductive castes as problematic. Like 
Hamilton, Hölldobler and E. O. Wilson (2009: 17) also argued that, had Darwin been aware of 
Mendelian genetics, he would have considered the evolution of non-reproductives as the major 
problem because, if the members of the colony are not genetically homogeneous, then the fact 
that individuals “give up” reproduction in favour of helping others becomes problematic (i.e. 
the BA paradox). As I highlighted in the previous chapter, Hölldobler, E. O. Wilson, as well 
as most current eusociality researchers, formulate their views from the perspective of the 
worker castes due to the Sturtevant-Hamilton problem of sterility. Darwin, on the other hand, 
took the perspective of the reproductives. According to Darwin, throughout the evolutionary 
history of eusociality the worker castes were never evolutionary individuals in their own right. 
As above, from the evolutionary origins of eusociality the worker castes were not directly 
affected by natural selection, instead the reproductives that produced them were. And more 
importantly, instead of being a problem for Darwin, the fact that some members of the colony 
are “sterile” proved to be essential evidence for his theory over Lamarckism; the reproductive 
division of labour was what enabled Darwin to explain away the “special difficulty”. 
 
 85 
 There is another set of examples from eusocial insects that are often taken as clear cases 
of BA. But these are not instances of sterility or non-reproduction but, instead, examples of 
workers sacrificing their lives. For example, because the stings of honey bee workers are 
barbed they typically die if they sting intruders in defence of the colony, whereas the queen’s 
sting is not barbed and not used to defend the colony (Queller and Strassmann 1998: 317). 
Darwin (1859: 151-152) also discussed the case of self-sacrifice by worker honey bees when 
stinging in defence of the colony. Some authors (Gardner and Foster 2008: 1-2; Chancellor 
2015: 147) have used this to claim that Darwin did discuss BA, as his explanation for the barbed 
sting of honey bee workers was that they evolved because they were beneficial to the 
community (colony). In other words, it is argued that Darwin’s explanation fits the definition 
of BA because he claimed that the barbed sting benefits others at the cost of the life to the 
worker. But to interpret Darwin’s discussion of self-sacrificing traits in eusocial insects in 
terms of BA has implications for the understanding of Darwin’s broader argument for the 
evolution of eusociality. This is because, if an individual is biologically altruistic, then this 
implies that this individual is under natural selection and therefore has a personal fitness value; 
otherwise it would not make sense to describe the individual as benefitting others at a cost to 
its own fitness. But, as I have just argued, from the evolutionary origins of eusociality, Darwin 
did not consider the non-reproductive castes as evolutionary individuals; i.e. the workers do 
not directly partake in natural selection. Therefore, to suggest that Darwin considered the self-
sacrificing defence of the colony by workers as a case of BA is to imply that Darwin considered 
every member of the colony to be under individual selection, which I have shown to be 
incorrect. 
 
 Finally, to interpret Darwin’s explanation in terms of kin selection (via worker BA) or 
group selection is not only historically inaccurate, but also risks affecting the current debate on 
 86 
the evolution of eusociality. This is because kin selection (via worker BA) and group selection 
are not the only possible theories for the evolution of eusociality (Hunt 2007), as I will explore 
in more detail in chapter 3. Thus, to restrict an interpretation of Darwin to one or another theory 
is dangerous because Darwin is still often invoked in order to justify current theoretical 
perspectives (Ruse 1980; Ratnieks et al. 2011). Not only was Darwin not aware of Mendelian 
genetics but, more importantly, he was not aware of the modern debate over the levels of 
selection and the theories of kin and group selection as we understand them currently (Borrello 
2010: 7-14). Moreover, Darwin’s argument for the evolution of eusociality, and consequently 
his solution to the “special difficulty”, is, if at all, more similar to the theory of parental 
manipulation (which I explore in more detail in chapter 3) and colonies-as-individuals 




In this chapter I have argued that, within eusociality research, history is often appealed to in 
order to justify the present. In particular, many authors have claimed that Darwin discussed 
and/or developed the concept of BA. These claims are inaccurate however, as the concept of 
BA, and its associated paradox, did not become widely studied until around the 1960/70s due 
to the influential work of Hamilton, as I have shown in chapter 1. 
 
 I have highlighted that within post-Hamiltonian eusociality research, claims started to 
emerge arguing that BA has been a fundamental problem in biology since at least Darwin 
(claim (2)). Additionally, many authors have claimed that the reason why Darwin considered 
eusocial insects as the greatest difficulty to his theory of natural selection, which he referred to 
as the “special difficulty”, was because of the BA exhibited by the non-reproductive castes 
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(claim (3)). Such claims have the effect of justifying the current theoretical perspective, for 
example the widespread use of the concept of BA to describe the non-reproductive castes of 
eusocial insects. If an author argues that Darwin discussed a problem using the same concept 
or theory as themselves then this has the consequence of adding historical weight to their own 
argument (Ruse 1980), whether this is the intention of the author consciously or not. 
 
 However, I have shown that Darwin did not discuss or develop the concept of BA. In 
section 2.1.1., I argued that Darwin did not discuss the concept of BA in his argument for the 
evolution of morality in The Descent of Man. Many authors have argued that Darwin’s concept 
of morality is the same as the modern concept of BA. However, this interpretation is inaccurate. 
Although Darwin did discuss the possible costs of moral behaviour, he argued that these were 
only possible consequences of the trait, not its defining feature. The key aspect of Darwin’s 
argument was that moral behaviours were only possible in moral animals, because moral 
behaviours require intentionality. Thus, if Darwin’s concept of morality can be said to be 
similar to the concept of altruism, we must mean by this that it is similar to psychological 
altruism rather than BA. In section 2.1.2., I demonstrated that, contrary to many claims, 
Darwin’s “special difficulty” with eusocial insects in the Origin was not to do with the concept 
of BA. Rather, the “special difficulty” was the fact that the non-reproductive castes have 
evolved to be different to the reproductive castes (and in some cases amongst themselves, e.g. 
workers and soldiers) despite not reproducing their own kind. Consequently, claim (3) — that 
Darwin discussed and/or developed the concept of BA — is inaccurate. I argued, in section 
2.1.3., that claim (3) mainly emerged due to the widespread use of the concept of BA within 
post-Hamiltonian eusociality research. I already highlighted in the previous chapter that claim 
(2) is also inaccurate, the concept of BA was not considered as a fundamental issue for 
eusociality research until at least the 1960s. Due to the success of kin selection, many authors 
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conceptualised the evolution of eusociality as the evolution of BA, following Hamilton. Thus, 
the concept of BA came to be seen as a fundamental problem for eusociality research. 
Consequently, many authors viewed the history of eusociality research to be centred around 
the concept of BA and made the inaccurate claims (2) and (3). 
 
 In section 2.2., I argued that history is not only used to justify the continued widespread 
application of the concept of BA to eusocial insects, it is also used by opposing camps in the 
debate over the evolution of eusociality. Many authors use their interpretations of Darwin’s 
solution to the “special difficulty” to either argue for kin selection and BA or to argue for group 
selection. For example, Hölldobler and E. O. Wilson (2009) began their overview of the history 
of evolutionary theories of eusociality with Darwin, and interpreted his explanation as group 
selection, which is the theory that they hold for the evolution of eusociality. Crozier (2008), in 
turn, claimed that Darwin was the first to argue for a form of kin selection via BA, which is the 
theory that he prefers. However, I argued that these claims are guilty of Whiggish 
historiography, they are attempts at judging the past from the perspective of the present. 
 
 Darwin’s treatment of eusocial insects was constituted of two parts, the solution to the 
“special difficulty” and an explanation for the evolution of eusociality. For the solution to the 
“special difficulty”, Darwin argued that the non-reproductive castes can evolve their special 
traits (e.g. polymorphism) by selection affecting the reproductives that produced them. This, 
in turn, led Darwin to an explanation for the evolutionary origins of eusociality. He argued that 
if some reproductives could cause a portion of their offspring to be non-reproductive workers, 
and if this was beneficial to the reproductives in producing more fertile offspring, then the 
reproductives that can produce colonies (via non-reproductive workers) would be more fit than 
reproductives that cannot. Those reproductives that can produce eusocial colonies would be 
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selected for, and over evolutionary time, these colonies could evolve ever more complex 
division of labour due to selection affecting the reproductives. 
 
 I have argued that Darwin’s solution to the “special difficulty”, and by extension his 
argument for the evolutionary origins of eusociality, was not group selection. Darwin simply 
applied classical selection to reproductives that can produce eusocial colonies. Not only was 
Darwin not aware of the levels of selection debate, his main purpose when tackling the “special 
difficulty” was to overcome a potentially fatal problem to his theory. In actual fact, he even 
considered his solution to the “special difficulty” as strong evidence for his theory of evolution 
by natural selection against alternatives such as Lamarckism. Moreover, neither is kin selection 
via BA an accurate interpretation of Darwin’s solution to the “special difficulty”. Darwin did 
not consider the non-reproductive castes as biologically altruistic. Instead, unlike modern kin 
selection theorists, Darwin took the perspective of the reproductives, and argued that the non-
reproductive castes could evolve if they benefit the reproductives that produced them. It could 
be argued that this is a general form of kin selection, albeit without the notion of inclusive 
fitness — Darwin was unaware of Mendelian genetics. But, as I highlighted in the previous 
chapter, current kin selection theorists typically conceptualise the evolution of eusociality as 
the evolution of BA. Consequently, authors who interpret Darwin’s solution as kin selection, 
such as Crozier (2008), are implying that Darwin argued that eusocial insects evolved due to 
the altruistic workers and kin selection. 
 
 Thus, again, this is not simply an issue over historical accuracy. The Whiggish 
interpretations of Darwin’s treatment of eusocial insect evolution in the Origin risk affecting 
the current debate over the evolution of eusociality. Interpreting Darwin’s solution to the 
“special difficulty” as either group selection or kin selection (via worker BA) adds historical 
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weight to current arguments for each perspective, to the detriment of possible alternatives. I 
have argued that both interpretations are inaccurate; Darwin did not apply group selection to 
the evolution of eusociality and, even though his argument could be interpreted as a general 
form of kin selection, Darwin did not consider the non-reproductive castes as biologically 
altruistic. Consequently, if Darwin’s solution to the “special difficulty” is similar to any current 
theory, it is more similar to parental manipulation (which is compatible to kin selection — see 
chapter 3) as his explanation was from the perspective of the reproductive; he argued that 
eusocial insects evolved due to the ability of reproductives to produce non-reproductive 
workers. This could have implications for the current debate over the evolution of eusociality; 
not only did Darwin not consider the non-reproductive castes as biologically altruistic, but he 
did not consider them to be evolutionary individuals in their own right. In other words, Darwin 
argued that, since the evolutionary origins of eusociality, the non-reproductive worker castes 
did not directly partake in natural selection; such a position could be worth reconsidering once 
again by current eusociality researchers. 
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Recently, J. H. Hunt (2007: 183-187) has challenged the claim that the concept of BA is a 
fundamental problem for eusociality research (claim (1)). He argued that, in fact, the 
widespread use of BA has impeded eusociality research because it has led to important 
biological factors to be ignored, e.g. phenotypic plasticity. Moreover, Hunt argued that BA is 
just one of multiple ways to conceptualise the non-reproductive castes, as is supported by the 
fact that the concept did not become widespread until after Hamilton introduced his theory of 
kin selection. On the other hand, F. L. W. Ratnieks and colleagues (2011), have argued that the 
concept of BA is a fundamental problem for eusociality research, but this went relatively 
unnoticed until the important work of J. B. S. Haldane (1932), Hamilton (1964a, 1964b, 1972), 
J. Maynard Smith (1964), and more. 
 
 In this chapter I will assess the claim, above, that the concept of BA is a fundamental 
problem for eusociality research (claim (1)). I will do so by assessing the role of the concept 
of BA within evolutionary studies of eusocial insects. In the previous chapter I argued that the 
current widespread use of the concept of BA led to the incorrect historical claim that the 
concept has been a fundamental problem for eusociality research since Darwin. Instead, as I 
highlighted in chapter 1, the concept only became widely used in the 1960s due to the influence 
of Hamilton and kin selection theory. Prior to this time BA was rarely employed by eusociality 
researchers, with alternatives such as the superorganism, coercion, the “germ-soma” argument, 
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and others, in use instead. The concept of the superorganism has seen a resurgence in the 1980s, 
due to the introduction of new group selection. Since then, the presence of colony selection has 
been demonstrated in many species, typically the most evolutionary derived species with large, 
complexly-organized colonies. In such species, the colony is the unit of selection; i.e. a 
superorganism. This has consequences for the use of the concept of BA; if the colony is the 
unit of selection, then the concept of BA is not applicable to the workers. This is because the 
concept is only applicable to evolutionary individuals since its definition is based on fitness 
consequences to its bearer; BA is a trait that causes its bearer to benefit others at a cost to itself. 
But in superorganisms, the non-reproductive castes are not evolutionary individuals in their 
own right, they are parts of a higher-level system. Therefore, the concept of BA is only 
theoretically applicable to eusocial insect species in which colony selection does not occur. 
This is typically the case in the simplest species, which are the target of evolutionary theories 
for the origin of eusociality. 
 
 Firstly, in section 3.1., I address some current definitional issues with the concept of 
BA. I will argue that there are currently multiple definitions of the concept of BA in use due to 
the current mainstream evolutionary theories of eusociality — kin selection and MLS. In 
section 3.1.1., I will assess the notion of weak BA, which is the preferred definition of the 
concept by MLS. I argue that weak BA is not true BA because the fitness consequences of the 
trait are defined relatively. Kin selection theorists define the fitness consequences of BA in 
terms of absolute fitness — with respect to the whole breeding population — but, in section 
3.1.2., I will argue that the current mainstream definition (of BA) is potentially vacuous. This 
is because kin selection theorists typically define BA in terms of fitness consequences alone 
— a trait that causes negative selection to the focal individual and positive selection to those 
that it interacts with. But I will argue, that other cooperative traits could also fit this definition, 
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such as coercion. Thus, in section 3.1.3., I will propose a new definition of BA with an added 
clause that stipulates that the trait that causes the fitness consequences must be possessed by 
the focal individual. 
 
 Secondly, in section 3.2., I will review the mainstream theories for the evolution of 
eusociality — kin selection and group selection — and the role of the concept of BA within 
them. Specifically, I will examine whether the concept of BA, that I argued for above, is used 
and/or required by either of the theories. Additionally, I will assess if there is any evidence to 
support the application of BA to eusociality. I will argue that only kin selection is applicable 
with the concept of BA, whereas group selection is only compatible with weak BA, which I 
argued is not true BA. But I will highlight that there is a lack of empirical evidence to support 
the application of BA to the non-reproductive castes, in fact, recent evidence supports the 
alternative claim that offspring are coerced into the non-reproductive castes. Thus, I will argue, 
similarly to Hunt, that the concept of BA is not a fundamental problem for eusociality research, 
contrary to claim (1). Moreover, there is no evidence to support the claim that it is the correct 
description of the behaviour of the non-reproductive castes. 
 
3.1. Biological altruism: definitional issues 
 
There have been definitional issues with the concept of BA since its origin, and debate 
continues over the correct way to define the concept (Okasha 2013). J. B. S. Haldane (1932: 
207) simply defined BA as a trait that is ‘socially valuable but individually disadvantageous’. 
This definition is quite vague and does not specify, for example, whether the cost must be 
short- or long-term. However, Haldane (1932: 130-131, 210) did argue that the altruism in 
eusocial insects is ‘congenital’, and therefore is an inherited lifetime trait, as opposed to forms 
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of altruism in other species (such as humans) that he argued is actually beneficial to the 
individual and is therefore more like cooperation. In other words, what may seem like BA in 
other animals is actually mutualism (behaviour that benefits both the individual and others — 
West et al. 2007), or in the case of humans, possibly psychological altruism. Moreover, as I 
have shown in chapter 1 (1.1.2.), Haldane (1932: 207-210) also emphasized the self-sacrificing 
aspect of BA, whether that be sacrificing one’s life or foregoing reproduction. Thus, congenital 
altruism — or biological altruism as it is now known — denotes long-term costs to the focal 
individual. Haldane, therefore, argued that the evolution of his concept of BA is likely to only 
be possible in eusocial insect species precisely because of their reproductive division of labour 
(Huxley 1942: 482). 
 
 Subsequent authors overlooked the fact that Haldane limited his concept of BA to 
eusocial insects only — or more specifically to any species that exhibits a reproductive division 
of labour. This is mainly because of the influence of Hamilton and his theory of kin selection. 
As I have shown in chapter 1, it was only after Hamilton argued for inclusive fitness as a model 
for kin selection theory in the 1960s that the concept of BA became widely used, particularly 
in eusociality research. With the introduction of inclusive fitness, Hamilton had provided the 
first mathematical model to explain the evolution of cooperative traits, including BA, and 
consequently redefined the concept of BA in terms of this explanatory model. This was the 
first significant alteration to the definition of BA since Haldane. Hamilton defined BA as 
negative selection on the focal individual but positive selection for the recipients of the focal 
individual’s behaviour, according to absolute fitness values in the whole population (West et 
al. 2007). Added to this, the levels of selection debate, and the rejection of good-for-the-species 
(or old group selection) arguments, led to authors applying the concept of BA to more species, 
including those that do not exhibit a reproductive division of labour, unlike Haldane. In other 
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words, authors applied the concept to any example of negative selection for the focal individual 
and positive selection for the recipients of the focal individual’s behaviour. But this led to 
further definitional issues with the concept of BA. 
 
 For example, the notion of reciprocal altruism emerged. Reciprocal altruism was 
introduced by R. L. Trivers (1971) in order to account for the evolution of BA without kin 
selection. In other words, reciprocal altruism was intended to explain how BA can evolve 
among non-relatives or even between different species. Trivers (1971) argued that BA can 
evolve among non-relatives if altruistic individuals preferentially benefit other altruistic 
individuals that have helped them in the past, a form of evolutionary game theory (Wilson and 
Wilson 2007). But reciprocal altruism is not true BA because the cost of this type of cooperative 
act is short term and is ultimately beneficial to the focal individual, i.e. if the focal individual 
preferentially benefits another individual in order to gain a future benefit in return then this is 
a form of mutualism because both individuals benefit (Hamilton 1996: 263; West et al. 2007). 
For this reason it is has been argued that reciprocal altruism should be referred to simply as 
mutualism, or reciprocal cooperation (West et al. 2007: 420). But the case of reciprocal 
altruism highlights the issue of whether the cost and benefits involved in BA should be defined 
as short- or long-term fitness effects. I prefer to follow S. A. West, and colleagues (2007) in 
defining the fitness effects of BA as long-term costs and benefits, measured over the lifetime 
fitness of the focal individual. This is because if an individual benefits another at a cost to itself 
in the short-term, that individual could offset that cost in the future by reproducing, for 
example. Moreover, a trait or behaviour that causes the focal individual to benefit others at a 
short-term cost to itself could be beneficial in the long-term if this ensures that it obtains future 
benefits that offset the initial short-term costs, such as reciprocal cooperation. Thus, defining 
the costs and benefits in the short-term is in danger of rendering the concept too general; i.e. 
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this notion of BA would not differentiate between forms of mutualism and genuine cases of 
BA whereby an individual reduces its own fitness when benefitting another. 
 
 Issues to do with the definition of BA still persist however, which I will discuss in more 
detail next. In section 3.1.1., I will address the issue over defining the costs and benefits of BA 
relative to the focal individual’s group or in terms of the absolute fitness of the focal individual 
across the whole population. In section 3.1.2., I address an issue with the definition that I feel 
has been missed within the literature. Namely, I will argue that current definitions of BA lack 
a cause that specifies that the costs and benefits of BA must derive from the focal individual. 
Finally, based on the issues discussed in this section, I will argue for a definition of BA, in 
section 3.1.3., that not only captures the original “self-sacrificing” element of the concept from 
Haldane but can also still fit with the current usage of the concept. 
 
3.1.1. Absolute and relative (or weak and strong) definitions 
 
As I have shown in Chapter 1, group selection was widely rejected for around a decade or so 
from the 1960s due to the emergence of the debate over the levels at which natural selection 
operates. But with the subsequent renewed interest in group selection a major conceptual issue 
arose for the concept of BA. This conceptual issue is to do with whether the fitness 
consequences (i.e. the cost and benefits) of BA should be defined relative to the focal 
individual’s group only, or whether they should be defined with reference to the whole 
breeding population, i.e. defined in absolute terms (West et al. 2007; Wilson 2008a). 
 
 As I explained in chapter 1, old group selection focused on between group (inter-group) 
selection rather than within group (intra-group) selection. Old group selection argued that 
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inter-group selection drives individuals within groups to behave primarily for the benefit of the 
group rather than behaving with unrestrained selfishness (West et al. 2007; Wilson 2008a) — 
which is similar to the good-for-the-species perspective that was also popular prior to the 1960s 
(see Cronin 1991). Whereas, using MLS theory, new group selection theorists argued that 
selection can occur at multiple levels simultaneously and brought attention to how group-level 
factors affect individual fitness within groups; i.e. both inter- and intra-group selection 
dynamics are important (West et al. 2008). Consequently, the attention of group effects on 
individual fitness led some authors to once again claim that it is possible for BA to evolve via 
group selection (Wilson 1975a, 2008a; Sober 1988). 
 
 To do this, D. S. Wilson (1975a) argued that the fitness consequences of BA should be 
defined relatively. Wilson argued that if an individual benefits others in its group, at a cost to 
itself, resulting in the focal individual have a lower fitness than other members of its group, 
then that is BA. Furthermore, because such altruistic individuals increase the fitness of non-
altruist individuals in their group, then their group will be more successful than other groups 
with no (or fewer) altruists. Thus, inter-group selection could drive the evolution of BA, 
according to this approach. However, even though these individuals have a lower fitness in 
their group, they have a higher fitness value compared to members in less successful groups, 
due to inter-group selection. In other words, according to this view, altruistic individuals have 
a low relative fitness (i.e. fitness relative to other members of their group) but a high absolute 
fitness (i.e. defined in comparison to the whole breeding population). Consequently, this type 
of BA is often referred to as ‘weak’ BA (West et al. 2007: 420-421; Okasha 2013). 
 
 It has been argued that weak BA should not be classed as a form of BA (West et al. 
2007, 2008). This is because even though an individual with weak BA will have a lower fitness 
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in their group, that individual will actually have a high absolute fitness value because of the 
beneficial effects of being in a successful group. In other words, weak BA is actually beneficial 
to the focal individual rather than costly, when absolute fitness is taken into account. Therefore, 
weak BA is more akin to mutualism rather than true BA, because both the focal individual and 
members of its group benefit from the weakly altruistic behaviour/trait — the non-altruistic 
members of the group benefit directly from the weakly altruistic members of the group, and 
the weakly altruistic members benefit from being in successful groups — (West et al. 2007, 
2008). 
 
 Wilson (2008a) further pointed out, however, that even though weak BA increases the 
focal individual’s absolute fitness, it cannot evolve without group selection: 
 
Traits for which ∆p < 0 within groups are precisely those that require the ingredients of 
group selection to evolve. (Wilson 2008a: 370. Emphasis their own).  
 
What Wilson means by this is that weak BA cannot evolve without inter-group selection. This 
is because if there is a single group, i.e. the whole breeding population, weak altruists will be 
less fit than non-altruists (just as weak altruists are less fit within groups), therefore non-
altruists will outcompete weak altruists (Okasha 2013). 
 
 However, if the population is not structured into groups, then weak BA will equate to 
strong BA. This is because if there are no discreet groups in the population then the whole 
breeding population equals one group. Consequently, in this case, relative fitness will equal 
absolute fitness because, as I have shown above, relative fitness means the fitness of an 
individual related to its group but here the group = the breeding population. Therefore, in this 
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case, relative fitness = absolute fitness. Or more simply, when a population is not structured 
into groups, there is no group-relative fitness. Thus, the focal individual’s group equals the 
breeding population, and weak BA equals strong BA; altruistic individuals will have a lower 
fitness with respect to the whole breeding population and consequently, BA will decline in the 
population. But, as I have shown in Chapter 1, Hamilton (1964a, 1964b) already provided an 
explanation for the evolution of (strong) BA, even in cases of non-group structured 
populations. Consequently, Wilson’s (2008a) argument that weak BA cannot evolve without 
group selection appears to be incorrect. Without a group-structured population weak BA 
collapses into strong BA, and strong BA does not require group selection in order to evolve. 
 
 Defining the costs and benefits of BA relatively, with respect to the members of the 
group, is not theoretically sound. Weak BA decreases the relative fitness of the focal individual 
but actually increases its absolute fitness due to between-group selection; i.e. weak altruists 
are less fit in their groups but are more fit because groups with weak altruists in them are more 
successful than groups with less or no weak altruists. But in non-group structured populations 
there is no relative fitness as there are no discreet groups, thus the costs and benefits of fitness 
must be defined in absolute fitness terms. Thus, in group structured populations, weak BA is a 
form of mutualism as it increases the focal individual’s absolute fitness, and in non-group 
structured populations, weak BA = strong BA. Consequently, defining BA using relative 
fitness is not only unhelpful but may cause more confusion in the debate (West et al. 2007, 
2008). ‘Weak BA’ and BA are two distinct traits that likely require two independent 
explanations, consequently labelling the former as BA could obscure this point. A trait that 
increases the absolute fitness of its bearer, via between-group selection, is interesting in its own 
right, but it is not a case of BA. Therefore, the costs and benefits of BA are best defined with 
respect to absolute fitness. 
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3.1.2. A case for an additional clause 
 
As I have shown in chapter 1, the concept of BA was introduced and defined in 1932 by J. B. 
S. Haldane. He defined BA as a trait that causes an individual to benefit others at a cost to 
themselves and emphasized the self-sacrificing aspect of the concept. This definition of the 
concept received relatively little attention until the famous papers on kin selection by Hamilton 
(1964a, 1964b). Hamilton argued for a more precise definition that was more suitable for his 
mathematical model (inclusive fitness) than Haldane’s original definition was. Hamilton 
(1964a) focused on the selective outcomes of BA, namely, that BA results in selection against 
the focal individual but selection for the individuals that benefit from the focal individual. 
Specifically, he defined BA as negative selection on the focal individual but positive selection 
for the recipients of the beneficial behaviour (−/+ selection dynamics), measured in long-term 
absolute fitness values — relative to the whole breeding population — (West et al. 2007). 
Whilst Hamilton’s notion of BA was a more precise definition than Haldane’s, in terms of 
mathematical modelling, it lost the “self-sacrificing” element of the original. In other words, 
Hamilton’s new definition is about fitness consequences and simply points to a situation where 
there is negative selection for the focal individual and positive selection for individuals that it 
interacts with. Typically, biologists currently conceive of the concept in the same way due to 
the huge influence of Hamilton and kin selection. Many biologists understand BA in terms of 
fitness consequences and use the concept to describe cooperative traits that cause negative 
selection on the focal individual and positive selection on recipient individual(s) (Foster et al. 
2006; Lehmann and Keller 2006; Ratnieks and Wenseleers 2008; Foster 2009). 
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 However, defining BA based solely on fitness consequences is problematic. This is 
because defining the concept in this way is in danger of rendering the concept vacuous. 
Specifically, this definition cannot, without further assumptions or context, pick out the cause 
of these selection dynamics. To illustrate this it will be useful to briefly describe a hypothetical, 
but biologically possible, example. 
 
 Take, for example, a solitary female (Q) that produces 3 daughters in her first brood. 
When the daughters emerge, they remain in the nest to form a cooperative group with Q. But 
these 3 younger females (W) do not partake in direct reproduction but instead help Q to 
reproduce more (reproductive) offspring. Consequently, W are under negative selection 
because they do not reproduce and Q is under positive selection due to the cooperation of W. 
Without any further information, the concept of BA (if defined by fitness consequences) can 
be applied to this example, specifically to W, but crucially, so can the concept of coercion (if 
also defined by fitness consequences). In other words, without any further information, it is 
equally possible that either 1) W are biologically altruistic and increase their inclusive fitness 
by not reproducing but helping Q, or 2) that Q coerces W into becoming non-reproductive 
helpers. Both 1 and 2 result in negative (direct) fitness for W and positive fitness for Q (i.e. −/+ 
selection dynamics). 
 
 Most authors would agree, however, that the concepts of BA and coercion describe 
different social/cooperative traits. Yet here there is a situation in which both concepts are 
equally applicable if the concepts are defined solely in terms of fitness consequences, and if 
we have no additional information about the cause of the W phenotype. Of course it could be 
argued that biologists will apply either of the concepts based on further information, i.e. they 
are context-based concepts. However, this reply misses the point that if both of these concepts 
 102 
are defined only by their fitness consequences then they both share exactly the same definition. 
Defined by fitness consequences their respective definitions would be: 
 
BAf = a trait that causes negative fitness to the focal individual and positive fitness on the 
recipient individual(s) 
 
Coercionf = a trait that causes negative fitness to the focal individual and positive fitness 
on the recipient individual(s) 
 
In the hypothetical example, above, the focal individual is any member of W since our research 
focus is to explain why the young females became non-reproductive cooperatives for Q. But 
whether the young females develop into the W phenotype via BA, in an attempt to increase 
their inclusive fitness, or via coercion from Q, the fitness consequences will be the same; 
namely a trait (BA or coercion) causes negative fitness on W and positive selection on Q. 
Consequently, both BAf and coercionf will be equally applicable regardless of the actual cause 
for the young females developing into the W phenotype. 
 
 Therefore, defining the concept of BA on fitness consequences alone is not adequate. 
The definition also requires an additional clause stipulating that the trait that causes the −/+ 
selection dynamics must be possessed by the focal individual. For instance, for BA to be 
applicable to the hypothetical example above, it must be shown that the trait that causes W to 
not reproduce but help Q to do so is internal to W. In other words, if the young females develop 
into the W phenotype due to an internal factor, i.e. in order to increase their own inclusive 
fitness, this would be a case of BA, because the young females became non-reproductive 
helpers ‘of their own accord’. Whereas if young females became non-reproductive helpers due 
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to a trait that Q possesses, e.g. the ability to physical dominate her offspring, then this would 
be a case of coercion but not BA. 
 
3.1.3. Biological altruism: a proposed definition 
 
I have shown above, that there are currently multiple definitions of the concept of BA in use, 
weak BA and (strong) BA. The former defines the fitness consequences of BA with respect to 
the group, whereas the latter defines fitness consequences in absolute terms, with respect to the 
whole breeding population. Weak BA is the favoured version of the BA concept used by group 
selection theorists (Wilson 1975a; Sober 1988; Hölldobler and Wilson 2009). It is argued that 
even though weak BA causes the focal individual to be less fit within its group, its absolute 
fitness is raised because its group is more successful than groups with less or no weak altruists 
(less cooperative groups). Thus, weak BA is not truly costly to the focal individual, it is a form 
of mutualism because the focal individual benefits from weak BA (West et al. 2007). 
Consequently, using the concept BA to refer to a trait that is costly to an individual in its group 
(costly to its relative fitness) but actually beneficial to its absolute fitness is likely to add 
confusion to the debate, this is because such a trait is different to true BA (which is costly to 
an individual’s absolute fitness) and potentially requires a different explanation (i.e. group 
selection). 
 
 Additionally, I have shown that since Hamilton (1964a) the concept of BA has been 
defined in terms of fitness consequences only. However, I argue that this is also problematic 
as it potentially renders the concept vacuous. As above, although Hamilton’s definition was 
more precise than Haldane’s (1932) original, it lost the self-sacrificing element of the original. 
Following Hamilton, the concept of BA is currently defined (BAf) as a trait that causes negative 
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fitness on the focal individual and positive fitness on the recipient(s) (West et al. 2007, 2008). 
But if the concept of coercion is also defined solely in terms of fitness consequences then it 
would share the same definition (coercionf). As I have shown above, if defined solely by fitness 
consequences then both BA (BAf) and coercion (coercionf) could equally describe the 
phenotype W in the hypothetical example above, regardless of the actual cause of W. 
Consequently, the concept of BA requires an extra clause in the definition stipulating that the 
trait that causes the −/+ selection dynamics must be possessed by the focal individual. 
 
Therefore, I propose the following definition for the concept of biological altruism: 
 
BA = a trait possessed by the focal individual, that causes it to benefit others at a long-
term cost to itself, resulting in negative selection on the focal individual and positive 
selection on the recipient(s) 
 
Whereby the fitness consequences are measured in absolute terms, with reference to the whole 
breeding population. 
 
3.2. The evolution of eusociality 
 
In this section, I will review the mainstream theories for the evolution of eusociality — kin 
selection and group selection — and the role of the concept of BA within them. Specifically, I 
will examine whether the concept of BA, that I argued for above, is used and/or required by 
either of the theories. Additionally, I will assess if there is any evidence to support the 
application of BA to eusociality. 
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3.2.1. Kin selection: BA and parental manipulation (coercion) 
 
Since Hamilton’s (1964a, 1964b) famous papers, kin selection has been the mainstream theory 
for the evolution of eusociality. Against the backdrop of the Modern Synthesis and the resultant 
gene-centred view of evolution, kin selection was very appealing to eusociality research. This 
is because it provided an explanation for the evolution of the apparent BA of eusocial insect 
workers in genetic terms, within the framework of the Modern Synthesis (Hunt 2007: 194-
195). 
 
 As I have shown in chapter 1, Hamilton (1963, 1964a, 1964b) developed kin selection 
in order to explain the evolution of cooperation, in particular BA, in terms of individual 
selection. Kin selection theory is based on the notion of inclusive fitness, which is the sum of 
an individual’s direct fitness, i.e. their personal success, and indirect fitness, i.e. their 
contribution to the success of their close relatives (West et al. 2007). The key innovation of kin 
selection was the idea that cooperative traits need not only increase direct fitness to evolve, 
but, in special cases, they can also evolve by increasing indirect fitness. Thus, kin selection is 
based on the principle of inclusive fitness maximisation (Foster et al. 2006; West et al. 2007; 
Birch and Okasha 2015). Put simply, natural selection is the process of individuals attempting 
to increase their inclusive fitness. Typically, this occurs through the increase of direct fitness, 
but in the case of BA, for example, inclusive fitness is maximised by increasing indirect fitness 
instead of direct fitness. 
 
 Inclusive fitness maximisation occurs via Hamilton’s rule. As I have shown in Chapter 
1, Hamilton’s rule is defined as rb > c — where r equals the coefficient of relatedness, b the 
benefit to the recipient, and c the cost to the focal individual (Birch and Okasha 2015). 
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Following Hamilton’s rule, BA can evolve via natural selection if the cost to the focal 
individual is outweighed by the benefit to close relatives; rb > c. The key feature of eusociality 
is the reproductive division of labour, i.e. that colonies have reproductive and non-reproductive 
castes — typically a queen (and king in termites) and worker castes, respectively. Thus, in the 
case of eusocial insects, it is argued that even though the workers do not reproduce, whilst 
cooperating for the colony, the cost of not reproducing is outweighed by the benefits this 
behaviour provides to the colony. Furthermore, so long as the trait is not expressed in the queen 
(and king in termites) but only in the worker castes, then this trait can evolve via the 
reproductives. 
 
 Hamilton (1964b, 1972) argued that the evolution of the non-reproductive castes is 
most troubling and important aspect of eusocial insects that must be explained by evolutionary 
theories. This is because he conceived of the evolution of eusociality as the evolution of BA 
due to the Sturtevant-Hamilton problem of sterility, as I argued in chapter 1. According to the 
Sturtevant-Hamilton problem of sterility, the evolution of the non-reproductive castes occurred 
in the absence of colony selection (because eusocial insects evolved from solitary ancestors), 
thus, it follows that some individuals in the species evolved despite not directly reproducing. 
Hamilton concluded that the worker castes evolved because they are biologically altruistic and 
he applied kin selection in order to explain this. He argued that some individuals in the species 
increased their inclusive fitness by becoming non-reproductive workers rather than attempting 
personal reproduction. 
 
 It is important to point out, again, that the concept of BA is not entailed by kin selection 
theory. It is equally theoretically possible that some individuals evolved to be non-reproductive 
workers due to coercion from the queen (Kapheim et al. 2015). In this case, the non-
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reproductives evolve because of a trait possessed by the queen that enables her to coerce some 
of her offspring into becoming workers, rather than a trait (BA) possessed by the offspring that 
causes them to increase their inclusive fitness by developing into workers. 
 
 But due to the success of kin selection, Hamilton had a huge impact on eusociality 
research. As a consequence, since Hamilton, subsequent authors have also argued that the 
presence of the reproductive division of labour, specifically the non-reproductive castes, is the 
most troubling feature that theories of the evolution of eusociality must explain. It is often 
questioned how the non-reproductive castes can evolve via natural selection if they do not 
reproduce (Gadagkar 1996; Queller and Strassmann 1998; Dugatkin 2002; Ratnieks and 
Wenseleers 2008; Wilson 2008b). Thus, authors typically conceptualise the evolution of 
eusociality as the evolution of BA, following Hamilton; alternatives such as parental 
manipulation received less attention. 
 
 Under the kin selection framework, it is argued that in certain environmental and/or 
developmental conditions, some offspring would have a higher inclusive fitness if they 
remained at their maternal nest to become non-reproductive workers rather than attempting to 
establish their own nests. For instance, if there is high competition for suitable nesting sites, in 
terms of location to the primary food sources for example, then some offspring might have a 
higher inclusive fitness by foregoing personal reproduction and increasing their indirect fitness 
by remaining at the nest to help produce siblings, rather than dispersing and attempting to 
establish their own nest. Moreover, the size of an individual may affect their ability to disperse 
and successfully establish their own nest in many species. For example, if an individual is too 
small, due to poor nutrition levels during development, they may not have enough fat stores in 
order to provide sufficient energy whilst they establish their nest (as foraging is often not 
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possible until after nest establishment), thus, becoming workers in their parental nest would be 
more beneficial to their inclusive fitness (Harris and Beggs 1995; Smith et al. 2007). Thus, 
typically, kin selection theorists argue that the reproductive division of labour (and 
consequently eusociality) evolved due to BA; some offspring remained at the nest to become 
non-reproductive workers because they exhibited BA and attempted to increase their inclusive 
fitness. 
 
Is BA compatible with kin selection? 
 
But is the concept of BA, as defined above in 3.1.3., compatible with kin selection theory? Yes 
it is because, firstly, the definition of BA already employed by kin selection is similar to the 
definition I argued for above, albeit without the added clause to do with the possession of the 
trait that causes the specific fitness consequences. Hamilton (1964a, 1996) developed kin 
selection in order to explain the evolution of BA (and other cooperative traits) and, whilst doing 
so, he provided the basis for the definition of BA that is used today by most kin selection 
theorists; namely BAf (West et al. 2007, 2008). Kin selection theorists already define the fitness 
consequences in terms of absolute fitness, with reference to the whole breeding population. 
Moreover, the cost to the focal individual is defined as a long-term cost. Secondly, the added 
clause from the definition of BA in 3.1.3. is compatible with kin selection. Importantly, the 
concept of inclusive fitness is a causal one (Birch and Okasha 2015). As above, inclusive fitness 
is the sum of direct and indirect fitness, and the latter refers to the focal individual’s causal 
impact on the direct fitness of others (West et al. 2007): 
 
An organism’s inclusive fitness is defined as a weighted sum, over all individuals in the 
population (including itself), of those portions of each individual’s reproductive output 
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for which the organism is causally responsible, with the weights given by relatedness 
coefficients. (Birch and Okasha 2015: 25. Emphasis added). 
 
Thus, kin selection is already compatible with the definition of BA I argue for in 3.1.3. due to 
inclusive fitness. Specifically, inclusive fitness can be used to determine whether the trait that 
causes the −/+ fitness consequences is possessed by the focal individual or by another (i.e. the 
queen). For instance, if the focal individual’s inclusive fitness is raised by it becoming a non-
reproductive worker, this is possible evidence that they possess a trait that causes them to 
benefit others at a cost to their direct fitness (i.e. BA). Whereas, if the focal individual’s 
inclusive fitness is not increased by them becoming a non-reproductive worker, then this is 
strong evidence that they are not altruistic, i.e. that the cost to the focal individual is due to a 
trait possessed by another individual (the queen in this case) that causes the focal individual to 
benefit her at a cost to itself (Kapheim et al. 2015). In other words, in the latter case, the focal 
individual becomes a non-reproductive worker not because they are attempting to increase their 
inclusive fitness (BA) but due to coercion from the queen (i.e. parental manipulation). 
 
Does the evidence point to BA or to coercion and parental manipulation? 
 
In the decades since the introduction of kin selection, there has been a lot of theoretical and 
empirical work done in order to support the theory as an explanation of eusociality; with a 
particular focus on sex-ratio conflicts within colonies (see Queller and Strassmann 1998; Abbot 
et al. 2011). However, there is relatively little empirical support for the role of BA in the 
evolution of eusociality (Alonso and Shuck-Paim 2002; Abbot et al. 2011). This is partly 
because the factors that led to the evolution of eusociality within a species may be different to 
the factors that lead to the maintenance of eusociality (Gadagkar 1996; Alonso and Schuck-
 110 
Paim 2002). It is now widely accepted that eusociality evolved directly from solitary ancestors, 
the ‘subsocial’ route, as opposed to evolving from a more simple form of cooperative group 
living without a reproductive division of labour, the ‘semi-social’ or ‘parasocial’ route to 
eusociality (Boomsma 2009; Howard and Thorne 2011).11 Thus, the factors for the emergence 
of a reproductive division of labour and colonial living in a previously solitary species are 
likely to be different to the maintenance, and evolution of further organizational complexity, 
within species that have already evolved eusociality. Consequently, the simple eusocial insect 
species that exhibit facultative eusociality, such as the sweat bee Megalopta genalis (see 
chapter 5), have become good candidate species for studying the factors involved in the 
evolution of eusociality (Kapheim et al. 2015). In such species, every generation typically 
exhibits both solitary and eusocial nests within the population, thus biologists can directly 
observe the factors that lead to a nest becoming eusocial rather than remaining solitary. Despite 
this, the majority of empirical support for kin selection as an explanation for the evolution of 
eusociality is provided indirectly from the studies on sex-ratio conflicts and other phenomena 
in already established eusocial species (Alonso and Schuck-Paim 2002; Foster et al. 2006; 
Abbot et al. 2011); even though this provides support for the theory of kin selection, it does 
not provide direct support for BA. In other words, whilst there is ample support for kin selection 
as a general theory of social and eusocial evolution, there is currently no empirical support for 
the role of BA in the evolution of eusociality. Which I will argue for presently. 
 
 Recent evidence supports the alternate view that the reproductive division of labour is 
a result of coercion (parental manipulation) rather than BA. However, because many biologists 
defined the concept of BA based solely on the fitness consequences (BAf), as above, the 
 
11 Although, for termites (Isoptera), there is less evidence for the subsocial argument, but importantly, 
there is no current evidence for the parasocial argument for termite evolution (Howard and Thorne 
2011; Nalepa 2015). 
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evidence for coercion was interpreted as evidence for BA (Foster et al. 2006; Shimoji et al. 
2018). For instance, F. L. W. Ratnieks, T. Wenseleers (2008), and colleagues (Foster et al. 
2006), have argued for the contradictory concept of enforced or coerced BA. However, this is 
problematic because both coercion and BA are separate concepts that imply different forms of 
cooperation, as I argued above. Ratnieks and Wenseleers (2008) argued that parental 
manipulation (i.e. coercion) was not likely to have been the cause for the evolution of the 
reproductive division of labour (and thus eusociality). They argued that i) coercion requires 
acquiescence,12 thus the reproductive division of labour must have evolved first, via BA, in 
order for coercion to act on it and reinforce the helping behaviour of the workers. And ii) 
because parental manipulation theory does not require that workers evolve the costly concept 
of BA, eusociality should be much more prevalent than it is if parental manipulation is true. 
However, both points i) and ii) are problematic. 
 
 Ratnieks and Wenseleers (2008: Box 1) use a theoretical model in order to argue for 
point i). They argued that BA alone would not account for the extreme degree of reproductive 
division of labour that is typically found in eusocial insect colonies. According to their model, 
without coercion acting on the reproductive division of labour (i.e. if the reproductive division 
of labour was due to BA alone) a percentage of the workers would be selected to reproduce 
(around 13% for workers of singly mated queens and around 54% for workers of multiply 
mated queens) because workers are more closely related to their sons then brothers, in 
haplodiploid Hymenoptera. Thus, they argued that only through coercion can eusocial insect 
colonies achieve the extreme degree of reproductive division of labour that is typical (i.e. only 
1-2 reproductives and tens to millions of non-reproductives). Using Hamilton’s rule they 
 
12 Hamilton (1996: 361) also argued that parental manipulation would require acquiescence of the 
workers otherwise they would evolve mechanisms to evade coercion. 
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provide an elegant model to support their claim and applied it to honey bees (Apis mellifera) 
and a selection of wasp species (including Vespula vulgaris). They demonstrated that, in the 
absence of policing in queenless colonies, a percentage — close to that predicted by their model 
— of workers had activated ovaries and could thus potentially reproduce (Wenseleers and 
Ratnieks 2006; Ratnieks and Wenseleers 2008). Whilst their data supports their claim that the 
extreme reproductive division of labour is only possible through different forms of coercion 
(i.e. queen and/or worker policing of worker-laid eggs, ovary suppression via pheromones, 
polymorphic castes etc.), it does not support their claim that the remaining non-reproductive 
workers are altruistic. In other words, it does not support point i). In fact, it provides evidence 
against the previously mainstream view that workers are altruistic; i.e. this shows that worker 
reproductive potential is externally inhibited. Moreover, since they did not study the 
development of the colonies, but only what happens if you disturb mature colonies by removing 
the queen, then all that can reasonably be inferred from their empirical data is that the 
ontogenetic emergence of the reproductive division of labour in these species is multifaceted 
and complex. Moreover, genetic models such as theirs ignore the multiple biological factors 
that may also inhibit worker reproduction in the species that they studied, e.g. developmental 
plasticity, polyethism, pheromone signals, competition for ovipositing space, dominance, etc. 
For example, in the common wasp (Vespula vulgaris) many workers do have activated ovaries 
in queenless colonies but fail to successfully raise their offspring because multiple eggs are 
often oviposited in the same comb cells (Potter 1964). As I will show in chapter 5, in V. 
vulgaris, colony organization rapidly declines after queen death (foraging and other tasks 
almost cease) and cannibalism of the brood by workers occurs (Potter 1964). Thus, the fact that 
a large percentage of workers still do not reproduce in the absence of coercion, in V. vulgaris, 
is better explained by these biological and organizational factors rather than by the concept of 
BA or enforced BA. Furthermore, in their study, Wenseleers and Ratnieks (2006) used colonies 
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from evolutionary advanced eusocial insect species, in which eusociality is obligate; i.e. 
species whereby selection likely takes place at the colony level. Therefore, their use of the 
concept of BA to such cases is misplaced. If the colony is the unit of selection then the members 
of that colony do not directly partake in selection, and thus, the non-reproductive castes are not 
evolutionary individuals, i.e. they do not have direct fitness values. Since BA is a concept that 
refers to a trait that causes direct fitness consequences for its bearer (and those individuals that 
it interacts with) then the concept is not applicable to the non-reproductive castes of colonies 
that are evolutionary superorganisms. Therefore, even if their data supports their model for 
coercion, it does not support their use of BA. However, point ii) of their argument may still be 
correct. 
 
 Following E. L. Charnov (1978), Ratnieks and Wenseleers (2008) argued that, in the 
evolutionary origins of eusociality, if a female is singly mated then parental manipulation 
benefits the parents and reproductive siblings of workers and, crucially, this is not costly to the 
non-reproductive workers. This is so because, as Hamilton (1964a) pointed out, full siblings of 
singly mated females have the same average degree of relatedness as parent-offspring (i.e. 
1/2).13 Therefore, from the worker’s perspective, there is little difference between helping to 
rear full siblings or producing one’s own offspring. Thus, they argued that if BA was not 
required then eusociality should have evolved many more times than it has (point ii): 
 
In fact, given that both parents and siblings benefit from coercing offspring to help their 
parents […] and that offspring are indifferent to being coerced if they are rearing full 
 
13 This is the case for both diploid and haplodiploid species. But in the latter, the argument applies to 
daughter offspring of the queen and full sister relationships. 
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siblings […] we suggest that eusociality should be more common if it had originated as 
a result of coercion. (Ratnieks and Wenseleers 2008: 50). 
 
However, whilst Charnov (1978: 456-457) did argue that the offspring of a singly mated parent 
would be indifferent to raising full siblings or their own offspring, he did not use this to argue 
for BA and against the role of coercion, or parental manipulation, in the evolutionary origins 
of eusociality. Indeed, Charnov (1978) actually argued that parental manipulation, but not BA, 
is likely to have been the key to the evolution of eusociality. He argued that this is because, 
although offspring would attempt to oppose the coercion of their parent if they were not 
biologically altruistic, the offspring would not evolve mechanisms to evade coercion because 
there is no selection for this: 
 
It seems likely that the first attempts at parent➝offspring parasitism would result in 
actions by the offspring to prevent it […]. However, mother has a large advantage here. 
She is selected to pursue the parasitism even if she kills some of her daughters — while 
her daughters are not selected to continue stopping her. A daughter loses fitness by being 
killed by its mother; it does not gain by killing its mother. (Charnov 1978: 457). 
 
But Charnov (1978: 460) argued that the conditions for successful parental manipulation, and 
thus the evolution of eusociality, would be rare — singly-mated female and daughters 
remaining at the nest — thus, providing an argument why eusociality rarely evolved. Thus, 
point ii) of Ratnieks and Wenseleers’ (2008) argument may not be correct either. 
 
 Ratnieks and Wenseleers’ (2008) argument for enforced BA relies on points i) and ii) 
above. However, I argue that the fact that some workers still do not attempt to reproduce in the 
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absence of coercion does not, in itself, support their claim that BA is also involved (point i)). 
They must provide evidence for this. I argue that the reason that they did not was because 
Ratnieks and Wenseleers (2008) employed the fitness consequences (BAf) definition of BA, 
thus they consider any worker in the colony that does not reproduce as altruistic. In other words, 
according to their use of the concept, any worker that does not reproduce automatically 
qualifies as altruistic because it has a negative fitness but confers positive fitness on the 
reproductive individuals in the colony, i.e. satisfying the −/+ selection dynamics (i.e. BAf). But 
this use of the concept of BA is problematic, as I argued in 3.1.2. Therefore, to claim that BA 
is involved, Ratnieks and Wenseleers must provide evidence that any worker that still does not 
reproduce, in the absence of coercion, does so because of a trait that they possess which causes 
them to maximize their inclusive fitness by not reproducing. Point ii) of Ratnieks and 
Wenseleers’ argument — that eusociality would be more prevalent if it evolved due to parental 
manipulation alone — was based on the statement from Charnov (1978); i.e. that offspring 
(workers) would be indifferent to parental manipulation. However, Charnov (1978) argued that 
the conditions for this would be rare, and unlike Ratnieks and Wenseleers, he argued that 
parental manipulation was key for the evolution of eusociality. Indeed, other authors have 
argued that the ecological and biological conditions — e.g. lack of suitable nesting sites, 
monogamy, and extended parental care — are likely to be the key factors for the rarity of 
eusociality (Queller 1996; Boomsma 2009). Too much focus on genetic models, and the 
concept of BA, has the danger of authors potentially missing key biological and ecological 
factors in the evolution of eusociality (Hunt 2007). Consequently, Ratnieks and Wenseleers 
must provide more evidence in order to justify their argument for BA (or enforced BA). 
 
 Recently, some eusociality researchers have specifically assessed whether BA does 
play a role in the reproductive division of labour and the evolution of eusociality. K. M. 
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Kapheim, and colleagues (2015), assessed whether daughters of the facultative sweat bee 
Megalopta genalis become workers because they are altruistic or due to parental manipulation. 
In every generation, M. genalis (reproductive) females can either become solitary 
reproductives or produce a eusocial colony. Kapheim and colleagues (2015) found that 
offspring do not increase their inclusive fitness by remaining in the nest as non-reproductive 
workers, instead, they found that they do so because of coercion from the queen. The queen 
produces workers, firstly, by providing a restricted diet to daughter offspring (those that she 
wants to become workers) resulting in daughters that are smaller than the queen, secondly, this 
enables the queen to coerce her smaller daughters into becoming non-reproducing workers 
(Kapheim et al. 2013, 2015, 2016). Thus, in M. genalis, whether a female remains a solitary 
reproductive or produces a eusocial colony is not decided by the presence of altruistic workers, 
instead it is decided by the ability of the female to coerce some of her offspring into becoming 
workers. 
 
 In sum, there is a lack of direct evidence for the role of BA in the evolution of 
eusociality using kin selection models. Most arguments for BA are justified by theoretical 
models, for example the kin selection model by Ratnieks and Wenseleers (2008) above. There 
is, however, a lack of direct empirical evidence for BA. The majority of empirical evidence 
used to support arguments for BA is actually only evidence for the general theory of kin 
selection (Queller and Strassmann 1998; Alonso and Schuck-Paim 2002). This lack of direct 
evidence for BA has not been made apparent due to most eusociality researchers employing 
the fitness consequences definition (BAf); i.e. according to this definition of the concept, 
workers are “altruistic” simply by the fact that they do not reproduce. But this definition of the 
concept is problematic because coercive traits would also qualify as BA, as I argued in 3.1.2. 
For BA to be applicable to workers it must be demonstrated that offspring develop into non-
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reproducing workers due to internal causes; e.g. to maximize their inclusive fitness. Indeed, 
Kapheim and colleagues (2015) found, in M. genalis, daughters do not increase their inclusive 
fitness by becoming workers but instead become workers because of coercion from the queen. 
Parental manipulation is a form of kin selection because the coercion occurs between related 
individuals (Bourke and Franks 1995). Therefore, given the lack of direct empirical evidence 
for BA and the increasing evidence for coercion in the reproductive division of labour within 
colonies (Ratnieks and Wenseleers 2008; Kapheim et al. 2015; Shimoji et al. 2018), the role of 
parental manipulation in the evolution of eusociality should be investigated further. 
 
3.2.2. Group selection: MLS1 and MLS2 
 
As I have shown in Chapter 1, the levels of selection debate in the 1960s led to the widespread 
rejection of group selection in evolutionary biology (Cronin 1991; Chancellor 2015). Even 
though new forms of group selection emerged in the subsequent decades, kin selection 
remained the mainstream model for studying the evolution of cooperation and sociality (West 
et al. 2007, 2008). However, due to the influential work of B. Hölldobler, E. O. Wilson and 
colleagues, group selection is once again at the forefront of eusociality research (Wilson and 
Wilson 2007; Hölldobler and Wilson 2009; Nowak et al. 2010; Wilson and Nowak 2014). As 
I highlighted in chapter 1, new group selection is based on MLS, which emphasises the fact 
that selection can occur at multiple levels simultaneously (Wilson and Wilson 2007; West et 
al. 2008; Birch and Okasha 2015). MLS is differentiated into two versions, namely MLS1: the 
effects of group living on individuals, and MLS2: groups that are units of selection, or groups 
that are more than simply the sum of their parts (Damuth and Heisler 1988; Hamilton and 
Fewell 2013). More simply, MLS1 is applicable to cases where groups are not units of selection 
but individual fitness is affected by being part of a group, and MLS2 is only applicable to cases 
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in which groups have properties or traits at the collective level that result in group selection — 
whereby between-group selection is high and within-group selection is low or zero — (Okasha 
2014). Thus, MLS2 is group selection. 
 
 For eusociality research, MLS1 is more appropriate to the evolution of eusociality, and 
the more evolutionary basal species. This is because colony selection is unlikely to have 
occurred in the evolutionary origins of eusociality as it does not occur in the extant basal 
species that are facultatively eusocial; e.g. M. genalis. Thus, the main focus of this approach 
would be to assess whether MLS1 drove the evolution of eusociality. Whereas MLS2 is only 
applicable to the more evolutionary derived species in which colonies are potentially the units 
of selection (i.e. between-colony selection is stronger than within-colony selection); e.g. honey 
bees (A. mellifera), etc. (Hölldobler and Wilson 2009; Johnson and Linksvayer 2010). In this 
context MLS2 is, therefore, appropriate for studying the evolution of the superorganism but 
not the evolutionary origins of eusociality (Maynard Smith and Szathmáry 1995; Hou et al. 
2010; Hamilton and Fewell 2013). 
 
Is BA compatible with MLS? 
 
True BA, as I have defined it in 3.1.3., is not compatible with MLS. This is because, according 
to this approach, individual selection is defined as within-group selection and consequently, 
individual traits that affect fitness, like BA, are defined in terms of relative fitness (Okasha 
2013). MLS theorists redefined BA in terms of relative fitness (West et al. 2007; Wilson 
2008a). According to MLS, even though BA causes individuals to be less fit within their 
groups, it can evolve in the population because groups with more altruists out compete groups 
with less altruists. However, in this case the “altruists” also benefit, in terms of absolute fitness, 
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due to the fact that they are in more successful groups. Thus, only weak BA is compatible with 
group selection, but as I have argued above in 3.1.1., weak BA is not true BA (West et al. 
2007). However, even though BA is not compatible with MLS, this theory could still be 
applicable to the study of the evolutionary dynamics in eusociality: MLS1 could possibly 
explain the evolution of eusociality, and MLS2 could possibly explain the evolution of the 
superorganism. 
 
MLS or kin selection? 
 
It is widely argued that MLS and kin selection are formally equivalent as they both correctly 
describe population gene frequency for a given trait (West et al. 2008; Birch and Okasha 2014). 
However, S. Okasha (2014) argued that this does not entail that they provide the same causal 
explanation; kin selection argues that traits evolve due to Hamilton’s rule and inclusive fitness 
maximization, whereas MLS argues that traits evolve due to within- and between-group 
selection dynamics. Consequently, Okasha (2014) argued that biologists should choose 
between the two different approaches based on causal aptness, i.e. choose the approach that 
better describes the causal structure of selection for a specific case. In group structured 
populations, kin selection may be more appropriate if group fitness is simply the sum of the 
fitness of each member in the group. In this case, individual selection is primary (even if group 
membership affects individual fitness) as groups are not units of selection (MLS1). Kin 
selection can also deal with group effects on individual fitness and, thus, in cases where groups 
are not units of selection (MLS1) both kin selection and MLS1 are two different ways to 
describe the same situation (West et al. 2008; Birch and Okasha 2015). Moreover, kin selection 
is generally considered to be easier to apply than MLS1 (West et al. 2008). However, when 
group are units of selection then biologists should apply MLS2, since in this situation kin 
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selection does not correctly describe the causal structure of selection (for more details on the 
mathematical aspects of each model, and their issues, see Okasha 2014). In other words, certain 
traits evolve within the population because of the selection between groups, which causes 
group level adaptations to evolve (e.g. polymorphism in the non-reproductive worker castes). 
 
 As A. H. Sturtevant (1938) argued long ago, selection at the colony level is unlikely to 
occur in the evolutionary origins of eusociality since eusociality evolved from solitary 
ancestors. Moreover, colony selection does not occur in the most basal extant eusocial insect 
species (Johnson and Linksvayer 2010). In many of the facultative eusocial species there is 
little physical difference between the queen and workers and, consequently, workers are fully 
totipotent, even in species with slight body size differences between the queen and workers 
such as M. genalis (Bourke 1999; Anderson and McShea 2001; Smith et al. 2009). In such 
species, even though workers typically do not reproduce, workers can replace the queen in the 
event of her death, for example. Thus, in these species, selection is typically operating at the 
individual level, specifically on those individuals that reproduce (i.e. queens, queen/king in 
termites). It could be argued that the queen benefits from being in the colony and therefore 
MLS1 is more causally apt than kin selection. However, if coercion is the main factor in the 
reproductive division of labour (as current evidence alludes to, see above) then the workers do 
not benefit from being in the group. Instead, if the reproductive division of labour emerges due 
to coercion then kin selection is more causally apt. Since the non-reproductive workers evolve 
due to parental manipulation (via kin selection) rather than the indirect benefits of being in a 
group. Specifically, those individuals that can successfully produce non-reproductive workers 
are selected for, thus the worker phenotype is indirectly selected for via the reproductive 
parents. An argument very similar to Darwin’s (see chapter 2). 
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 However, once colony selection emerges in a species, then MLS2 is more appropriate 
than kin selection. As the organizational complexity within colonies increases, for example 
larger colony size, increased polymorphism, pheromone signalling, polyethism, etc., then 
obligate eusociality emerges whereby members of the colony cannot develop or survive as 
solitary individuals (i.e. decrease of worker totipotency), consequently the colony itself 
becomes the evolutionary individual (Bourke 1999; Johnson and Linksvayer 2010; Okasha 
2014). Colony selection feeds back onto the organization of the colony and drives the evolution 
of further organizational complexity. Consequently, between-group selection becomes the 
primary cause of the evolution of traits in these species. Thus, MLS2 is more causally apt for 
the maintenance and further evolution of eusociality compared to kin selection (Anderson and 
McShea 2001; Hölldobler and Wilson 2009; Okasha 2014). 
 
3.2.3. Evolution of eusociality: a summary 
 
Both kin selection and group selection (MLS) are the mainstream evolutionary approaches to 
eusociality today, but a strong debate continues between theorists and biologists as to which is 
more appropriate (West et al. 2008; Nowak et al. 2010; Abbot et al. 2011; Wilson and Nowak 
2014; Birch and Okasha 2015). It has been shown that both models are formally equivalent, 
consequently some have argued that kin selection should be preferred as it is a more general 
theory (West et al. 2007, 2008). However, even though they are formally equivalent, both 
models provide different causal explanations for the evolution of a given trait; in the former 
inclusive fitness and Hamilton’s rule and in the latter within- and between-group selection 
dynamics. Recently, Okasha (2014) has provided an appealing argument for how researchers 
can choose between the two approaches for a given species or trait, namely causal aptness. 
Broadly, this approach argues that kin selection is more appropriate in situations where groups 
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are not the unit of selection and, alternatively, when groups are the unit of selection then group 
selection (MLS2) is more appropriate. 
 
 Okasha’s (2014) causal aptness approach is welcome since the evolution of eusociality 
is likely to involve two distinct stages, whereby kin selection occurs and then MLS2 occurs. 
Firstly, in the evolutionary origins of eusociality colony selection did not likely occur. This is 
because eusociality evolved from solitary ancestors, thus selection was likely to have taken 
place between solitary reproductives and reproductives that produce (small) colonies that 
consist of non-reproductive workers (Sturtevant 1938; Boomsma 2009; Johnson and 
Linksvayer 2010). The evidence from the extant basal eusocial insect species supports this. 
Colony selection does not occur in facultatively eusocial species such at the sweat bee M. 
genalis (Kapheim et al. 2015). Therefore, eusociality is likely to have evolved from a process 
of kin selection. Secondly, as colonies evolved more organizational complexity and obligate 
eusociality emerged, so did colony selection. In other words, as colonies became larger and 
individuals became more specialized (i.e. worker polymorphism) the division of labour became 
more complex (Bourke 1999). Consequently, individuals became totally dependent on the 
colony for their development and survival (obligate eusociality), and between-group selection 
emerged. Colony selection likely drove the evolution of further organizational complexity, 
which resulted in the emergence of hierarchically-organized superorganisms (i.e. evolutionary 
and physiological individuality at the colony level) such as in A. mellifera (see chapter 5). Thus, 
obligate eusociality is likely to have evolved via MLS2. Consequently, kin selection is more 
appropriate for studying the evolutionary origins of eusociality and MLS2 more appropriate 
for studying the maintenance of eusociality and the evolution of superorganisms. 
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 However, eusociality researchers should take caution not to focus solely on the genetic 
level when using either kin selection or group selection. This is because important biological 
factors, such as developmental plasticity, may also have played a key role in the evolution of 
eusociality (Hunt 2007: 194-201; Nalepa 2015; Ronai et al. 2016). M. J. West-Eberhard (1996; 
2003) proposed the groundplan theory, which argued that division of labour could evolve due 
to developmental life phases (i.e. reproduction, foraging, etc.), that developed in solitary 
ancestors, being differentially expressed among the members of eusocial colonies, resulting in 
reproductive and non-reproductive castes (Hunt 2007; Johnson and Linksvayer 2010). Other 
authors have argued that, due to developmental plasticity, individuals have differences in their 
response thresholds to different tasks, resulting in division of labour within groups (Robinson 
1992; Page Jr. and Erber 2002; Schulz et al. 2002). In other words, differences in response 
thresholds among members of a group would result in some individuals more responsive to 
cues for foraging and other more responsive to cues for nest construction, for example. This 
argument has been supported experimentally; solitary bees were forced to nest together and a 
division of labour naturally emerged, with one becoming a dominant reproductive and the 
other(s) doing “worker” tasks (Page Jr. and Erber 2002). Such developmental plasticity could 
enable parents to manipulate the development of their offspring such that they are more prone 
to undertake “worker” tasks, and coercion from the parent could enforce this and inhibit their 
reproduction. In other words, forms of division of labour within groups may emerge more 
naturally than was previously assumed under the more genetic-focused approaches of the 
Modern Synthesis. As well as other factors, such as monogamy and extended parental care, 
developmental plasticity may promote the evolution of parental manipulation. 
 
 Since eusociality has evolved multiple times within insects, therefore the evolutionary 
origins may differ in certain species (Hunt 2007; Hölldobler and Wilson 2009). However, most 
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evidence points to eusociality evolving from solitary ancestors (subsocial route), rather than 
from other forms of sociality (semi-social route) (Boomsma 2009). Consequently, theories that 
are compatible with kin selection, i.e. worker BA, parental manipulation, the groundplan 
theory, are good candidates to explain the evolutionary origins of eusociality. But the 
maintenance and evolution of organizational complexity in extant eusocial insect species is 
more likely to be a case of colony selection. Thus, in this case MLS2 approaches are more 
appropriate (Okasha 2014). Importantly, due to the lack of direct evidence of BA, researchers 
should not only focus on the concept of BA in evolutionary studies of eusociality, but should 
also address the alternatives such as parental manipulation, the groundplan theory, etc. (Hunt 




In this chapter I have assessed the role of BA in evolutionary studies of eusociality. In part 1 I 
highlighted some definitional issues with the concept of BA. Firstly, I argued that weak BA, 
which is the version of BA employed by MLS models, is not true BA because it defines the 
fitness consequences in terms of relative fitness. Weak BA is defined as a trait that causes its 
bearer to benefit other members of its group at a cost to itself, resulting in the focal individual 
having a lower fitness within its group. However, because groups with more weak altruists do 
better than groups with less or none, then weak BA results in an increase in the focal 
individual’s absolute fitness, via between-group selection. In other words, weak BA reduces 
the focal individual’s relative fitness within its group but increases its absolute fitness within 
the whole breeding population. Weak BA involves no cost in terms of absolute fitness and is 
not, therefore, true BA (West et al. 2007). Secondly, I highlighted an issue with the definition 
of BA that is employed in kin selection models, one that is rarely touched upon within the 
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literature. Specifically, since Hamilton (1964a) many authors define the concept of BA based 
on fitness consequences alone (BAf), but this is problematic because it potentially renders the 
concept vacuous. This is because BA is not the only trait that can cause the −/+ selection 
dynamics. For instance, whilst BA would cause the negative selection for the focal individual 
and positive selection on individuals it interacts with, so too could traits such as coercion, for 
example. Defining BA by fitness consequences alone cannot pick out the cause of the fitness 
consequences without further context. Thus, I argued that the concept of BA requires an 
additional clause stipulating that the focal individual possesses the trait that is the cause of the 
fitness consequences. Consequently, I proposed the following definition of BA: a trait 
possessed by the focal individual, that causes it to benefit others at a long-term cost to itself, 
resulting in negative selection on the focal individual and positive selection on the recipient(s). 
 
 In part 2 I reviewed the role of BA in the two mainstream evolutionary theories of 
eusociality, namely kin selection and group selection. I argued that, despite the widespread use 
of BA within eusociality research, only kin selection is compatible with the concept of BA that 
I proposed; group selection is only compatible with weak BA but, as I argued in part 1, weak 
BA is not true BA. However, there is a lack of empirical evidence for BA in eusocial insects. 
On the other hand, there is empirical evidence for coercion and parental manipulation (Ratnieks 
and Wenseleers 2008; Kapheim et al. 2015; Shimoji et al. 2018). Further, I argued that both 
kin selection and MLS are likely to be involved in the evolutionary dynamics of eusociality, 
this is because there is likely to be at least two phases in the evolution of eusocial insects; the 
origin of eusociality (first phase) and the emergence of the superorganism (second phase). 
Eusociality likely evolved from solitary ancestors in insects (the subsocial route), and therefore 
in the evolutionary origins of eusociality colony selection is unlikely to occur. Specifically, 
selection is likely to have taken place between females that are solitary and females that can 
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coerce some of their offspring into being non-reproductive workers (eusociality). Therefore, in 
the first phase, eusociality likely evolved due to parental manipulation (kin selection). In some 
species, organizational complexity within colonies increased over generations and the 
members of the colony become more specialised (a decrease in individual totipotency). 
Consequently, obligate eusociality emerged and colony selection arose in these species. In 
other words, selection began to primarily take place between colonies in the more complex 
eusocial species. Additionally, colony level selection fed back on colony organization leading 
to the evolution of the superorganism, such as in honey bees (which I will explain in more 
detail in chapters 4 and 5). Thus, in the second phase, superorganisms evolved via group 
selection (MLS2). Importantly, there is no evidence that BA occurred in either phase of 
eusociality evolution; in the first phase, even though kin selection occurs, it is not altruistic 
workers but parental manipulation that drove eusociality to evolve, in the second phase, 
colonies are the units of selection and thus BA is not applicable to individual members of the 
colony — weak BA could be applicable but, again, this is not true BA. 
 
 It is theoretically possible that BA occurred in eusocial insects; i.e. it is possible that 
the non-reproductive workers evolved because they are biologically altruistic. However, there 
has been little empirical research done in order to directly test this, even though there has been 
a lot of empirical research carried out that supports the theory of kin selection more generally. 
When this question has been empirically assessed, the evidence points to coercion rather than 
BA (Kapheim et al. 2015). In other words, in the evolutionary origins of eusocial insects, 
parents coerced some of their offspring into becoming non-reproductive workers (i.e. parental 
manipulation theory). Moreover, there is plenty of evidence from many species of eusocial 
insects, especially in the more derived species, that coercion (from the queen and other 
workers) is crucial for the development and maintenance of the reproductive division of labour 
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once eusociality has evolved. Furthermore, in those species where colony selection occurs, the 
colony is the unit of selection not the individual insects, which entails that the worker castes 
cannot be biologically altruistic, since BA is by definition a trait that concerns evolutionary 
individuals (i.e. those individuals under direct selection). Therefore, even though BA is 
theoretically possible in the evolutionary origins and the more basal species without colony 
selection, there is currently no evidence for it. Moreover, this undermines the claim that the 
concept of BA is a fundamental problem for eusociality research (claim (1)). Researchers 
should look at the alternatives to BA, such as coercion or developmental plasticity, when 
researching the evolutionary origins of eusociality under kin selection. In general, more 
empirical research, from a greater number of evolutionary basal eusocial insect species without 
colony selection, needs to be carried out in order to assess whether BA does occur in any 
species, or whether factors such as coercion are more widespread than was recently known. 
 
 In the next chapters I will explore the concept of the superorganism in more detail, but 
from a functional/organizational perspective rather than solely from an evolutionary 
perspective, as above. In chapter 4, I will review the history and current status of the concept, 
showing that it is currently typically understood from an evolutionary perspective (using group 
selection), even though originally it was primarily used from an organizational/physiological 
perspective. In chapter 5, I develop an organizational approach to the superorganism, one that 
focuses on the ontogenetic and actual organizations within colonies. I apply this approach to 
three case studies in order to assess the types of individuality at the colony level — i.e. 
evolutionary (unit of selection) and/or physiological-like (hierarchical-organization) — across 
different representative species of eusocial insects, with the aim of further showing that BA is 
not likely to be a correct description of the worker castes. I will show that colonies of some 
species qualify as evolutionary units of selection, whereas those in the most evolutionary 
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derived species also qualify as physiological-like superorganisms because of their hierarchical-
organization. In other words, colonies of some species can be considered, in many aspects, to 
be analogous to physiological individuals because of their integrated organization. Thus, in 
such cases the individuals in those colonies do not develop into workers because of BA but 
rather they do so because they act as functional parts of an integrated hierarchically-organized 
unit; i.e. they are responding to regulatory signals from the collective colony level. 
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Due to their unique organizational properties — such as the reproductive division of labour, 
high cooperation, polymorphism, etc. — eusocial insect colonies have long been viewed as 
biological individuals in their own right (Emerson 1939; Hamilton 1972). Indeed, this led 
Wheeler (1928) to apply the concept of the superorganism to eusocial insects; he argued that 
colonies are higher-order biological organisms. In chapter 1, I argued that one of the reasons 
that the widespread use of the concept of BA was problematic for eusociality research was the 
decline of alternative perspectives, particularly the superorganism argument. This was due to 
Hamilton’s kin selection theory and the conceptualisation of the evolution of eusociality as the 
evolution of BA. Because kin selection was such a groundbreaking theory for eusociality 
research (and evolutionary biology in general) it led to the widespread use of the concept of 
BA. This, in turn, led to a prominent view, in post-Hamiltonian eusociality research, that 
eusocial insect colonies are groups formed of altruistic and non-altruistic individuals. 
However, as I argued in the previous chapter, if colonies exhibit a form of individuality at the 
colony level (either evolutionary and, possibly, physiological-like) then the concept of BA is 
not applicable to the members of the colony as they are not evolutionary individuals in their 
own right, instead they are lower-level parts in a higher-order system. 
 
 In this chapter, I will review the history and current state-of-the-art of the 
superorganism concept. I will begin, in section 4.1., by reviewing the history of the colonies-
as-individuals argument. I will highlight how the concept of the superorganism was originally 
approached from and evolutionary and a physiological perspective. In other words, it was used 
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to argue that eusocial insect colonies are higher-level biological individuals in the fullest sense 
of the term. I will then assess the decline of the concept, highlighting the prominent role of kin 
selection and the concept of BA in its decline. I will then introduce the notion on eusociality 
complexity spectrum. This is the notion that there is qualitative differences in colony 
organization across eusocial insects; whereby in the large colonies of the most complex species 
(typically the evolutionary derived species), colony organization and cohesiveness are the 
result of a network of interactions among the members. I then argue that research into complex 
eusocial insects, as well as the emergence of new group selection, led to the revival of the idea 
of the superorganism in post-Hamiltonian eusociality research. However, the concept is 
currently understood using an evolutionary perspective of biological individuality. 
Consequently, today the concept is used to denote colonies that are units of selection; i.e.  
evolutionary superorganisms. 
 
 In section 4.2., I assess why the superorganism is currently only approached from an 
evolutionary perspective. I will argue that this is the result of the problem of hierarchy. It is 
often presupposed that colony cohesiveness is the result of self-organization in complex 
species, and that, even the large colonies of the most complex eusocial insect species can be 
explained without referring to a top-down hierarchical control. As a result, current explanatory 
approaches that focus on the physiological and proximate causes for colony cohesiveness (i.e. 
the actual organization) are centred around the concept of self-organization — which I will 
refer to as the self-organization (SO) approach. According to this view, even the most complex 
eusocial systems can be explained by appealing to a set of local interactions between parts of 
an initially disordered system, without the need of any hierarchical control.  Consequently, 
colonies in complex eusocial insects are typically conceived of as self-organized groups that 
can be units of selection, and thus evolutionary superorganisms. Finally, I will conclude that 
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whilst the evolutionary notion of the superorganism is useful, particularly for an etiological 
perspective, it cannot assess the organizational differences across colonies of different species. 
 
4.1. The superorganism: from a physiological to an evolutionary 
perspective 
 
4.1.1. The superorganism of old 
 
In pre-Hamiltonian eusociality research the colonies-as-individuals argument was widespread, 
as I highlighted in chapter 1. One of the first to develop the idea of colonies-as-individuals into 
theory was W. M. Wheeler (1911; 1920; 1926; 1928). Wheeler was a leading biologist of his 
time and had a great impact on eusociality research, publishing numerous works on ants and 
other eusocial insects (Melander and Carpenter 1937). Not only was Wheeler well-read in 
biology but also in philosophy (Melander and Carpenter 1937). Consequently, Wheeler (1911; 
1926) approached the problem of individuality in eusociality from a philosophical, as well as 
biological, perspective. 
 
 Eusocial insect colonies act as a cohesive unit, they are individuated and persist over 
time (once colonies are formed they do not dissolve or merge with other colonies), they 
undergo development (as opposed to being formed by the aggregation of a group of solitary 
insects), and most importantly, colonies can be a reproducing unit because of the reproductive 
division of labour. Due to this, analogies between eusocial insect colonies and organisms have 
tempted authors for many years (Emerson 1939: 182-183). However, Wheeler (1911) went 
further and argued that eusocial insect colonies are organisms. He did so for two reasons, firstly 
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eusocial insect colonies matched his definition of an organism and secondly, because of 
Wheeler’s philosophical perspective on biological individuality. 
 
 Wheeler (1911: 307-308) understood the concept of organism using a dynamical or 
processual perspective. He thus defined organisms as: 
 
An organism is a complex, definitely coördinated and therefore individualized system of 
activities, which are primarily directed to obtaining and assimilating substances from an 
environment, to producing other similar systems, known as offspring, and to protecting 
the system itself […] from disturbances emanating from the environment. (Wheeler 
1911: 308). 
 
Importantly, as opposed to other definitions around that time (Pradeu 2016: 805-807), this 
definition does not mention physical interconnectedness of the parts that form the whole, or 
body, of the organism. Instead, the key feature of organisms, according to Wheeler, is the 
integrated set of functions/processes which together form an individuated system. Such a 
system is an organism if it can maintain itself within its environment and produce other similar 
offspring systems. Thus, it is easy to see why eusocial insect colonies matched Wheeler’s 
notion of an organism. Even though eusocial insect colonies are not physically interconnected, 
they are individuated systems that are internally coordinated (in this case, according to 
Wheeler, primarily for reproduction), they produce offspring (either by swarming or releasing 
young reproductives which form their own colonies — Cronin et al. 2013) and they maintain 
themselves against perturbations, e.g. many species have ‘soldier’ castes or specific defence 
responses (Wheeler 1928). Therefore, Wheeler’s definition of an organism was not limited to 
physically interconnected systems such as cells and multicellular organisms but also eusocial 
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insect colonies and other biological systems. This is turn, was because of Wheeler’s specific 
philosophical perspective of biological individuality. 
 
 Wheeler (1911: 308-310, 1926) was sympathetic to the idea of ‘emergent evolution’, 
which, as a non-reductionist position, was opposed to the mainstream reductionism of the 
materialists during that time. It is from this basis that Wheeler composed his definition of an 
organism that, as above, did not emphasize physical interconnectedness but instead emphasized 
functional organization. Based on this, Wheeler (1911: 308-309) argued for a hierarchy of 
organisms; from cells, cell aggregates (biofilms), multicellular organisms, eusocial colonies, 
human society, and more. With multicellular organisms as the prototypical organism within 
this hierarchy. Wheeler (1911: 309, 1926) argued that each token of the different types of 
organism in this hierarchy are emergent wholes, which are more than just the sum of their parts. 
In other words, higher-order organisms are emergent wholes constituted by members of some, 
or one, of the lower-order types of organisms in the hierarchy, for example human societies are 
formed by multicellular organisms (which are formed by cells). Wheeler was a realist about 
his hierarchy of organisms, he did not consider it merely as an analogy: 
 
[But] I believe, nevertheless that all of them [cells, cell aggregates, metazoan, colonies, 
etc.] are real organisms and not merely conceptual constructions or analogies. (Wheeler 
1911: 309). 
 
It appears that it is for this reason that Wheeler (1920: 117, 1926, 1928) later applied the term 
‘superorganism’ to eusocial insects, i.e. he considered that colonies are emergent, second-
order, organisms that have the prototypical (multicellular) organisms as their constitutive parts. 
Or more simply, that colonies are organisms ‘in which whole organisms function as the 
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interacting determining parts’; i.e. super-organisms whereby the prefix “super” refers to a 
higher-order rank of organism (Wheeler 1926: 435). 
 
 The next leading protagonist in the history of the superorganism14 concept was A. E. 
Emerson. Although Emerson was also sympathetic to the notion of emergent evolution, his 
notion of the superorganism was different to Wheeler’s. Consequently, Emerson (1939) also 
argued for a hierarchy, similarly to Wheeler, but of biological individuals rather than of 
organisms. In other words, based on the notion of emergent evolution, Emerson (1939: 182) 
also argued for the existence of emergent biological wholes (units) that are the result of 
interacting lower-level parts, however, not all of these emergent wholes are organisms, even if 
they are ‘relatively independent of other units’.15 
 
Certainly, [a eusocial colony] is a community of organisms as far as the individual 
components are concerned. When the integrating mechanisms, however, are considered, 
the community possesses aspects of a single individual. That brings us back to the 
philosophical discussion of what we mean by the individual. (Emerson 1939: 208). 
 
Therefore, the first major difference between Emerson and Wheeler was that, for the former, a 
superorganism is a ‘social organism’ that is analogous to an organism (Emerson 1939), 
whereas for the latter the superorganism is an organism but of a higher-order (Wheeler 1911). 
 
 
14 In his later work, Emerson (1952) preferred the term ‘supraorganism’ rather than ‘superorganism’, I 
will continue to use ‘superorganism’ as for Emerson the two terms are synonymous, and he chose the 
latter for semantic reasons. 
15 Emerson (1939, 1952) did not specify exactly how a biological individual becomes an organism but 
his distinction appears to be based on 1) the degree of integration of the parts and 2) physical 
interconnectedness of the parts. His position, however, appears to anticipate the current debate on 
biological individuality (see Pradeu 2016). 
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 Moreover, for Emerson (1952), the superorganism concept was primarily a tool for 
analogical reasoning in the study of eusociality, and sociality more generally (Wilson 1971). 
Emerson (1952) argued that focusing on the analogies (and dissimilarities) between eusocial 
colonies and organisms can guide eusociality researchers to discover the processes and 
integrating mechanisms that enable the emergence of biological individuality at the level of the 
colony. This is because, Emerson argued, that treating eusocial colonies as superorganisms and 
consequently comparing them to organisms can lead to the discovery of general biological 
principles, particularly those pertaining to biological individuality. For example, Emerson 
argued that one key feature of all biological systems is a drive to increase homeostasis over 
evolutionary time: 
 
All levels of organization exhibit homeostasis and the trend of evolution is toward 
increased homeostasis. (Emerson 1952: 348). 
 
For Emerson, the drive to increased homeostasis leads to the evolution of division of labour 
and polymorphism within eusocial colonies, just as, he argued, it has led to the evolution of 
division of labour and cell differentiation in multicellular organisms. Thus, the second major 
difference between Emerson and Wheeler was that, for the former, the superorganism concept 
was a tool for analogical reasoning whereas, for the latter, it was a concept with which to 
classify a type of emergent organism. 
 
 In summary, for Wheeler, eusocial colonies are superorganisms because they are 
organisms formed of organisms (super-organisms), for Emerson, eusocial colonies are 
superorganisms because they are higher-level biological individuals, but not organisms, that 
have analogous traits and properties to organisms. Importantly, however, both authors 
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conceived of the superorganism concept from a physiological notion of individuality. For each 
author the important point was that eusocial colonies are emergent biological units 
(individuals), and consequently, one important aim of eusociality research should be to explain 
how systems that lack physical interconnectedness could achieve the cohesiveness required to 
enable this emergence. However, by around the 1960s the concept of the superorganism saw a 
sharp decline in use. 
 
4.1.2. The decline of the superorganism 
 
The decline of the superorganism occurred during the Modern Synthesis and the emergence of 
the ‘gene’s eye view’, which led to a prominent focus on the gene at the expense of additional 
focus at the phenotypic level and more holistic, or top-down, approaches (Cronin 1991; Wilson 
and Wilson 2007; Borrello 2010; Calcott and Sterelny 2011). E. O. Wilson (1971: 317-319) 
argued that the decline of the superorganism was due to both the focus on reductionist genetic 
approaches and also the alteration of the superorganism concept by A. E. Emerson (1956). As 
above, Emerson argued that the superorganism concept should primarily be seen as a tool for 
analogical reasoning. For Emerson, the aim is to understand how colonies could achieve their 
cohesiveness and homeostasis and he argued that understanding the common properties or 
characteristics they share with organisms could aid research into this. Yet, as Wilson (1971) 
argued, from around the 1960s most eusocial researchers were more interested in using 
reductionist approaches and explaining eusocial insects from the genetic level, thus the 
analogical version of the superorganism appeared unnecessary. 
 
 Additionally, the superorganism concept, and the colonies-as-individuals argument in 
general, declined due to the emergence of kin selection. This is because applying kin selection 
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presupposes that a colony is not an individual. Kin selection was developed by Hamilton (1963, 
1964a) in order to explain the evolution of cooperation, particularly BA, from a gene’s eye 
perspective, i.e. within the framework of the Modern Synthesis (Hunt 2007: 194; Hölldobler 
and Wilson 2009: 24-29). According to this perspective, competition between eusocial insect 
colonies is fully explained in terms of fitness differences of the insects of the whole population; 
i.e. some colonies are more successful than others because the fitness of each insect in the 
colony is higher (on average) than those in other colonies. Or in other words, the fitness of a 
colony is simply the sum of the fitness of each individual in the colony, colonies themselves 
are not the bearers of fitness. Kin selection, is therefore, primarily a reductionist approach 
(Okasha 2014). 
 
 Moreover, as I showed in chapter 1, Hamilton’s (1972) main reason for applying kin 
selection to the evolution of eusociality was because he rejected the colonies-as-individuals 
argument. Hamilton, along with many other biologists at the time, considered genetic 
homogeneity a necessary condition for biological individuality in order to avoid internal 
conflict (Sturtevant 1938; Hamilton 1972; Santelices 1999).16 Since eusocial insect colonies 
are not genetically homogeneous, Hamilton rejected the colonies-as-individuals argument. 
This, as well as his emphasis on the concept of BA, led Hamilton (1964b, 1972) to view 
eusocial colonies as social groups and thus he applied the theory of kin selection in order to 
explain their evolution and maintenance. 
 
 
16 The idea that genetic homogeneity is necessary for biological individuality is still held by authors 
today (e.g. Detrain and Deneubourg 2006). However, the debate over biological individuality is a 
prominent one (see Pradeu 2016), and whilst genetic homogeneity may be an important factor for 
organisms (Arnellos et al. 2014) it may be less important for other forms of biological individuality 
(Clarke 2010; Dupré 2010). 
 138 
 Kin selection was a groundbreaking theory for evolutionary biology and, consequently, 
it received much attention by eusocial insect researchers (Bourke and Franks 1995; Alonso and 
Schuck-Paim 2002). This, in turn, led to many authors to view colonies as groups, for the above 
reason. Therefore, I argue that the decline of the superorganism, and colonies-as-individuals 
arguments in general, was due to reductionist interpretations of the Modern Synthesis and due 
to the introduction of kin selection. However, that is not to say that kin selection is not 
applicable to eusocial insects at all, but rather, as I argued in the previous chapter, it is more 
appropriately applied to the evolutionary basal species and the origins of eusociality, i.e. before 
obligatory eusociality and colony level selection emerge. 
 
 Hamilton’s huge influence, due to his theory of kin selection, and his focus on the 
concept of BA, led to more attention being paid to the evolution of eusociality in the decades 
following his introduction of the theory (Gadagkar 1990: 115; Bourke 1999; Burchill and 
Moreau 2016). During this period relatively little attention was paid to the maintenance and 
further evolution of eusocial insects: 
 
Research on social evolution in insects has concentrated on the origin of eusociality […]. 
A less well-explored theme is the transition from simple to complex [eusociality] among 
[eusocial] insects. (Bourke 1999: 245). 
 
The subsequent research into complex eusocial insects — which were traditionally referred to 
as the evolutionary advanced species (Bourke 1999) — has resulted in evidence for the 
superorganism argument, which I will review next. 
 
4.1.3. Complex eusociality 
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Complexity in eusocial insect colonies is broadly defined by the following factors (Hölldobler 
and Wilson 1990; Bourke 1999; Anderson and McShea 2001; Leonhardt et al. 2016): 
 
colony size, which is measured by the number of members in the colony (not, for 
example, by the size of the nest); 
degree of polymorphism, which refers to the degree of physiological differentiation 
between the reproductive and worker castes, and if applicable, any possible 
physiological specialization amongst different worker castes (e.g. soldiers that are 
physiologically incapable of foraging or feeding themselves); 
worker totipotency, which refers to the degree to which workers are specialised to a 
specific role/set of tasks or are generalists and undertake all tasks (apart from 
reproduction); 
communication networks, which refers to the general degree of interaction amongst the 
members of the colony, as well as the type of interaction (behavioural, pheromonal, 
physical, etc.), and how those interactions coordinate the division of labour within the 
colony. 
 
Together, the degree of polymorphism and levels of worker totipotency point to the overall 
division of labour within colonies; for example, if a colony has multiple physiological worker 
castes (e.g. minor workers, soldiers, etc.) that are each specialised to a small set of tasks (e.g. 
nest building, foraging, defence, etc.) and therefore have low totipotency, this would point to 
a high degree of division of labour within the colony as a whole. However, there is no discreet 
threshold between simple and complex eusocial species, but rather a spectrum from the 
simplest to the most complex, with varying degrees of complexity across the spectrum. The 
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simplest eusocial colonies are normally relatively small (tens to hundreds of members) with no 
polymorphism between the reproductive and worker castes (i.e. any worker has the potential 
to become a reproductive in the event of the queen dying), high totipotency of the worker caste, 
with relatively simple/minimal communication networks. Consequently, complex colonies are 
large (thousands to millions of members) with polymorphism (a worker caste that is 
morphologically different to the reproductive caste, and in some cases, there is also multiple 
physiological worker castes), the loss of reproductive potential and totipotency in the worker 
castes, and complex communication systems (Anderson and McShea 2001). For example, 
honey bees (Apis mellifera) are considered a complex eusocial species due to their large colony 
size, the polymorphism between the reproductive and worker castes, a complex communication 
system and low totipotency — even though there is a small degree of worker reproductive 
potential. Honey bee workers do not have spermatheca and cannot mate, but they can produce 
unfertilized eggs (which due to the haplodiploidy genetic system, can develop into males), but 
this typically only occurs when the queen dies or loses her influence on the colony (Anderson 
and McShea 2001; Ronai et al. 2015). 
 
 The notion of ‘complex’ eusociality is not based on arbitrarily chosen parameters. For 
example, colony size is tightly linked to the degree of organizational complexity. Larger colony 
size in eusocial insects allows, for example, increased worker specialisation (reduced 
totipotency); this is because there are more workers available for each task and thus, sub groups 
of workers can specialise for specific tasks or sets of tasks. Instead, in smaller colonies there 
are less workers per task and it is therefore more efficient for the colony to maintain generalist 
workers rather than specialised ones (Fewell and Harrison 2016). Moreover, it has been shown 
that an increase in colony size (and thus overall mass) affects physiological properties of 
colonies in an analogous way to increased mass in unitary organisms — for example, mass-
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specific metabolic rate, germ/soma investment, ontogenetic growth, lifespan, are all effected 
by increased mass (Hou et al. 2010; Fewell and Harrison 2016). Or in other words, just as in 
multicellular organisms, larger size is linked with reduced energy use per unit (i.e. per insect 
in colonies, and per cells in multicellular organisms), as well as slower ontogenetic growth and 
longer lifespan (Hou et al. 2010). 
 
 Moreover, morphological worker castes are only associated with large colonies 
(Bourke 1999; Anderson and McShea 2001). Complete physical sterility of workers is rare, but 
it too is also only associated with large colonies (Anderson and McShea 2001). Additionally, 
in larger colonies increased genetic heterogeneity — by polyandry (multiply mated queens) or 
polygyny (multiple queens) — can be beneficial to the colony despite the classical predictions 
from kin selection that extreme cooperation requires high relatedness (Cremer et al. 2007; 
Oldroyd and Fewell 2007; Wilson 2008b). Increased genetic heterogeneity can lead to 
increased disease resistance or greater division of labour, but this is not the case for all species 
and depends on multiple factors (Wilson 2008b). Most importantly, increasing complexity at 
the colony level is associated with decreasing complexity at the level of the parts, i.e. the insects 
that form the colony (Anderson and McShea 2001). Or in other words, in complex eusocial 
insect species, the members of the colony tend to be physically and/or behaviourally specialised 
and lack totipotency. But at the same time, this results in an increased division of labour and 
functional integration at the colony level, compared to colonies of more simple species. There 
is, therefore, evidence for qualitative differences in the organization of colonies in the complex 
eusocial insect species compared to simple ones. 
 
4.1.4. The revival of the superorganism 
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 As I argued in the previous chapter, the use of the superorganism concept drastically 
declined around the 1960s. This was not only because Emerson’s analogical version of the 
superorganism was not seen as compatible with the reductionist approaches that became 
prevalent due to the Modern Synthesis, as E. O. Wilson argued (1971: 317-319). It was mainly 
due to the emergence of kin selection, a theory which presupposes that colonies are not 
individuals, and the subsequent widespread attention that it garnered. The concept of the 
superorganism has since been revived, however, around the late 1980s. The first attempt was 
by C. J. Lumsden (1982), who, like Wheeler and Emerson, argued for a notion of the 
superorganism based on a physiological approach to biological individuality. However, 
Lumsden wanted to move on from the analogical approach developed by Emerson to a more 
precise theoretical approach. To do this Lumsden (1982) utilised a systems approach and 
argued for a notion of the superorganism based on models of self-organization and feedback 
loops. Although self-organization became the mainstream approach when studying the actual 
organization of eusocial insect colonies, as I have shown in the previous chapter, Lumsden’s 
attempted revival of the superorganism was not so successful.17 It was not until the work of D. 
S. Wilson and E. Sober (1989) that the concept of the superorganism can really said to have 
been ‘revived’ (Haber 2013). 
 
 Wilson and Sober (1989) argued for a revival of the concept of the superorganism, but 
based on an evolutionary notion of biological individuality. For Wilson and Sober, the defining 
feature of organisms, and thus superorganisms, is the ability to directly partake in natural 
selection. Or in other words, what separates organisms from other biological systems/groups 
is that they are units of selection: 
 
17 Lumsden’s 1982 article has been cited 41 times, whereas Wilson and Sober’s 1989 article has been 
cited 580 times (according to Google Scholar — February 2019). 
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Individuals acquire the exquisite functional organization that justifies their status as 
organisms by the process of natural selection. (Wilson and Sober 1989: 339). 
 
Wilson and Sober argued that eusocial colonies, as well as other groups of organisms, also 
exhibit functional organization, and thus should be considered as higher-level organisms 
(superorganisms). In order to extend their definition of organism to colonies (and other groups 
of organisms) they relied on the notion of multi-level selection. Wilson and Sober argued that 
groups (e.g. eusocial colonies) can be considered as superorganisms if they achieve a high 
degree of internal cooperation (functional organization) such that between-colony selection is 
greater than within-colony selection. Or in other words, if colonies qualify as units of selection 
then they are superorganisms. 
 
 Though the key feature of Wilson and Sober’s definition of organism, and therefore 
superorganism, is the notion of functional organization, they do not define precisely what this 
means. For instance, what is the minimum amount of functions required to achieve functional 
organization? Wilson and Sober simply argue that functional organization is achieved by 
natural selection: 
 
[Natural] selection requires heritable variation. Individuals must differ in their properties, 
and those differences also must exist to some degree in their offspring. If so, then 
properties that enhance the relative survival and reproduction of individuals will increase 
in frequency from generation to generation. The accumulation of these properties is the 
functional organization that allows individuals to successfully survive and reproduce in 
their environments. (Wilson and Sober 1989: 339-340. Emphasis added). 
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This could be intentional on the part of Wilson and Sober, as it allows their definition to be 
more general and applicable to groups as well as organisms (Haber 2013). However, this also 
has the consequence that their notion of the superorganism does not say anything about how 
colonies achieve the required cohesiveness and integration in order to become units of 
selection. In other words, this approach does not focus on the actual organization of colonies 
but instead on their evolutionary, or phylogenetic, past. This is not necessarily a problem in 
itself, but it begs the question of how colonies can achieve their cohesiveness and elegant 
integration. 
 
The challenge is to understand the complex mechanisms that enable a colony to function 
as a single organism, exactly as imagined by Wheeler so long ago. (Wilson and Wilson 
2007: 342. Emphasis in the original). 
 
 Despite this issue, the revival of the superorganism concept by Wilson and Sober was 
relatively successful. Not only is the concept of the superorganism once again a central concept 
within eusociality research (Wilson and Hölldobler 2009), but it is generally understood using 
an evolutionary concept of biological individuality (Reeve and Hölldobler 2007; Queller and 
Strassmann 2009; Haber 2013). This is a direct consequence of Wilson and Sober’s (1989) 
revival of the superorganism, using an evolutionary notion of biological individuality. 
 
 A. Hamilton, and colleagues (2009), argued that there are actually two approaches to 
the superorganism concept in use today. The first is what they refer to as the ‘similarity 
approach’, which is essentially an analogous approach whereby eusocial colonies are compared 
to organisms, and the second is the ‘selection approach’, which argues that colonies are 
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superorganisms because they are units of selection (Hamilton et al. 2009: 574-576). The 
similarity approach is similar to Emerson’s version of the superorganism and it is argued that 
Wilson and Sober’s account is the key example of this approach (Hamilton et al. 2009). This 
is because, according to A. Hamilton et al., Wilson and Sober consider colonies as 
superorganisms because, like organisms, they are functionally organized. Whilst this is true, 
Wilson and Sober’s justification for this is that colonies are units of selection, and therefore 
their account also falls under the selection approach — a fact with which A. Hamilton and 
colleagues also agree with (2009: 575-576). However, this highlights the problem with A. 
Hamilton and colleagues’ argument; most contemporary accounts of the superorganism are 
based on evolutionary notions of biological individuality and thus can be classed as selection 
approaches. However, they typically also employ analogical reasoning and compare colonies 
to organisms as further justification (Haber 2013). For example, in their influential book The 
Superorganism, B. Hölldobler and E. O. Wilson (2009) argued: 
 
[The] term superorganism may be applied only to colonies of an advanced state of 
eusociality, in which interindividual conflict for reproductive privilege is diminished and 
the worker caste is selected to maximize colony efficiency in intercolony competition. 
(Hölldobler and Wilson 2009: 9. Emphasis in the original). 
 
Thus, their account could be classed under the selection approach, however, in the glossary 
section they define a superorganism as: ‘A society, such as a eusocial insect colony, that 
possesses features of organization analogous to the physiological properties of single 
organisms’ (Hölldobler and Wilson 2009: 513). Therefore, additionally, their concept of the 
superorganism could also be classed under the similarity approach. 
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 This is also true of other authors who use the concept of the superorganism (Reeve and 
Hölldobler 2007; Eggleton 2011; Haber 2013). Thus, the problem of Wilson and Sober still 
remains, namely that an evolutionary notion of the superorganism does not say much about the 
actual organization of colonies. This is demonstrated by the fact that authors typically claim 
that eusocial colonies are superorganisms because they are units of selection, but they 
subsequently employ analogical reasoning, comparing colonies to organisms, in order to 
account for this phenomenon. But defining colony individuality by comparing colonies to 
multicellular organisms has the potential risk of missing or neglecting the unique and/or 
important factors that enable groups of multicellular organisms to achieve biological 
individuality at the collective level (Haber 2013). Or in other words, focusing on how eusocial 
insect colonies are analogous to multicellular organisms (e.g. the reproductive division of 
labour) potentially focuses the attention of researchers on factors that are less important for 
colony individuality. For example, unlike prototypical multicellular organisms, eusocial insect 
colonies lack physical interconnectedness and any form of collective nervous system, which 
makes the emergence of regulation and control at the collective level a much different prospect 
than it is in the former. Eusocial insect colonies are systems that have free-moving multicellular 
organisms as the constitutive parts, thus the exportation of individuality to the collective level 
is likely to be very different to that of the transition from unicellular to multicellular 
individuality. 
 
 Although the superorganism argument went through a sharp decline for almost two 
decades it is once again at the forefront of eusociality research. Today, however, the argument 
is mainly made from an evolutionary perspective of biological individuality. Namely, authors 
use MLS to show that, for many eusocial insect species, colonies are the unit of selection, i.e. 
evolutionary individuals (Hölldobler and Wilson 2009; Queller and Strassmann 2009; 
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Strassmann and Queller 2010; Okasha 2014; Helanterä 2016). Yet, whilst the evolutionary 
aspects of eusocial insect colonies are important (e.g. the transition from selection of 
reproductives to selection of colonies) the physiological aspects are as equally important. For 
example, the relations and interactions between the members of the colony are important to 
understand the proximate causes for the functional integration that enables colony selection 
(see Arnellos et al. 2014 for an analogous argument for multicellular individuality). However, 
despite this, the superorganism is rarely approached from a physiological perspective today. 
 
4.2. The self-organization approach to complex eusociality 
 
4.2.1. The problem of hierarchy 
 
As above, research into complex eusociality has only relatively recently gained attention. This 
is important because the data from this research, particularly the finding that there are 
qualitative differences in colony organization in the complex species compared to the simpler 
ones, could point to a form of individuality at the colony level. Indeed, this research led to the 
revival of the superorganism (Lumsden 1982; Wilson and Sober 1989; Hölldobler and Wilson 
2009; Haber 2013). However, unlike in pre-Hamiltonian eusociality research, today the 
superorganism argument is typically only employed from an evolutionary perspective. In other 
words, authors use MLS to show that colonies of some eusocial insect species are units of 
selection (Moritz and Fuchs 1998; Detrain and Deneubourg 2006; Reeve and Hölldobler 2007; 
Hölldobler and Wilson 2009; Queller and Strassmann 2009; Nowak et al. 2010). The 
superorganism argument from a physiological perspective is, in comparison, currently rarely 
employed. If it is widely accepted that colonies are evolutionary individuals, why has there 
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been relatively little research into the question of whether colonies are also physiological-like 
biological individuals? Particularly as this view was made so long ago by Wheeler (1911). 
 
 The answer to this question is likely multifaceted, but the same reasons that led to the 
decline of the superorganism argument are likely to be involved. The prominence of 
reductionist approaches and a focus on the genetic level, due to the Modern Synthesis, likely 
reinforced the idea that genetic homogeneity is an essential part of physiological individuality: 
 
Likewise any metazoan, ant societies are made of units that are differentiated into sterile 
or reproductive individuals and function as a cooperative unit. Yet the analogy is clearly 
strained since somatic cells are all genetically identical while ants are not. (Detrain and 
Deneubourg 2006: 165. Emphasis added.) 
 
It is argued that genetic heterogeneity could lead to potential conflict, and thus selection at the 
lower level would undermine higher-level selection. However, genetic homogeneity is not 
necessarily required for all forms of biological individuality (see, for example, Dupré 2010). 
 
 Not only are eusocial insect colonies not genetically homogeneous but they also lack 
physical contiguity, i.e. colonies are formed of free-moving insects, and thus do not have clear 
boundaries as do cells or multicellular organisms. The lack of physical contiguity, as well as 
genetic heterogeneity, reinforce the intuition that colonies are groups rather than physiological 
individuals.18 Moreover, as above, kin selection presupposes that colonies are groups. Thus, 
the huge focus on kin selection in the decades following its introduction likely had an influence 
 
18 Along with genetic homogeneity, physical contiguity has historically also been viewed as important 
factor for physiological individuality (see Pradeu 2016). 
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on the current mainstream view that eusocial insect colonies are groups that can be, at most, 
evolutionary individuals (units of selection). 
 
 Finally, another reason for the mainstream view of colonies as groups rather than 
individuals is that it is commonly argued that top-down hierarchical control does not occur, or 
is not necessary, in the large colonies of complex species. Arguments are made along the 
following lines, ‘[…] their colony as a whole lacks command and control by a still higher-level 
system. It therefore must be self-organized’ (Hölldobler and Wilson 2009: 58). In other words, 
because colonies lack physical contiguity and any type of organ or nervous system at the 
collective level (i.e. colony level), such as in multicellular organisms, it is argued that top down 
hierarchical control does not occur. However, I argue that this view needs to be reassessed, 
from both a theoretical and empirical perspective. Even though colonies lack physical 
contiguity and do not have organs, they do have complex communication mechanisms that 
could enable hierarchical control (Johnson and Linksvayer 2010). In other words, the network 
of interactions among the members of the colony could result in a higher-order organization 
that can regulate and control the lower level parts (the insects in the colony) — i.e. a 
hierarchical-organization — which I will argue for in the next chapter. But the presupposition 
that hierarchical control does not occur in the large colonies of complex eusocial insects has 
led to the mainstream view that the coordination and cohesiveness of colonies can be explained 
by self-organization alone. Current explanatory approaches that focus on the actual 
organization of colonies are centred around the concept of self-organization (Boomsma and 
Franks 2006; Detrain and Deneubourg 2006; Fewell et al. 2009). Consequently, even colonies 
of the most complex eusocial species (with polymorphic castes, complex division of labour, 
colony selection, etc.) are typically conceived of as self-organized groups. 
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4.2.2. The self-organization approach 
 
The concept of self-organization was developed in thermodynamics to explain how 
macroscopic patterns/order could spontaneously emerge in previously disordered physical and 
chemical systems, as a result of distributed local interactions of the microscopic parts (Detrain 
and Deneubourg 2006). In other words, self-organization was used to explain the phenomenon 
of emergent order at the macroscopic level without the need of internal or external top-down 
hierarchical control. The concept of self-organization was thus appealing to eusociality 
researchers, since as above, it was widely considered that large complex colonies were 
incapable of hierarchical control but were nevertheless well-organized cohesive complex 
systems (Bonabeau et al. 1997; Boomsma and Franks 2006; Detrain and Deneubourg 2006; 
Fewell et al. 2009). This approach, what I refer to as the self-organization (SO) approach, began 
around the 1980/90s and was developed by E. Bonabeau, S. Camazine, J.-L. Deneubourg, G. 
Theraulaz, among others (Boomsma and Franks 2006). The main tenet of the SO approach is 
that complex colony level phenomena can occur in eusocial insect colonies without hierarchical 
control, instead they are the result of a flat network of locally distributed interactions amongst 
the parts (in this case the individual insects). 
 
 To illustrate this, it will be useful to give a brief example of self-organization in eusocial 
insects, namely collective decision making. A simple case of collective decision making can 
occur when there is a choice to be made by the foragers of a colony between two equal sources 
of food, A and B. At first, each individual forager will randomly choose one of the two choices. 
Additionally, each forager leaves a pheromone signal to recruit other foragers to their choice. 
If for any reason more foragers choose A over B, for example, this would cause the pheromone 
signal at A to be stronger than at B. In turn, the stronger pheromone signal at A will positively 
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feedback on the decision of other foragers, i.e. the stronger pheromone signal will attract more 
foragers to choose A over B, which will eventually lead to all foragers choosing A over B. 
Thus, the ‘choice’ of A over B by the group is a result of a positive feedback loop on initial 
local random choices of each individual forager (Bonabeau et al. 1997; Detrain and 
Deneubourg 2006). In other words, in this case the initial decision of option A was randomly 
caused by more foragers choosing A over B, but this decision was reinforced by a pheromone 
signal causing a positive feedback on the subsequent individual choices of other foragers. But 
in other cases, the decision could be less random. For example, if foragers can differentially 
emit the pheromone signal depending on the quality of the food, then if A is a better quality 
food source than B, it will attract a stronger pheromone release by foragers, which will 
feedback on the choice of subsequent foragers entailing that eventually, the whole group will 
collectively choose A. Consequently, in the context of eusocial systems, the SO approach 
typically focuses on self-organized phenomena produced by feedback loops (positive or 
negative) resulting from the multiple locally distributed interactions of the insects in a colony, 
and the amplification of random fluctuations in those interactions (for more details see 
Bonabeau et al. 1997). 
 
 However, unlike physical systems, the parts that make up complex eusocial insect 
colonies are not molecules but cognitive agents, and therefore in this context self-organization 
is sometimes combined with the concept of stigmergy and referred to as stigmergic self-
organization (Bonabeau et al. 1997; Holland and Melhuish 1999). Stigmergy, developed by P. 
P. Grassé, refers to how the behaviour of an agent can be influenced by an environment that 
was itself affected by earlier behaviour (Hölldobler and Wilson 2009: 479-481). Essentially, 
stigmergy emphasizes that an agent, in this case an insect in a eusocial colony, can produce 
complex constructions (e.g. nest, honey comb, etc.) or work without the need of a complete 
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knowledge of the construction or task in hand. Instead, the agent only requires a simple set of 
behavioural rules. It has been shown that through very simple behavioural rules (or 
interpretative decision making) complex colony level processes can occur via the insects in the 
colony responding in accordance to local information, i.e. stigmergic self-organization. For 
example, Holland and Melhuish (1999) found that robots programmed with a few simple 
response rules could sort two distinct types of Frisbee in a given space, and put one type into a 
cluster. The robots achieved this by responding differently to different stimuli, for example; all 
Frisbees that are not in contact with another Frisbee are picked up, if the robots encountered 
ringed Frisbees that were in contact with any other Frisbee then they cannot pick them up and 
move them, but the plain type of Frisbee are always picked up and moved when encountered. 
After several hours this results in a cluster containing mainly ringed Frisbees. But importantly, 
for this clustering to occur, no robot required the complete plan the ringed Frisbees should be 
clustered but not plain ones; they only required simple behavioural rules. The process of 
clustering different types of objects occurs in certain eusocial colonies, for example brood 
sorting in some ant species (Holland and Melhuish 1999). 
 
 Another factor that is claimed to influence the self-organization of eusocial insect 
colonies is what is referred to as the ‘response threshold theory’ (Robinson 1992; Page Jr. and 
Erber 2002). The response threshold theory argues that due to naturally occurring differences 
among the individual insects in the colony, not every insect will respond at the same time to 
task stimuli. Some insects will have lower response thresholds for some tasks, say pollen 
foraging, and will react first to any stimulus for this behaviour (e.g. reduced pollen stores). As 
they undertake this behaviour the stimulus for it is reduced, consequently, other individuals 
with a higher threshold for this behaviour will not respond. Therefore, only a subset of the 
colony responds to the pollen foraging stimulus in this case (unless the stimulus was so high 
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as to also induce a response from individuals with a higher threshold). At the same time, those 
that did not respond to pollen foraging may have lower response thresholds for other tasks, like 
water foraging, and so on. The response threshold theory, therefore, also provides a good 
explanation for how basic division of labour can emerge naturally within groups; namely via 
differential response thresholds and self-organization dynamics.  
 
 Broadly then, the SO approach attempts to explain colony level phenomena by focusing 
on the interactions of the insects in the colony. The insects in the colony can achieve collective 
order (i.e. nest constructions, foraging patterns, etc.) simply by acting on local information in 
a distributed network (Detrain and Deneubourg 2006; Boomsma and Franks 2006): 
 
The collective behaviour of insect colonies is achieved through feedback mechanisms 
arising from the activities of individual insects, each following a basic set of rules. 
(Makinson and Beekman 2014: 2020). 
 
In other words, the SO approach conceives the actual organization of the colony as a flat 
network of interactions, and that colony cohesiveness emerges through self-organization alone. 
The SO approach has become the mainstream approach in the study of the actual organization 
of colonies (specifically the complex species) because of the widely held presupposition that 
the global behaviour of complex eusocial insect colonies can be explained without resorting to 
top-down hierarchical control. 
 
 The SO approach has been very successful in furthering our understanding of the actual 
organization of eusocial insect colonies, particularly those collective processes that are based 
on feedback loops. However, as has been argued by B. R. Johnson and T. A. Linksvayer (2010), 
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coordinating mechanisms or processes are also required in order for the different (self-
organized) colony level processes to occur in a cohesive organization. For example, if multiple 
colony processes were occurring at the same time, then coordinating mechanisms would ensure 
that enough workers were available for each process, additionally, coordinating mechanisms 
would be essential to ensure that different colony processes occur in the correct sequence or at 
the correct time. In the next chapter I will argue that such coordinating mechanisms could be 
evidence of hierarchical control and regulation. Thus, the claim that there is no hierarchical 
control and regulation in the large colonies of complex eusocial insects needs to be reassessed. 
Therefore, in the next chapter I will propose a different approach, that whilst incorporating 





In this chapter I have reviewed the history and current state-of-the-art of the superorganism 
argument, as well as the study of complex eusociality. To begin with, in section 4.1., I reviewed 
the history of the superorganism. I highlighted, in 4.1.1., that the concept was originally 
understood using a physiological and evolutionary perspective of biological individuality. 
Wheeler, who first applied the concept to eusocial insects, conceived of superorganisms as 
higher-order organisms. He used an organizational approach to define organisms and argued 
that eusocial insect colonies fulfilled this definition as equally as multicellular organisms, thus 
they should be considered as superorganisms. I then highlighted how Emerson, next major 
protagonist in the history of the superorganism, altered the concept. He argued that the 
superorganism should be used primarily as a tool for analogical reasoning, in order to discover 
how eusocial insect colonies can achieve integration and homeostasis at the colony level. 
 155 
However, he conceived of superorganisms as biological individuals but not organisms. In 
4.1.2., I highlighted that the superorganism radically declined in use around the 1960s primarily 
as a result of the emergence of kin selection. Kin selection is a reductionist approach, with a 
particular emphasis on the genetic level and population genetics. Moreover, applying kin 
selection to eusocial insects presupposes that colonies are not individuals because inclusive 
fitness models posit a personal fitness value to each member of the colony. In other words, kin 
selection theorists argued that inter-colony competition can be fully explained in terms of the 
fitness differences of the individuals insects within breeding populations, rather than by colony 
selection. Thus, with the emergence of kin selection in the 1960s, the concept of the 
superorganism declined. 
 
 However, in section 4.1.3., I argued that the recent research into complex eusocial 
insect species provided renewed evidence for the superorganism argument. Complex eusocial 
species are characterised by large colony size, worker specialisation (low worker totipotency), 
polymorphism, and complex communication networks. As organizational complexity at the 
colony level increases, the complexity of the members in the colony decreases (Anderson and 
McShea 2001). In other words, as the division of labour becomes more complex, the members 
of the colony become more specialised, and as a result, become more reliant on the colony for 
their development and survival. This empirical evidence, as well as the emergence of new 
group selection, led to a revival of the superorganism concept. I argued, in section 4.1.4., that 
the superorganism argument saw a resurgence in the late 1980s due to the work of Wilson and 
Sober (1989), who were influenced by the increasing research into complex eusociality. 
However, they conceived the superorganism concept from an evolutionary perspective of 
biological individuality, using MLS2; colonies are superorganisms when between-colony 
selection is greater than within-colony selection. As a result, today, the concept is typically 
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understood from an evolutionary perspective of biological individuality; i.e. colonies that are 
units of selection are superorganisms. Whilst the evolutionary notion of the superorganism is 
useful from an etiological perspective, it cannot tell us anything about the organizational 
differences among colonies of different eusocial species. 
 
 In sum, despite its revival in the 1980s, the superorganism argument, form a 
physiological perspective of biological individuality, is less prevalent today than compared to 
pre-Hamiltonian eusociality research. In 4.2.1., I argued that this is because of the 
presupposition that hierarchical control does not occur, or is not necessary, in the large colonies 
of complex eusocial insects. This led to the mainstream view that colony cohesiveness, which 
enables colony selection in many complex species, is due to the self-organization of the 
members of the colony alone. In section 4.2.2., I highlighted that, as a result of the 
presupposition that hierarchical control does not occur, the actual organization of complex 
eusocial colonies are studied by what I referred to as the self-organization (SO) approach. 
According to this view, even the most complex eusocial systems can be explained by appealing 
to a set of local interactions between parts of an initially disordered system, without the need 
of any hierarchical control. Thus, the SO approach conceives the organization of colonies as 
flat network of interactions, i.e. a result of self-organization alone. Consequently, authors 
typically employ the superorganism concept in order to denote a self-organized group that is a 
unit of selection. However, as I will argue next, the mechanisms/processes that coordinate the 
different (self-organized) colony processes could be evidence of hierarchical control. 
Therefore, in the next chapter I will challenge the presupposition that hierarchical control does 
not occur in complex eusocial insect colonies by developing an alternative organizational 
approach (the hierarchical-organizational approach) that assesses if there is hierarchical 
organization within complex colonies. Moreover, I will argue that such an approach is more 
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suited to assessing the different types of individuality at the colony level in eusocial insects in 
species from across the eusociality complexity spectrum, using a comparative case study. 
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Chapter 5 — Revising the superorganism: the hierarchical-




In the previous chapter I argued that the superorganism argument, that was prevalent in pre-
Hamiltonian eusociality research, saw a radical decline after the emergence of kin selection. 
This is because kin selection predetermines that colonies are not conceived of as individuals 
because each member is assigned an (inclusive) fitness value. However, research into complex 
eusociality (i.e. the more evolutionary derived species with large colonies, polymorphism and 
worker specialisation, complex communication systems, etc.) influenced a revival of the 
superorganism. But the superorganism argument is typically employed from an evolutionary 
perspective today — i.e. colonies that are units of selection are evolutionary individuals and, 
thus, superorganisms. On the other hand, the idea that hierarchical control is not needed for 
explaining colony organization in the large colonies of complex eusocial insects, led to the 
mainstream view that colonies are self-organized groups. Consequently, the study of the actual 
organization of eusocial colonies is done so using the self-organization approach. According 
to this view, even the most complex eusocial systems can be explained by appealing to a set of 
local interactions between parts of an initially disordered system, without the need of any 
hierarchical control. 
 
 In this chapter, I will argue the presupposition that hierarchical control does not occur, 
or is not needed, in the large colonies of complex eusocial insects needs to be reassessed. I 
argue that this claim should be assessed theoretically and empirically rather than assumed a 
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priori. To do so I will develop an alternative organizational approach (the hierarchical-
organizational approach) that assesses if there is hierarchical organization within complex 
colonies, that “modulates” (i.e. regulates and controls on) the self-organized dynamics within 
the colony system; i.e. this approach will be able to assess if colony organization is the result 
of self-organization only or also and mainly due to hierarchical regulation and control. I will 
also argue that this approach would be better suited to assess the issue of whether complex 
eusocial insect colonies should be considered biological individuals or not. This is because if 
there are colonies with hierarchical organization then an argument can be made that the colony 
is in “control” rather than the insects that instantiate it, i.e. the colony organization is not solely 
the result of self-organization but a higher-level organization that exerts top-down control on 
its parts. In other words, if there is evidence of hierarchical-organization within colonies of 
eusocial insects, then this would be evidence for the superorganism from a physiological-like 
perspective, as well as an evolutionary perspective of biological individuality. 
 
 I will begin, in section 5.1., by reviewing a recent physiological approach to colony 
individuality, namely the “social physiological” approach. I will argue that whilst the social 
physiology approach is interesting, it may not be suitable for assessing the different types of 
individuality at the colony level across eusocial insects because it focuses primarily at the 
genetic level. I then develop the hierarchical-organizational (HO) approach as an alternative to 
the current explanatory approaches to the actual organization in complex eusocial insects. 
Taking the colony as a whole, the HO approach will focus on the development of colony 
organization, in particular assessing the mechanisms and signals that coordinate the collective 
(self-organized) colony processes. In section 5.2. I will apply the HO approach to three 
representative case studies of species from across the eusocial complexity spectrum — namely, 
Megalopta genalis, Vespula vulgaris, and Apis mellifera — in order to assess the 
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presupposition that hierarchical control does not occur. I will review colony development and, 
where applicable, collective colony processes, and how such processes are regulated. In other 
words, I will assess if colony organization is the result of self-organization alone, or whether it 
is due to hierarchical control and regulation. Then in section 5.3., I will assess the types of 
colony individuality, if applicable, in the three species. Specifically, I will assess whether 
colonies exhibit individuality at the colony level, and if so, if they can be considered as 
superorganisms from only an evolutionary perspective (i.e. if they are units of selection), or 
also from a physiological-like perspective (i.e. if they are hierarchically-organized). Finally, in 
5.4., I will highlight how the superorganism argument provides further evidence against the 
claim that the non-reproductive castes in eusocial insects are examples of BA. 
 
5.1. The hierarchical-organizational approach 
 
As I highlighted in the previous chapter, the SO approach has been very successful in furthering 
our understanding of the actual organization of eusocial insect colonies, particularly those 
collective processes that are based on feedback loops. However, the prominent view that the 
large colonies of complex eusocial insect species are self-organized groups has led to a lack of 
physiological approaches to the superorganism argument. The superorganism is typically 
understood as groups that are units of selection, but the evidence from complex eusocial insect 
colonies points to the fact that they could exhibit colony individuality in a stronger sense. In 
this section I will develop a physiological approach to the superorganism. I do so by outlining 
an organizational approach, that whilst incorporating self-organization, does not discard the 
role of hierarchical control, namely the hierarchical-organizational (HO) approach. However, 
before I do so, I will briefly overview a recent physiological approach to the superorganism 
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that is particularly interesting; the ‘social physiology’ approach (Johnson and Linksvayer 
2010). 
 
5.1.1. The social physiology approach 
 
Eusocial insect colonies typically undergo development, are individuated and have relatively 
clear boundaries (despite lacking physical contiguity), and exhibit (reproductive) division of 
labour (Eggleton 2011). Moreover, colony selection occurs in many species, particularly in the 
more complex species, due to the reproductive division of labour (Hölldobler and Wilson 
2009). Therefore, in many cases, it is better to view the colony as a single complex system in 
order to uncover the proximate causes for colony cohesiveness and colony selection. More 
specifically, the mechanisms and/or interactions that coordinate the different collective colony 
processes can be studied more accurately if the colony is viewed as a single unit. This is 
because many factors (e.g. pheromones, behaviours, etc.) that affect or control a specific colony 
process (e.g. foraging, nest building, caste determination, etc.) derive from different parts or 
subsets of the colony organization, many of which are not directly involved in that process. 
Thus, studying a specific colony process in isolation, as has historically been the case, may 
result in important factors in the emergence and control of that process to be ignored (Smith et 
al. 2016). 
 
 The social physiology approach conceives of colonies as integrated units and focuses 
on the mechanisms that coordinate the different collective processes in the colony. Following 
the groundplan theory (West-Eberhard 1996, 2003; Johnson and Linksvayer 2010), the social 
physiology approach argues that the division of labour (and polymorphism, etc.) is a result of 
differential expression of the ancient genetic groundplan — which evolved in the solitary 
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ancestors to eusocial insects — in the different members of the colony; i.e. reproductive traits 
in the queen, non-reproductive traits in workers. The differentiation of the members of the 
colony, i.e. polymorphisms (queen, worker castes, etc.) and temporal castes (as in honey bees 
— see below), is what they refer to as ‘social anatomy’. The social anatomy is the specialisation 
(or reduction of totipotency) of colony members that is the basis for the division of labour. The 
coordinating mechanisms (e.g. pheromones, hormones, etc.) and communication networks that 
enable integration at the colony level is what they refer to as ‘social physiology’ (Johnson and 
Linksvayer 2010). In other words, social physiology are the aspects that regulate the division 
of labour within the colony. 
 
 The main tenet of this approach is that both social anatomy and social physiology are 
the result of novel regulatory gene networks that are not present in the ancient groundplans of 
the solitary ancestors. In turn, these novel regulatory genetic networks coordinate the different 
colony processes, particularly in complex species with polymorphic worker castes: 
 
We proposed that social physiology, in contrast to the minor alteration of intact genetic 
networks, is dependent on many formerly independent sensory processes being 
integrated together into novel gene networks. These novel gene networks then facilitate 
the coordination of action necessary for collective problem solving. (Johnson and 
Linksvayer 2010: 73). 
 
Thus, according to this approach, social physiology is the result of emergent novel genetic 
networks, particularly in complex eusocial insect colonies that have a high degree of 
polymorphism and polyethism (social anatomy). Consequently, the social physiology approach 
argues that the whole colony should be treated as a single genome. 
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 The social physiology approach is interesting in that it focuses on the whole colony 
system and the coordination of colony processes. However, this approach focuses primarily on 
the genetic level and, consequently, may be less adequate at assessing the types of individuality 
at the colony level across different eusocial insect species. B. R. Johnson and T. A. Linksvayer 
(2010: 59-60) did employ broad criteria to distinguish organizational differences between 
simple and complex colonies; namely ‘team-like’ and ‘factory/machine-like’ organizations. 
Team-like colonies are those that are large enough for collective colony processes, but in which 
there is little to no polymorphism and workers can generally do most tasks (i.e. high 
totipotency). Factory-like and machine-like colonies are those with temporal polyethism 
(factory-like) and/or polymorphic worker castes (machine-like), whereby specific castes 
specialize in certain sets of tasks. But these criteria essentially rely on the definition of 
complexity within eusociality and therefore tracks the complexity spectrum across eusocial 
insect species. The eusocial complexity spectrum is likely to be a good indicator for 
physiological-like individuality at the colony level, i.e. the most complex species with 
polymorphic worker castes are likely to be better candidates for physiological-like 
superorganisms than the less complex species, but this cannot be assumed, concrete criteria are 
required in order to assess this. Thus, the social physiology approach, in its current form, 
appears to lack the conceptual tools to determine the differences, at the collective level, of the 
control and integration of colony processes. 
 
5.1.2. The hierarchical-organizational approach 
 
Unlike the social physiology approach, the HO approach will focus on the organizational 
factors, at the collective level, that coordinate and control collective colony processes in order 
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to assess how colonies achieve the cohesiveness that enables them to ‘function as a single 
organism, exactly as imagined by Wheeler so long ago’ (Wilson and Wilson 2007: 342. 
Emphasis their own). Specifically, taking the colony as a whole, the HO approach assesses if 
there is hierarchical organization within complex colonies, i.e. an organization that 
“modulates” (i.e. regulates and controls on) the self-organized dynamics within the colony 
system. In other words, this approach will be able to assess if colony organization is the result 
of self-organization only or also and mainly due to hierarchical regulation and control. 
Consequently, this approach would be better suited to assess the issue of whether complex 
eusocial insect colonies should be considered biological individuals or not. This is because if 
there are colonies with hierarchical organization then an argument can be made that the colony 
is in “control” rather than the insects that instantiate it, i.e. the colony organization is not solely 
the result of bottom-up self-organization but also of a higher-level organization that exerts top-
down control on its parts. But how can hierarchical control be achieved in the large complex 
eusocial insect colonies? 
 
 The HO approach is derived from the organizational account based on autonomy 
theory, what I refer to as the Autonomous Perspective (Moreno and Mossio 2015). The key 
emphasis of the Autonomous Perspective is, as the name suggests, a focus on the autonomous 
aspects of biological individuals, namely, a focus on how self-determination and self-
regulation are achieved. Moreover, autonomy is a key defining feature of biological 
individuality for this account, i.e. autonomy at the system level is required in order for a 
biological system to achieve biological individuality (for more details see Moreno and Mossio 
2015). Recent work from the Autonomous Perspective has focused on biological individuality 
in multicellular systems (Arnellos et al. 2014; Arnellos and Moreno 2015, 2016). This approach 
focuses on the organizational conditions in multicellular systems that allow for autonomy at 
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the collective level. According to this approach, the cells in the system must produce, via the 
network of interactions, a set of inter-cellular mechanisms that can regulate the development 
and function of the lower level parts of the system (namely the cells themselves), but at the 
same time these regulatory mechanisms must be dynamically decoupled from operations of the 
cells, thus forming a new hierarchical level, enabling autonomy at the collective level. In other 
words, collectively, the cells themselves must produce a higher-order organization, which is 
sufficiently dynamically decoupled from the lifespan and operation of each individual cell, 
such that this higher-order organization is stable enough to hierarchically regulate and control 
the collective, enabling self-determination at the collective level. 
 
 However, analysing the actual organizations of eusocial insect colonies in order to 
assess the coordination of colony processes, and the degree of hierarchical control, is a difficult 
task. It must be remembered that eusocial colonies are complex systems that are themselves 
formed of complex parts (i.e. multicellular insects). Moreover, researchers have typically 
studied specific colony processes (e.g. foraging, nest building, etc.) in isolation, rather than 
within the context of the wider colony organization. Consequently, much of the data that is 
crucial for studying colony organization as a whole is not readily available, or widely published 
(Smith et al. 2016). Thus, as a first proposal, the HO approach will focus on specific colony 
processes, within the context of the wider colony organization (where possible), and the critical 
aspects involved in their control and regulation. To do so, the HO approach will focus on the 
causal factors, that I refer to as signals, that regulate and coordinate a given colony process. 
Consequently, signals are defined as any endogenously produced function/constraint (e.g. 
pheromone, mechanism, etc.) that acts as a causal factor inducing/modulating/inhibiting the 
development, physiology, and/or behaviour of the colony members or a colony process. 
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Furthermore, such signals are designated as first-order and second-order based on their 
dynamical relation to the process that they affect. 
 
 First-order signals are those signals that are dynamically coupled to the process that 
they have a controlling effect on. In other words, first-order signals are both produced by and 
feedback on the same colony process. For example, if the control of a specific colony process, 
such as soldier caste determination, is due to a signal that derives from the parts in that process, 
and furthermore, the signal is only present based on a change in concentration of the 
constitutive parts — i.e. a high amount of soldiers ensures significant amounts of signal in 
order to inhibit more larvae developing into soldiers — then this signal is dynamically coupled 
to the process of soldier development; i.e. the signal controlling soldier caste determination 
relies on the growth of new soldiers. Whereas, second-order signals are dynamically decoupled 
from the process that they regulate. Or more simply, second-order signals, although 
endogenously derived from the colony, are not derived from the constitutive parts of the 
specific colony process that they regulate. For example, if the control of a specific colony 
process, again soldier caste determination, is due to a signal that derives from another part (or 
subset) of the colony instead of from the constitutive parts of the process (i.e. soldiers), then 
that signal is a second-order one. In other words, if the signal derives from the queen or another 
worker caste, the presence of the signal would not be dependent on a change in concentration 
of the soldiers themselves, it would therefore be dynamically decoupled from soldier caste 
determination. Thus, second-order signals act hierarchically on the processes that they 
modulate. 
 
 By focusing on the type of signals involved in regulating a colony process, researchers 
can determine if the regulation and/or control of specific colony processes, e.g. caste 
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determination or nest construction, is due solely to first-order signals, and thus is a process of 
flat self-organization, or due principally to second-order signals, i.e. hierarchical control. If 
there are second-order signals present in colony organization this would, I argue, be evidence 
that not all complex eusocial insect colonies are solely the result of flat self-organization. The 
presence of second-order signals would be evidence that the colony is hierarchically-organized 
rather than a flat network of distributed self-organization. Consequently, by assessing colony 
processes within the context of the wider colony organization, researchers can determine 
whether the organizational cohesiveness is due solely to a flat self-organized network of 
interactions or due to a hierarchical network; i.e. a hierarchical-organization. 
 
 Furthermore, the focus on first- and second-order signals can also be used to assess the 
type of individuality at the colony level. Specifically, I argue that 1) if a colony has multiple 
second-order signals in multiple colony processes and 2) if these second-order signals derive 
from more than one source (i.e. not only the queen but also the brood, different worker castes), 
then this could be evidence of a form of autonomy at the colony level. This is because premise 
1) would point to a high degree of hierarchical control within the colony, i.e. this would point 
to the possibility of multiple colony processes being hierarchically controlled. Additionally, 
premise 2) highlights that hierarchical control is distributed at the colony level, rather than 
emerging from a single part (i.e. the queen). Not only would this result in a more robust 
hierarchical-organization, since it is not reliant on a single part (i.e. the queen), but it would 
also point to a higher-order organization that is sufficiently dynamically decoupled from the 
lower level parts of the system (i.e. each individual insect). This is because the hierarchical-
organization, formed by the second-order signals, emerges through a network of interactions 
rather than emanating from a single part of the colony. Consequently, it operates at a different 
timescale compared to each individual insect within the colony. Therefore, the presence of 
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multiple second-order signals from more than one source in a colony could be evidence of a 
dynamically decoupled higher-order organization that hierarchically controls and regulates the 
lower level parts. Thus, it can be argued that this higher-order organization represents a form 
of self-determination or autonomy at the collective level; i.e. physiological individuality. 
 
5.2. The application of the HO approach to three representative case 
studies of species from across the eusocial complexity spectrum 
 
In this section I will apply the HO approach to three representative case studies of eusocial 
insects in order to assess the types of colony individuality across the complexity spectrum; 
namely the sweat bee Megalopta genalis, the common wasp Vespula vulgaris, and honey bees 
Apis mellifera. However, the analysis of these case studies is somewhat limited as many authors 
do not publish much of the data that is essential for understanding the detailed process of colony 
organization, i.e. colony size (in terms of insects in the colony), colony developmental details, 
interactions between different castes and queen, etc. This type of data is referred to as 
sociometric data, but as many authors/research groups focus on specific colony processes that 
occur across species (such as types of foraging, nest construction, etc.), as I argued in the 
previous chapter, then much of these data sets are not assessed or published as it is not seen as 
relevant to such studies (Smith et al. 2016). 
 
5.2.1. Facultative eusocial bees, Megalopta genalis 
 
Megalopta genalis are a species of sweat bee from the Halictidae family that are facultatively 
eusocial (Kapheim et al. 2016). Reproductive females can either become solitary reproductives 
or they can produce a eusocial colony (Smith et al. 2007). As with other sweat bee species of 
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the Halictidae family, M. genalis are on the ‘simple’ end of the eusocial complexity spectrum 
(Bourke 1999: 247). They have small colony sizes, from 2-11 bees — but, on average, colonies 
have around 2-4 member bees (Smith et al. 2003: 15). The only form of polymorphism in M. 
genalis colonies is that workers are smaller than queens, but workers are completely totipotent 
and have full reproductive potential (Wcislo and Gonzalez 2006; Kapheim et al. 2013). M. 
genalis have gained a lot of attention from researchers because they are facultatively eusocial 
and can thus be a good analogue for the origins of eusociality (Smith et al. 2003; Kapheim et 
al. 2015). 
 
 M. genalis colonies are typically established by a single female (Wcislo and Gonzalez 
2006). M. genalis nest in dry/dead wood (e.g. twigs, branches, etc.) that are suspended off of 
the ground in vegetation. The queen (or solitary female) excavates a tunnel into the wood, 
which forms the main part of the nest, she then excavates brood cells that adjoin to the central 
tunnel — the cell entrances are flush with the tunnel walls — (Smith et al. 2003: 15). The 
entrance to the nest is constricted to a size slightly bigger than the queen’s head; this is achieved 
by the queening adding chewed wood to the entrance hole (Smith et al. 2003: 15). 
 
 The division of labour in eusocial colonies of M. genalis typically consists of the queen 
undertaking reproduction and guarding the nest entrance and the worker(s) primarily foraging 
and feeding other members of the colony via trophallaxis (Kapheim et al. 2016). There are no 
worker castes or polyethism (specialization) among the workers, instead all workers do the 
same tasks. This is expected as worker specialization and polymorphic worker castes are only 
found in the larger colonies of the more complex species (Anderson and McShea 2001). 
Worker specialization is risky for small colonies since if one of the specialized workers die, 
before another is produced to replace it, then the colony organization is adversely affected, 
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whereas in large colonies with many workers, the death of individual workers has little effect 
on colony organization as there are typically many workers of each type (Anderson and 
McShea 2001; Khoury et al. 2011). 
 
 Division of labour in M. genalis is determined and maintained via aggression by the 
dominant queen. Typically, the queen is larger than the workers and this enables the queen to 
coerce some of her female offspring to become workers (Kapheim et al. 2011, 2013). The 
smaller size of workers compared to queens is likely due to the queen restricting the amount of 
nutrition the worker receives during development, i.e. parental manipulation (Smith et al. 2009; 
Kapheim et al. 2011). After she establishes the nest and before the first workers emerge, the 
queen will undertake all of the colony tasks. The queen will forage for nectar and pollen which 
she mixes together and forms into a mass. M. genalis are mass provisioners, as opposed to 
progressive provisioners such as honey bees (A. mellifera), which means that eggs are 
oviposited into brood cells that already contain all the food required for the larval and pupal 
developmental stages (Wcislo and Gonzalez 2006; Kapheim et al. 2011). The queen will 
oviposit an egg on a food mass within a brood cell, she will then close the brood cell by 
plugging the entrance with chewed wood (Quiñones and Wcislo 2015). Thus, for worker-
destined brood the queen will deposit less food in the cell prior to ovipositing. 
 
 Workers emerge from their brood cells around 35 days post oviposition (Quiñones and 
Wcislo 2015: 309). Workers then remain in the nest and are fed, via trophallaxis, by the queen 
for the first 1-14 days (Smith et al. 2003: 15). This is likely due to the young adult workers 
requiring time to develop their flight muscles. Not only does the queen still undertake the 
majority of colony tasks during this period, but the queen will also establish dominance during 
the first 10 days after worker emergence; if it does happen, queen usurpation (i.e. when a 
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worker overtakes the queen as the dominant reproductive) only occurs within the first 10 days, 
after this queen dominance is secured (Kapheim et al. 2016). The queen establishes dominance 
over her worker-destined female offspring via aggression, if successful the young female(s) 
will become the worker(s) and begin foraging and feeding other colony members via 
trophallaxis, and the queen will then remain in the nest as the only reproductively active 
member whilst also guarding the nest, when needed, by blocking the entrance with her 
abdomen (Kapheim et al. 2016). 
 
 In established M. genalis eusocial colonies, not only is the queen typically larger than 
the workers but the queen also has higher juvenile hormone (JH) levels and larger ovaries 
(Kapheim et al. 2013). It has been argued that increased JH levels in the queen increases her 
ability to dominate some of her female offspring to become workers, since eusocial queens 
have higher JH levels than solitary reproductives and workers (Smith et al. 2013). However, 
even though the larger size of the queen enables her to dominate the smaller workers, body size 
does not determine reproductive potential (Kapheim et al. 2013). If the queen dies, then one of 
the workers will likely replace the queen and become the new dominant reproductive. Workers 
that become replacement queens, even though they are smaller in size than typical queens, can 
be as reproductively fecund as the typical larger queen phenotype (Smith et al. 2009). Thus, 
the queen inhibits worker reproduction, via aggression, but workers can activate their ovaries 
in the event of queen death. 
 
 There are no collective colony processes in M. genalis colonies because of the small 
size of colonies and the lack of specialization; each task is carried out by an individual. There 
is, therefore, no higher-order organization in M. genalis colonies and, consequently, there are 
no second-order signals that could coordinate the different collective colony processes within 
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the higher-order organization. Instead, colony organization is based on a dominance hierarchy; 
the queen coordinates the division of labour via aggression. 
 
5.2.2. The common wasp, Vespula vulgaris 
 
The common wasp (Vespula vulgaris) lies around the centre of the eusociality species 
complexity spectrum; they have relatively large colony size and exhibit polymorphism between 
the reproductive and non-reproductive castes, but they have no worker castes and relatively 
simple communication networks (Bourke 1999). Colonies are established in underground nests 
by a single queen. Nests are constructed from pulp that is created by the wasps from a mix of 
foraged wood and water. They consist of an outer enclosing layer made up of multiple 
envelopes, which acts to insulate the interior and create a boundary for the nest, and inside 
there are multiple layers of horizontal combs (facing down) for rearing the brood, which are 
also made from pulp (Potter 1964; Steinmetz et al. 2002). The queen builds the first envelopes 
of the outer layer and the first brood comb. The queen does all colony tasks (i.e. nest and comb 
construction, foraging, nursing, etc.) before the first worker generation emerges, as in M. 
genalis. Once the first generation of workers emerge and become active the queen focuses only 
on reproduction, which becomes her main task — her abdomen enlarges, and she loses the 
ability to fly — whereas workers take over all other tasks (Potter 1964). 
 
 V. vulgaris have relatively large colony sizes; around 3000 or more (Potter 1964; 
Archer 1972). But there are no polymorphic or temporal worker castes, or polyethism,19 in V. 
 
19 Polyethism refers to task specialisation in eusocial insects, i.e. that different members of the colony 
specialise for different tasks. Polyethism can be based, for example, on age or polymorphism: as 
workers age they may change task specialisation, or workers may develop into different 
morphological castes (e.g. soldiers for defence). In honey bees workers exhibit the former. 
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vulgaris. Instead workers are generalists and can typically undertake any worker task after 2-3 
days post emergence (Potter 1964).20 Thus, unlike M. genalis colonies, V. vulgaris colonies are 
large enough for collective colony processes to occur, but, as in M. genalis, common wasp 
colonies have relatively little worker specialisation (no polymorphic worker castes or 
polyethism). Consequently, there are relatively few collective colony processes compared to 
colonies of the more complex eusocial species, such as honey bees (A. mellifera) that I will 
explore below. I will assess some selected collective colony processes of V. vulgaris presently. 
 
 Comb construction: Workers overtake comb construction (and envelope construction) 
from the queen once the first generation of workers emerges, as above. Workers build new 
comb layers, using pulp, beneath the original horizontal layer that the queen constructed. 
Workers likely construct the comb via stigmergic self-organization. No single worker needs a 
complete plan of the comb architecture in her mind, instead multiple workers simultaneously 
construct the comb each with a set of simple behavioural rules for this process. Since V. 
vulgaris use pulp instead of endogenously produced wax (as in honey bees), comb construction 
is constrained by the amount of available raw material, as well as the number of workers present 
in the colony able to forage for wood. This is demonstrated by the fact that comb cells increase 
in size as a colony grows (Archer 1972; Hunt 2007: 94-95). As a colony grows and produces 
more workers, there are more workers available to forage for raw material for pulp. 
Consequently, there is more pulp available for comb construction, and not only do workers 
produce more comb but in each successive comb layer the brood cells increase in size. 
Moreover, larger workers are produced as a result of larger worker-cells, and larger workers 
 
20 However, during the mature colony state young workers (up to 7 days old) may perform more 
intranidal tasks and only forage after 7-9 days, but thereafter perform intranidal and extranidal tasks. 
Moreover, older workers tend to forage less. But in general, all workers can perform all tasks (for 
more details see Potter 1964). 
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live longer (Hunt 2007: 94-95). This results in a greater worker-to-brood ratio towards late 
summer, around the end of the ergonomic stage. It has been argued that the high worker ratio 
initiates reproductive-comb production (Hunt 2007: 94). However, this hypothesis is not 
supported by previous evidence. N. B. Potter (1964: 58-63) demonstrated that, for V. vulgaris 
at least, the queen is more important to reproductive-comb production than the worker-to-brood 
ratio. Potter (1964: 58-63) found that if a queen from a mature colony is transferred to a 
younger small colony (which has a small worker-to-brood ratio), the workers in the small 
colony will construct reproductive-comb instead of worker-comb, moreover the opposite was 
confirmed, if a young queen is transferred to a mature colony in the reproductive stage, the 
workers destroy any reproductive-comb and instead build worker-comb. This shows that the 
type of comb constructed is likely controlled by an element of the queen pheromonal mix 
(QPM) (Potter 1964). 
 
 Consequently, for V. vulgaris, once the workers take over from the queen in comb 
construction (and envelope construction) it becomes a self-organized collective colony process. 
Thus, the self-organized building activities of the workers results from a set of a first-order 
signals in the collective process of comb construction. Whereas, the QPM modulates this 
process by ensuring that the workers build worker-comb and reproductive-comb at the optimal 
time in colony development. The QPM is dynamically decoupled from the comb construction 
process as it derives from the queen, who is no longer directly involved in the process. 
Moreover, the queen is a constant presence within the colony and therefore is not reliant on the 
comb construction process in order to provide the signal that modulates this process. Thus, the 
QPM acts as a second-order signal on the collective process of comb construction. 
 
 175 
 Queen/worker caste determination: As above, in V. vulgaris there are no polymorphic 
worker castes but there is a form of polymorphism between queens and workers (Wheeler 
1928: 74; Potter 1964; Jeanne 1980). Queens are larger than workers and have larger ovaries 
and genitalia than workers. Consequently, workers are typically unable to mate with males 
because of their smaller size and therefore are unable to produce fertilized eggs (Spradbery 
1973: 229-234; Jeanne 1980: 376). Workers can produce unfertilized eggs (which produce 
males) but typically only do so in the case of queen death; in queen-right colonies workers 
typically do not oviposit (Ross 1985). 
 
 Any fertilized egg can develop into a reproductive or a worker (Archer 1972), as in 
many other wasp, bee and ant species (Schwander et al. 2010). There are, consequently, 
mechanisms present in the brood stage that determine whether larvae develop into queens or 
workers; namely, the size of the comb cell and the amount of nutrition. Queens are produced 
in the larger comb cells of the reproductive-comb and workers are produced in the smaller 
comb cells of the worker-comb (Spradbery 1971). As above, the type of comb built by the 
workers is determined by the second-order signal from the queen (the QPM). But the amount 
of nutrition that larvae receive is dependent on their location in the nest and the number of 
workers available to forage for food. Differential feeding of larvae does not occur in V. 
vulgaris, however frequency and quantity of food differs between different areas of the nest 
(Potter 1964: 61). Reproductive-comb are the last comb layers to be produced by the colony, 
in the mature reproductive stage, and are thus the lowest comb layers and closest to the nest 
entrance (Potter 1964). Brood cells on the lowest combs are closer to the nest entrance, and the 
larvae in these cells are the first to be fed by returning foragers (Archer 1972). As above, the 
colony produces larger workers as it matures, larger workers live longer which results in a 
greater worker-to-brood ratio in mature colonies (Archer 1972). Moreover, larger workers can 
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collect more nutrition (Richards 1971). Consequently, there are more workers to forage for 
food in the reproductive stage when queen-brood is produced, and because these workers are 
large they can forage for greater amounts of food, which results in the queen-brood receiving 
more food than worker-brood typically do. Increased nutrition causes the queen-brood to grow 
larger than worker-brood, and the larger comb cells allows space for this increased growth. 
 
 Therefore, the process of caste determination in V. vulgaris is modulated by two 
variables in the brood stage; the amount of nutrition and the size of the comb cell. The former 
variable, nutrition, is ultimately determined by a feedback loop (self-organization). This is 
because nutrition levels increase as a colony grows (Archer 1972). Consequently, the nutrition 
variable is a first-order signal on caste determination as it is dynamically coupled to the process 
itself. In other words, as a colony grows there are more workers available to forage, which 
positively feedbacks on the amount of nutrition received by the brood. Whereas the other 
variable, size of the comb cell, is ultimately dependent on a second-order signal in the earlier 
process of comb construction, above. The type of comb produced is determined by the QPM 
(a second-order signal). 
 
 Worker reproductive inhibition: Reproductive division of labour is underpinned by the 
caste determination process, above. In other words, the polymorphic differences between the 
queen and worker castes already ensures that the queen has a greater reproductive potential 
than workers. Additionally, reproductive division of labour is further ensured by the queen. 
Specifically, the queen can inhibit worker reproductive potential via her QPM (Van Oystaeyen 
et al. 2014). Even though workers typically do not mate they do have ovaries (which are 
typically smaller than those of the queen) and can produce unfertilized eggs (Ross 1985). But 
typically, workers only have activated ovaries and attempt to oviposit unfertilized eggs when 
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there is no queen, or in the declining stage of the colony when the queen is in senescence (Potter 
1964; Ross 1985). A. Van Oystaeyen, and colleagues (2014), demonstrated that this is because 
elements of the QPM inhibit ovary activation and/or causes oocyte regression in workers. In 
other words, the queen ensures that workers remain in the non-reproductive caste by inhibiting 
their reproductive potential. 
 
 Consequently, the earlier process of caste determination can be considered as a first-
order signal on the reproductive division of labour. This is because caste determination ensures 
that workers are produced, which are physiologically distinct from the queen, in particular they 
have less reproductive potential than the queen. But the QPM from the colony’s queen can be 
considered as a second-order signal on reproductive division of labour. This is because the 
QPM further influences the caste determination process by inhibiting adult worker 
reproductive potential, but this signal is dynamically decoupled from this process. As above, 
this is because, unlike the workers, the queen is a constant presence in the colony (Potter 1964). 
Thus, the QPM works at a different timescale to the operation of worker development, i.e. the 
queen lives as long as the colony and, thus, can constantly produce her QPM, whereas there 
are many generations of workers throughout the colony cycle (Potter 1964). 
 
5.2.3. Honey bees, Apis mellifera 
 
Honey bees (A. mellifera) are a well-studied complex eusocial insect species (Bourke 1999). 
Like V. vulgaris, they have large colony sizes and polymorphism between the queen and 
worker castes, but additionally, they exhibit (temporal) worker castes (Lyko et al. 2010; Smith 
et al. 2016). A. mellifera colonies are initiated from swarms, rather than a single queen as in V. 
vulgaris, above (Cronin et al. 2013). This entails that, from their inception, honey bee colonies 
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exhibit division of labour; i.e. reproductive division of labour and task specialisation are 
involved in all stages of A. mellifera colony development. Colonies reproduce, via swarming, 
in late spring/early summer (in temperate climates). The parent colony — the old queen with 
around two thirds of the worker population (primary swarm) — leave the old nest in order to 
establish another nest in a new site. What is left behind in the old nest is one third of the parent 
colony (workers and, sometimes, drones) along with young queens (still in the brood stage), 
which have the potential to form an incipient colony — a new queen plus workers inherited 
from the parent colony — (Lee and Winston 1987;  Beekman et al. 2006; Grozinger et al. 2014; 
Smith et al. 2016). This cycle is repeated yearly (Smith et al. 2016). 
 
 Colonies nest within suitable cavities — those with enough space for the comb to be 
produced but with a single entrance that can be guarded by the bees — typically in tree trunks 
or logs (Seeley and Morse 1976; Simone-Finstrom and Spivak 2010; Hepburn et al. 2014). 
Nests contain vertical layers of comb, which is the main element of the nest; it is where the 
larvae develop into adult bees, it is used to store honey and pollen, and it is the central hub for 
communication (Seeley and Morse 1976; Tautz 2009). Unlike V. vulgaris, honey bee comb is 
made from endogenously produced wax, from special glands in workers. Honey bee colonies 
are large, containing tens of thousands of bees; 10,000-20,000 in feral colonies and 40,000+ in 
domesticated colonies (Harris 2008; Smith et al. 2016). Colony organization is more complex 
compared to that in V. vulgaris, consequently, there are more collective colony process in A. 
mellifera. As above for V. vulgaris, I will presently assess selected colony processes for A. 
mellifera. 
 
 Temporal polyethism and worker castes: As above, unlike V. vulgaris, workers in 
honey bee colonies exhibit a further division of labour. A. mellifera workers undergo a temporal 
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polyethism schedule and, consequently, within colonies there are temporal worker castes. The 
worker castes of A. mellifera are the following: 
 
 nurses, specialise in feeding and attending the brood (and queen), as well as feeding 
the queen and other members of the colony; 
 nest workers,21 specialise in other intranidal (inside the nest) tasks such as comb 
construction and maintenance, ventilation, receiving nectar and processing it into 
honey, storing honey and pollen, and more; 
 foragers, specialise in extranidal (outside the nest) tasks, such as foraging for nectar, 
pollen and water (Seeley 1982; Johnson 2008). 
 
Adult worker bees transition through the different castes as they age. Thus, not only do the 
workers in each castes specialise for specific tasks, additionally, workers of each caste are 
physiologically tuned to their task set, e.g. nurses have large activated hypopharyngeal glands 
that they use to produce jelly to feed the brood/queen, whereas in nest workers these glands 
produce invertase in order to process nectar into honey, and foragers have inactive 
hypopharyngeal glands (Johnson 2003, 2008). Typically, during the active months (spring to 
autumn), the temporal polyethism schedule is the following; workers are nurses from around 
2-11 days old, nest workers 11-18 days old, and foragers around 18+ days old (Johnson 2008). 
But this temporal polyethism schedule is plastic and can be manipulated by the colony in 
response to environmental conditions, as I explain presently. 
 
 
21 I propose the term ‘nest workers’ for the middle-aged worker caste as they specialise in construction 
and housekeeping tasks, as well as food storage (Johnson 2008). ‘Nurses’ are commonly so-called 
because they specialise in feeding other members, particularly the brood, and likewise ‘foragers’ as 
they specialise in foraging. 
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 The temporal polyethism of each individual worker bee is controlled, internally, by 
juvenile hormone (JH) and the glycolipoprotein vitellogenin (Vg). It has been proposed that, 
within each worker bee, JH and Vg form a regulatory network — or ‘double repressor’ network 
(Amdam and Omholt 2003: 451) — since they mutually inhibit one another. Typically, levels 
of Vg are high after first eclosion (adult emergence from larva) and naturally decrease with 
age, high levels of Vg delay the biosynthesis of JH. As Vg decreases this allows for the 
biosynthesis of JH, and as JH levels increase this inhibits further Vg expression (Nelson et al. 
2007). This is important because Vg is associated with the ability of nurses to produce 
proteinaceous jelly that they feed to other members of the colony. Whereas JH biosynthesis 
causes the further development of adult workers, and their progression through the worker 
castes. For example, increasing JH levels induce change within the hypopharyngeal glands of 
the worker such that they go from producing jelly for feeding other colony members (a process 
which relies on Vg) to, instead, producing enzymes for processing nectar into honey, thus 
causing the switch from the nurse to nest worker caste. However, there are external signals, 
which derive from the colony, that also affect the temporal polyethism within each worker. 
 
 Signals from the queen, brood, and the forager caste also affect the temporal polyethism 
schedule in each worker, and therefore also the ratio of workers within each caste (Figure 1). 
Firstly, the queen has an inhibitory effect on JH biosynthesis in workers via her pheromone 
mix (QPM).22 It has been demonstrated that, in the presence of QPM, workers have 
significantly delayed JH biosynthesis compared to those not exposed to QPM (Kaatz et a. 1992; 
Pankiw at al. 1998). Secondly, the brood release signals that affect the polyethism schedule of 
workers. Young brood emit E-β-ocimene — a volatile pheromone that is transmitted into the 
 
22 I use the term ‘queen pheromone mix’ as it has been shown that queens produce pheromones from 
multiple sources — not only their mandibular glands as has been the main focus previously — that act 
as signals in the colony (Slessor et al. 2005; Masionnasse et al. 2010a). 
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nest aerially — that appears to target nest workers and causes increased development in them 
so that they transition to foragers sooner, probably by increasing JH biosynthesis. However, 
older brood emit brood ester pheromone, which is transmitted on contact, that targets nurses, 
delaying their development, most likely by inhibiting the biosynthesis of JH (Maisonnasse et 
al. 2010b). Finally, the forager caste release a signal which affects the temporal polyethism 
schedule of younger workers. Foragers produce ethyl oleate which gets transmitted via 
trophallaxis when foragers pass their nectar loads to nest workers, who deposit nectar in the 
comb. It has been shown that ethyl oleate inhibits the nest workers from developing into the 



























































































































































































































































































































































































 JH and Vg can be considered as first-order signals on the temporal polyethism schedule 
within each worker. They form an interactive mutual inhibitory network within each bee — 
high Vg levels inhibit JH biosynthesis and high JH levels inhibit Vg biosynthesis — but, 
moreover, their effects are limited to the worker in which they are produced. JH and Vg are 
thus dynamically coupled to the internal development system of each worker bee. Added to 
this, the inter-member signal ethyl oleate from the forager caste23 can also be considered as a 
first-order signal. This is because the inhibitory effect of ethyl oleate on the nest worker caste 
is due to a negative feedback loop, i.e. the presence of foragers inhibits the development of 
nest workers into the forager caste, but the absence of foragers allows nest workers to develop 
into foragers. Moreover, workers only begin to produce ethyl oleate at significant enough levels 
to act as a signal when they reach the forager caste (Leoncini et al. 2004). Thus, the operation 
of ethyl oleate on this process is tightly coupled to the internal constraints of the individual 
workers, i.e. there must be older workers (foragers) present in order for ethyl oleate to act as 
an inhibitory signal on younger workers’ (nest workers) development. 
 
 However, the inter-member signals QPM, brood ester, and E-β-ocimene, can be 
considered second-order signals on the temporal polyethism schedule (Table 1). This is 
because they are dynamically decoupled from the systems that they modulate, i.e. the internal 
developmental systems of individual workers. All of these signals affect the temporal 
polyethism schedule of workers — QPM and brood ester slow worker development and E-β-
ocimene induces worker development — but they operate at different timescales. The queen 
is, typically, a constant presence in the colony and therefore the presence of QPM and its 
influence on the temporal polyethism schedule of the workers is not reliant on a change in 
 
23 Ethyl oleate is also produced by the queen, brood and other workers. However, it has been argued 
that only forager-derived ethyl oleate affects the temporal polyethism schedule within workers 
(Leoncini et al. 2004; Slessor et al. 2005). 
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concentration of the workers and/or on a direct feedback loop, as is the case with forager-
derived ethyl oleate. The same is true of brood ester and E-β-ocimene, since they derive from 
the brood, which are not a part of the temporal polyethism or the worker castes. 
 
 Signal Source Target Role 
First-order signals     




Increased JH levels induce worker 
development to next worker caste 




High Vg levels are required for 
nursing, additionally high Vg levels 
inhibit JH biosynthesis 
 Ethyl 
oleate 
Foragers Nest workers Inhibits nest workers transitioning to 
the forager caste 
Second-order 
signals 
    
 QPM Queen Nurses and 
nest workers 








Young brood Nest workers Induces worker development (nest 
worker to forager), possibly by 
inducing JH biosynthesis or inhibiting 
Vg biosynthesis 
Table 1. Temporal polyethism and caste ratio control 
 
 The presence of second-order signals (QPM, brood ester, and E-β-ocimene) on the 
temporal polyethism of the workers allows for the worker caste ratio to be controlled at the 
level of the colony (i.e. hierarchically). This is because, the control of the ratio of workers 
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within each caste is not solely reliant on the self-organization of the workers themselves; i.e. it 
is not solely reliant on a signal (ethyl oleate) from the foragers inhibiting the development of 
nest workers via a negative feedback loop. Instead, in addition to the self-organization 
dynamics of the workers, there are second-order signals (QPM, brood ester, and E-β-ocimene) 
that modulate the development and temporal polyethism schedule within each worker. In other 
words, the control and regulation of the ratio of workers within each caste is not dependent on 
a change in concentration of the workers themselves (i.e. the growth of new workers) but 
instead on second-order signals that can modulate the former process and, thus, the existing 
workers. For example, when a colony reproduces via swarming, the queen and a large 
proportion of the workers, from all castes (i.e. of different ages), will leave the old nest in order 
to establish a new nest site (Smith et al. 2016). However, since it takes at least 3 weeks for the 
colony to produce new workers after it establishes a new nest, the current worker population 
will be predominately formed of older workers, i.e. the majority of the workers will be older 
than is typical for the nurse caste (Robinson et al. 1989; Smith et al. 2016). It has been shown 
that old workers (even those that have been foragers) can revert back to the nurse caste, with 
these ‘reverted’ nurses even having low JH levels and regenerated hypopharyngeal glands in 
order to feed the brood (Robinson 1992). This developmental reversion could be due to the 
presence of second-order signals. Specifically, older workers can revert to the nurse caste due 
to QPM and brood ester inhibiting JH biosynthesis, and consequently allowing Vg biosynthesis 
and the reactivation of the hypopharyngeal glands. Additionally, E-β-ocimene would 
counteract this by promoting JH biosynthesis to ensure that not too many workers revert to 
nurses and, thus, ensuring an equal balance between the worker castes. Thus, the plasticity of 
the temporal polyethism is likely to be controlled by the second-order signals that act on the 
internal development systems of the workers, consequently allowing the colony to regulate the 
ratio of workers in each caste. 
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 But this is not the case for all eusocial insect species that exhibit worker castes. For 
example, in Pheidole ants, soldier/minor worker caste determination does not appear to involve 
second-order signals. Pheidole ants do not exhibit temporal castes but many exhibit physical 
worker castes, typically minor worker and soldier castes (Lillico-Ouachour and Abouheif 
2017). Caste determination in Pheidole ants is determined during the larval stages. There is a 
developmental switch early in larval development; larvae with high JH levels activate the 
queen developmental programme and those with low JH levels activate the worker 
developmental programme. Those larvae that activate the worker developmental programme 
face a further developmental switch, into either a soldier or minor worker. This soldier/minor 
worker developmental switch is internally mediated by levels of JH; worker-larvae with high 
JH levels develop into soldiers and worker-larvae with low JH levels develop into minor 
workers. But crucially, Lillico-Ouachour and Abouheif (2017) found that this secondary 
developmental switch in worker-larvae is also affected by an inter-member signal, a 
pheromone from adult soldiers. They found that when adult soldiers are present in the colony, 
they inhibit worker-larvae developing into soldiers, possibly by the soldier pheromone 
inhibiting JH biosynthesis within each worker-larvae. Conversely, when the number of adult 
soldiers decreases (e.g. due to mortality) this induces worker-larvae to develop into soldiers as 
the inhibitory effect of the soldier pheromone will also decrease. 
 
 However, similarly to the operation of the ethyl oleate in A. mellifera, the inhibitory 
effect of the soldier pheromone is also dependent on a change in the concentration of the 
soldiers themselves, hence its action on worker-larvae development is dynamically coupled to 
worker-larvae development; i.e. the activation of the inhibitory effect of the soldier pheromone 
relies on the growth of new soldiers. Thus, the soldier pheromone can be considered as a first-
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order signal on soldier/minor worker caste determination. The soldier pheromone does allow 
for the ratio of the morphological worker castes (soldiers and minor workers) to be controlled 
collectively in Pheidole. But this type of collective control is localised to the soldier caste 
themselves via the negative feedback effect of the soldier pheromone. This is in clear contrast 
to the case in A. mellifera, whereby, due to the presence of second-order signals (Table 1) 
regulation of the temporal worker castes is hierarchically controlled at the collective colony 
level. 
 
 Reproductive/worker caste determination: Colony level control of the temporal 
polyethism schedule of workers is important for A. mellifera colonies because the presence of 
worker castes allows for further second-order signals; i.e. a more complex higher-order 
organization compared to common wasp colonies. This is clear in the case of queen production, 
as I will explain presently. 
 
 Similarly to V. vulgaris, in A. mellifera, queen/worker caste determination is not 
genetically predetermined, i.e. any fertilized egg can be used to produce a queen or a worker 
(Wang et al. 2015). There are, consequently, signals and mechanisms present in the brood stage 
that determine the development of a particular larva into either a queen or worker (Figure 2). 
Queen-brood require large vertically-protruding comb cells, that are produced by nest workers. 
This is because in the larval and pupal stages, queen-brood are much larger than worker-brood, 
and so the increased volume of the larger comb cells is essential for their proper growth (Wang 
et al. 2015). 
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 However, it is not only the size of the comb cell that determines the development of 




Queen cell Small comb cell
Royal jelly Brood food
Fig. 2. Queen/worker production. Any fertilized egg can develop into a queen or worker in 
A. mellifera. The type of comb cell, orange squares, and diet, blue squares, determine the 
development of larvae. Large queen cells and royal jelly cause larvae from fertilized eggs to 
develop into queens, whereas small comb cells and brood food cause equivalent larvae to 
develop into workers. Royal jelly induces an epigenetic change within the larvae. The size of 
the comb cell constrains larval growth. See text for more details. 
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stages is also an important factor. Nurse workers will begin feeding the larvae as soon as they 
hatch (eggs hatch after 3 days); worker-larvae receive ‘brood food’ — which is a mixture of 
jelly, honey and pollen — whilst queen-larvae receive a specialised diet of royal jelly and 
pollen (Wang et al. 2015). This is significant because it has been experimentally shown that 
newly hatched larvae (from fertilized eggs) that are fed a diet exclusively of royal jelly during 
the larval stage will develop into queens, whereas larvae fed with brood food will develop into 
workers (Page Jr. and Peng 2001; Wang et al. 2015). Lyko, and colleagues (2010), found that 
it is not just the higher nutritional value of the royal jelly that affects the larvae development. 
As well as accelerating metabolism and increasing growth, elements of the royal jelly (most 
likely phenyl butyrate) affect DNA methylation in the developing larvae by silencing DNA 
methyltransferase 3 (DNMT3). Royal jelly, therefore, induces an epigenetic change in the 
developing larvae. 
 
 As I have shown above, the different worker castes are maintained by the colony, via 
second-order signals, despite individual workers transitioning between castes. As a result of 
this, the nurse and nest worker castes are a constant presence in the colony, consequently, they 
can produce their respective signals for larvae development when required. Specifically, nest 
workers produce queen cells either in the event of the death of the queen or, more commonly, 
when the colony begins to prepare to swarm (Grozinger et al. 2014).24 The queen will then 
oviposit fertilized eggs within queen cells and once the larvae emerge, nurse workers will 
supply them with royal jelly as needed (Beetsma 1979).25 It can thus be argued that royal jelly 
and queen cells are dynamically decoupled from the process of reproductive caste 
 
24 It is unclear exactly what initiates the colony into swarm preparation, but multiple cues are likely to 
be involved (Grozinger et al. 2014). But as I discuss below, for the specific case of queen cell 
production, a change to, or lack of, QPM may be key. 
25 It is likely that the size of comb cells acts as a cue for the nurses (Beetsma 1979), i.e. nurses may 
respond according to the type of cell in the following way: for larvae in queen cells deposit royal 
jelly, for larvae in worker cells then deposit brood food. 
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determination, i.e. the presence of the nurse and nest worker castes, in order to provide these 
signals, are not directly dependent on the process that they affect. Therefore, both queen cells 
and royal jelly can be considered as second-order signals on reproductive caste determination 
(Table 2). 
 
 Signal Source Target Role 
First-order 
signals 













    
 Queen cells Nest workers Queen-larvae Larger comb cell volume allows for 
the increased growth of queen-larvae 
 Worker cells Nest workers Worker-
larvae 
Smaller comb cell restricts growth of 
worker-larvae 
 Royal jelly Nurses Queen-larvae Induces the queen developmental 
programme by causing an epigenetic 
change 
 Brood food Nurses Worker-
larvae 
Induces the worker developmental 
programme by not causing an 
epigenetic change 




 Thus, queen/worker caste determination is more complex than in V. vulgaris. As above, 
there are second-order signals involved in queen production in V. vulgaris but to a lesser degree 
than in A. mellifera. It can be argued that in V. vulgaris, queen production is practically 
determined by the queen — the state of the QPM determines the production of reproductive-
comb, and, even though nutrition levels increase due to self-organization, worker foraging is 
induced by the presence of the queen (Potter 1964: 50). Instead, in A. mellifera the production 
of queens is determined by the higher-order collective organization. Royal jelly, which causes 
an epigenetic change in queen-larvae, acts as a second-order signal; it is independent of the 
internal development systems of the developing larvae that it modulates. Also, this second-
order signal derives from the nurse temporal caste (rather than from the queen). Moreover, the 
production of reproductive-comb is not dependent on the QPM in the same way as it is in V. 
vulgaris, as I will show presently. 
 
 Comb construction: The comb is an essential element of a colony’s nest (Tautz 2009), 
it is where food (honey and pollen) is processed and stored, it is necessary for the production 
of brood (and therefore colony members), and it is essential for colony communication — for 
example, bees use the surface of the comb to do their communication dances, and vibrating its 
surface adds additional information to these dances (Hölldobler and Wilson 2009: 169-178). 
The comb is built and maintained by the nest worker caste (Johnson 2008). To do this nest 
workers secrete wax from glands in their abdomens, which they collect and use to construct 
the comb (Hepburn et al. 2014). Typically, only nest workers have activated wax glands 
(Johnson 2003). Comb construction is most likely the result of stigmergic self-organization 
(Oldroyd and Pratt 2015). This is because there is no need for any individual nest worker to 
have the complete plan of the comb in their mind, instead each cell of the comb can be 
constructed by multiple nest workers, each with a set of simple behavioural rules. Each nest 
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worker will react with the appropriate construction task based on the current state of any 
particular part of the comb as they come across it (for more details see: Oldroyd and Pratt 
2015). However, the size and type of comb produced is influenced by QPM (Maisonnasse et 
al. 2010a). It has been shown that nest workers construct less comb when there is no queen 
present in the colony as compared to when a queen is present. Moreover, when there is no 
queen present nest workers produce more drone-sized cells and queen cells in preparation for 
swarming rather than suitable comb for producing workers (Maisonnasse et al. 2010a). 
Therefore, an element of the QPM of the queen acts as a signal to the nest workers, affecting 
their building activity when constructing the comb. This signal ensures the correct type of comb 
is built at the correct time, i.e. worker-comb in the founding and ergonomic stages of colony 
development (Smith et al. 2016). 
 
 Signal Source Target Role 
First-order 
signals 
    
 Stigmergic 
building 
Nest workers Comb Construction of comb 
Second-order 
signals 
    
 QPM Queen Nest 
workers 
Induces nest workers to build more 
comb and predominately worker-
comb 
Table 3. Comb construction 
 
 It can be argued that stigmergic building by the nest workers is a first-order signal on 
comb construction in A. mellifera (Table 3). The role of the nest workers in this process is 
essential, without which no comb will be produced, and the colony cannot grow and maintain 
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itself. However, QPM can be considered as a second-order signal on comb construction (and 
therefore colony development). This is because it is not essential in order for comb to be 
produced, instead it acts as a modulator on this process, i.e. it is dynamically decoupled from 
it. QPM acts indirectly by affecting the nest workers during comb construction; with QPM 
present nest workers produce more comb and primarily worker-comb, with a reduction (or loss 
of) QPM present nest workers produce less comb and significantly more reproductive-comb. 
 
 In V. vulgaris, reproductive comb production is also regulated by the QPM, as above, 
but not in exactly the same way. In V. vulgaris comb construction ceases in queenless colonies 
(Potter 1964), but this is not the case for A. mellifera. Furthermore, in honey bees, the 
production of reproductive-comb in the absence (or lack) of QPM appears to suggest a colony 
level response to a perturbation. The absence of QPM could be due to the death of the queen, 
for example, and without a queen no workers can be produced, and the colony cannot grow 
and maintain itself. Put simply, a colony without a queen will not survive for long. If queen 
death occurs, the workers of the colony will attempt to produce a new queen (if there is young 
worker-brood, less than 3 days old,26 to convert into queen-brood by extending their comb cells 
into queen cells and feeding them royal jelly) and/or produce drones to send out to mate with 
young queens from other colonies (Free and Williams 1975; Tautz 2009: 135-139; Naeger et 
al. 2013). Therefore, it could be argued that the absence of the second-order signal (QPM) 
during comb construction causes a switch in the constitutive organization of the colony. The 
colony switches from normal growth and self-maintenance to a state of attempting to produce 
reproductives, in order to 1) replace the queen — to once again enable colony growth and self-
 
26 Queens can be produced from worker-larvae that are under 3 days old (Beetsma 1979). However, 
the age at which worker-larvae are switched to queen-larvae (via extended comb cells and royal jelly) 
affects the reproductive potential of the resultant adult queen: queens produced from the youngest 
worker-larvae have the highest reproductive potential as adults (Rangel et al. 2013). 
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maintenance — and/or 2) produce drones — in an attempt to reproduce in case of colony 
failure. 
 
 Worker reproductive inhibition: In A. mellifera workers cannot mate as they lack 
genitalia, but they do have ovaries and have the potential to produce unfertilized eggs that 
develop into males (Ronai et al. 2015). As in V. vulgaris, worker reproductive potential is 
inhibited in A. mellifera colonies by the QPM; it causes oocyte regression in workers (Ronai 
et al. 2015). But unlike V. vulgaris colonies, worker reproduction is also inhibited by signals 
from the brood, namely brood ester and E-β-ocimene (Maisonnasse et al. 2010b). QPM, brood 
ester and E-β-ocimene can all be considered as second-order signals on worker reproductive 
inhibition as again, they are dynamically decoupled from this process. The QPM derives from 
the queen and brood ester and E-β-ocimene derive from the brood, therefore their presence and 
effect on worker reproductive inhibition is not directly dependent on that process. 
 
5.3. Comparison of colony level individuality in three eusocial insect 
species 
 
In the previous section I applied the HO approach to three representative case studies — M. 
genalis, V. vulgaris, and A. mellifera — in order to assess the organizational differences 
between colonies of different species across the eusocial complexity spectrum. I showed that 
of the three, only A. mellifera exhibits second-order signals, a form of hierarchical control, 
from multiple sources; V. vulgaris has only one known source of second-order signals (the 
queen) and M. genalis colonies are too small for collective colony processes and, consequently, 
lack any collective organization with second-order signals. I will now conclude by comparing 
the types of colony individuality (table 4), if applicable, in each of these eusocial insect species. 
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 As above, M. genalis are on the very simple end of the eusocial complexity spectrum. 
Colonies of M. genalis are too small for collective colony processes; each task is done by an 
individual bee. They therefore lack the type of collective organization possible for second-
order signals. Instead, colony organization is controlled by the queen via aggression. Moreover, 
workers are fully totipotent and have full reproductive potential, but they typically do not 
reproduce due to the aggression of the queen. Consequently, selection is likely to be operating 
at the individual level only, rather than at the collective colony level (Kapheim et al. 2015; 
Johnson and Linksvayer 2010). In other words, colonies are not units of selection in M. genalis 
and consequently, colonies are not evolutionary individuals in this species. Additionally, 
colonies of M. genalis are not physiological-like individuals either since they have no higher-
order organization and second-order signals. Instead, they are groups with a dominant 
reproductive, similar to many mammal social groups (e.g. meerkats), and if anything happens 
to the dominant reproductive, then any other female member can take her place. 
 
 In comparison, colonies of both V. vulgaris and A. mellifera have large colonies that 
exhibit collective colony processes. Moreover, they both exhibit second-order signals that 
hierarchically control and coordinate the collective processes. However, A. mellifera colonies 
have second-order signals from multiple sources whereas V. vulgaris only have one known 
source of second-order signals, namely the queen. This has implications for the hierarchical-
organization within colonies; colony organization in V. vulgaris is likely to be much less stable 
than A. mellifera. This is demonstrated in the event of queen death, i.e. the absence of the sole 
source for second-order signals in the common wasp. 
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 In V. vulgaris colony organization breaks down when the queen dies, which typically 
happens after the colony has produced young reproductives in the autumn (Potter 1964). 
Workers begin to oviposit unfertilized eggs, although they are rarely successful because 
oviposition is relatively unorganized — multiple workers oviposit eggs in the same comb cell 
— and foraging almost completely ceases without a queen present, thus there is little food for 
any worker-laid brood. Moreover, workers begin to cannibalise any brood present due to the 
lack of foraging. Consequently, due to the lack of colony cohesiveness and lack of food, the 
colony dies (Potter 1964: 34). 
 
 Whereas A. mellifera colonies have discreet temporal worker castes, which allows for 
more sources of second-order signals than in V. vulgaris colonies. Consequently, colony 
organization is not reliant on once source of second-order signals and is, therefore, more robust. 
Unlike in V. vulgaris, colony organization does not break down in the case of queen death, 
instead A. mellifera colonies will attempt produce a new replacement queen. The nest worker 
caste will adapt the comb cells of suitable larvae (from fertilized eggs) into queen cells (a 
second-order signal), and the nurse caste will then feed these larvae exclusively with royal jelly 
(a second-order signal), thus allowing the colony to produce a replacement queen. 
 
 The presence of multiple sources of second-order signals in A. mellifera colonies results 
in a more complex hierarchical-organization whereby hierarchical control and regulation is 
distributed at the collective colony level, as opposed to V. vulgaris whereby the hierarchical 
control and regulation is centralized around the queen, resulting in a more minimal form of 
hierarchical-organization. Consequently, it can be argued that the network of interactions, 
particularly between the parts that produce second-order signals, forms a new hierarchical level 
of organization in A. mellifera colonies. A hierarchical level that is dynamically decoupled 
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from the lower level colony parts (the bees) but at the same time is capable of modulating and 
controlling on those lower level parts. In comparison, in V. vulgaris colonies the hierarchical-
organization is more tightly coupled to the operation of the lower level parts because the 
second-order signals derive from a single source (the queen). Thus, colonies of both species 
exhibit hierarchical control in the coordination of colony organization, but in V. vulgaris this 
is determined at the lower level (i.e. the queen) whereas in A. mellifera this is determined at 
the collective level, by the higher-order organization. 
 
 Evolutionary individuality Physiological-like individuality 
M. genalis No No 
V. vulgaris Yes No 
A. mellifera Yes Yes 
Table 4. Types of colony level individuality in three eusocial insect species 
 
 Therefore, it can be argued that there is a form of physiological-like individuality at the 
colony level in A. mellifera but not in V. vulgaris. In V. vulgaris colonies can, at most, be 
considered as phenotypic extensions of the queen. Or, perhaps more likely, simply as groups 
with a minimal form of hierarchical-organization. In other words, V. vulgaris colonies may 
represent an intermediate stage of colony individuality because they have not quite achieved 
physiological-like individuality at the colony level — there is only a minimal form of 
hierarchical-organization — but colonies are units of selection and, thus, there is evolutionary 
individuality at the colony level. Whereas colonies of A. mellifera are arguably superorganisms 
in both senses; i.e. there is arguably physiological-like individuality as well as evolutionary 
individuality at the colony level in honey bees. 
 
5.4. The concept of BA and the superorganism 
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 What do these conclusions entail for the use of the concept of BA within eusociality 
research? Out of the three species assessed in the comparative case study, BA is only 
theoretically possible in M. genalis because there is no form of individuality at the colony level. 
However, as I have shown above, it is quite clear that offspring do not develop into the non-
reproductive worker caste because of an internal trait that they possess, i.e. BA. Instead, they 
are coerced into that role by the queen. Thus, they do not become workers in an attempt to 
increase their inclusive fitness (BA), instead they are under parental manipulation (Kapheim et 
al. 2015). 
 
 In the case of V. vulgaris and A. mellifera, the concept of BA is not applicable to the 
workers because colonies are superorganisms. In V. vulgaris, colonies are units of selection, 
and thus evolutionary superorganisms. The evolutionary approach to the superorganism is 
based on MLS2, as I argued in chapter 3, which argues that selection occurs at multiple levels 
simultaneously. However, in the case of V. vulgaris, and other similarly organized eusocial 
insect species, selection is primarily occurring between-colonies (Hölldobler and Wilson 
2009). Thus, in such cases the insects within colonies are not evolutionary individuals in their 
own right, their fitness is derived from the colony level (Okasha 2014). Moreover, as I have 
highlighted above, V. vulgaris also exhibit a minimal form of hierarchical control, based on 
second-order signals from the queen. Individuals develop into non-reproductive workers due 
to mechanisms in the brood stage (comb cell size and amount of nutrition), which are both 
ultimately regulated by the second-order signals from the queen. Not only do wasps require the 
colony in order to develop and survive, offspring develop into workers — have their 
reproductive potential inhibited — by hierarchical control. Therefore, the claim that workers 
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in V. vulgaris are biological altruistic (according to the definition I proposed in chapter 3), as 
many authors do (e.g. Ratnieks and Wenseleers 2006, 2008), is incorrect. 
 
 In A. mellifera, colonies are superorganisms in the fullest sense. Not only are colonies 
units of selection (i.e. evolutionary superorganisms), due to their hierarchical-organization they 
are also physiological-like superorganisms. Not only are workers not evolutionary individuals 
in their own right (because the colony is the unit of selection), like in V. vulgaris, they are also 
lower level parts in a higher-order system. Because there are multiple sources of second-order 
signals, there is a more complex form of hierarchical-organization within A. mellifera colonies. 
As above, the network of interactions form a hierarchical level that is dynamically decoupled 
from the lower level colony parts (the bees) but at the same time is capable of modulating and 
controlling on those lower level parts. Therefore, not only are individual bees not evolutionary 
individuals, they are determined into their roles within the colony (e.g. queen or worker) due 
to the complex hierarchical-organization. Thus, workers in A. mellifera, and similarly 





In this chapter I have challenged the presupposition that hierarchical control does not occur in 
complex eusocial insects. Using the HO approach, I argued that there is evidence that 
hierarchical control occurs in at least two complex eusocial insect species (i.e. V. vulgaris and 
A. mellifera). Furthermore, I applied the HO approach to three representative case studies in 
order to assess the types of colony individuality in eusocial insects. 
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 To begin with, in section 5.1., I proposed an organizational approach that incorporates 
self-organization, but focuses on the possible hierarchical control within colonies, namely the 
HO approach. The HO approach focuses on the coordinating signals that control and regulate 
the collective colony processes (e.g. caste determination, nest construction, etc.). Specifically, 
the HO approach assesses whether colony processes are controlled solely by first-order signals, 
thus flat self-organization, or by second-order signals, thus a hierarchically controlled self-
organization. Additionally, I argued that there is a form of physiological-like individuality at 
the colony level if 1) a colony has multiple second-order signals in multiple colony processes 
and 2) these second-order signals derive from more than one source (i.e. not only the queen but 
also the brood, different worker castes). This is because, premise 1) points to the fact that the 
colony is hierarchically-organized. Whereas premise 2) highlights that hierarchical control is 
distributed at the colony level, rather than being reliant on a single part (i.e. the queen), 
therefore resulting in a higher-order organization that is sufficiently dynamically decoupled 
from the lower level parts of the system (i.e. each individual insect). A dynamically decoupled 
higher-order organization could be evidence of physiological-like individuality. 
 
 In section 5.2., I applied the HO approach to three representative case studies; a species 
representing the most simple eusocial insects (M. genalis), a species from the mid-range of the 
eusocial complexity spectrum (V. vulgaris), and a species representing the more complex 
species (A. mellifera). M. genalis colonies are too small for collective colony processes, thus 
they lack a collective organization possible for second-order signals. Whereas, both V. vulgaris 
and A. mellifera colonies are large enough for collective organizations and, furthermore, both 
exhibit hierarchical-organization due to the presence of second-order signals. However, there 
is only one known source of second-order signals in V. vulgaris colonies, namely, the queen. 
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Whereas, in A. mellifera colonies, there are multiple sources of second-order signals; the queen, 
the brood, and the temporal worker castes. 
 
 In section 5.3., I analysed the types of individuality in eusocial insect colonies. Based 
on these case studies, it is likely that in the most simple species of eusocial insects, represented 
by M. genalis, there is no form of individuality at the colony level. Instead, in species like M. 
genalis, colonies are groups with a dominant reproductive, i.e. the queen, who maintains colony 
cohesiveness via aggression. Whereas, as organizational complexity increases within eusocial 
insect species, colony individuality also emerges — as colonies evolved to be more complex, 
the insects that instantiate them became more specialised and, thus, they became individually 
less complex (Anderson and McShea 2001). Colonies of species on the middle range of the 
eusocial complexity spectrum, as represented by V. vulgaris, are units of selection due to the 
complex reproductive division of labour, and are consequently evolutionary superorganisms. 
However, V. vulgaris exhibit a minimal form of hierarchical-organization as the queen 
represents the unique source of second-order signals in the colony. Thus, in V. vulgaris, and 
similar species (around the centre of the eusocial complexity spectrum) with a minimal 
hierarchical-organization in colonies, there is no physiological-like individuality at the colony 
level. However, in the more complex species, as represented by A. mellifera, there are multiple 
second-order signals from multiple sources, which forms a higher-order organization that is 
dynamically decoupled from the lower level parts. Consequently, colonies in such species are 
not only evolutionary superorganisms, but also superorganisms in a physiological-like sense; 
as argued by Wheeler so long ago. 
 
 Finally, in section 5.4., I assessed the consequences of these findings for the use of the 
concept of BA within eusociality research. I argued that the BA is only theoretically possible 
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in one of the three species analysed in 5.2., namely M. genalis. This is because colonies of M. 
genalis are not superorganisms, in either sense. Moreover, as I highlighted in chapter 3, 
selection takes place primarily at the individual level in this species. However, it is clear from 
the case study that there is no evidence that individuals in M. genalis become non-reproductives 
because of an internal trait that they possess; i.e. individuals are not attempting to increase their 
inclusive fitness by becoming workers (i.e. BA). Instead, they are coerced into becoming 
workers by the queen (i.e. parental manipulation). Furthermore, I argued that BA is not even 
theoretically possible in V. vulgaris and A. mellifera. This is because colonies in both species 
are superorganisms. In V. vulgaris, colonies are evolutionary superorganisms (units of 
selection). Moreover, they exhibit a minimal form of hierarchical-organization. Not only are 
the workers not evolutionary individuals in their own right, they develop into non-reproductive 
workers due to hierarchical control, which is ultimately reliant on the queen. In A. mellifera, 
colonies are superorganisms in both an evolutionary and physiological-like sense. Colonies 
exhibit a complex hierarchical-organization that is dynamically decoupled from the lower level 
parts, but which at the same time is capable of modulating and controlling on those lower level 
parts. Thus, not only are individuals in A. mellifera not evolutionary individuals, they develop 
into non-reproductive workers due to hierarchical control of the collective organization. 
Therefore, workers in both V. vulgaris and A. mellifera are not biologically altruistic. 
 
 Eusociality researchers should, therefore, explore alternative approaches that do not 
rule out the possibility of hierarchical control in complex eusocial insects, such as the HO 
approach that I have developed in this chapter. As well as investigating the superorganism from 
an evolutionary perspective, and assessing which species exhibit colony selection, researchers 
should also approach the superorganism from an organizational perspective in order to assess 
which species can also be considered physiological-like individuals. It has been shown that 
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many species of eusocial insects exhibit colony selection, due to the evolution of obligate 
eusociality in these species (Hölldobler and Wilson 2009). Therefore, many species are likely 
to qualify as evolutionary superorganisms, such as in V. vulgaris. But some species, such as A. 
mellifera and other highly complex species, are also likely to be physiological-like 
superorganisms because of hierarchical-organization within these colonies. But more empirical 
research needs to be carried out by eusociality researchers in order to assess this. The concept 
of BA would not be applicable to the non-reproductive castes in those species in which colonies 
are superorganisms in any sense, as I argued above. Thus, the current widespread use of the 
concept of BA within eusociality research is not justified. It is only theoretically possible in 
the most simple species whereby colonies are not superorganisms in any sense; i.e. likely the 
facultative eusocial species such as M. genalis. However, as I argued in chapter 3, there is 
currently no direct evidence that the concept of BA is the correct description of the behaviour 
of the non-reproductive castes in these species. Moreover, applying the concept of BA to 
species such as V. vulgaris and A. mellifera, obscures important and interesting biological 





[The] earliest evolutionary steps towards eusociality are most favoured if mediated 
through maternal manipulation. (Kapheim et al. 2015: 5. Emphasis added). 
 
The aim of this thesis was to provide a critical analysis of the use of the concept of BA within 
eusociality research from a historical and philosophical perspective. Specifically, I addressed 
the following questions: 
 
A. Is the concept of BA a correct description of the behaviour of the non-reproductive 
castes in eusocial insect colonies? 
B. Has the widespread use of the concept of BA been problematic for eusociality 
research? 
 
I addressed these questions in the previous chapters by challenging the following claims about 
the concept of BA and eusociality research that are made within the literature: 
 
(1) That BA is a fundamental issue in eusociality research 
(2) That BA has been a fundamental issue in eusociality research since Darwin 
(3) Darwin discussed and/or developed the concept of BA and its associated paradox 
 
In chapters 1 and 2, I challenged claims (2) and (3). In chapter 1, I traced the history of the 
concept of BA within eusociality research. Contrary to claim (2), I argued the concept of BA 
was developed by Haldane (1932) seven decades after Darwin first published On the Origin of 
Species. Additionally, I argued that the concept did not become widely used within eusociality 
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research until around the 1960s, a century after Darwin published the Origin. This was due to 
the emergence of kin selection. Hamilton applied kin selection theory to the explanation of the 
evolution of eusociality because a) he rejected the superorganism argument that was previously 
widespread and b) he already considered eusocial insects as an example of BA prior to 
developing the theory of kin selection. But the reason why Hamilton applied the concept of 
BA has received little attention within the literature, and this is problematic because Hamilton’s 
influence led to the mainstream view that BA is necessarily required in order for eusociality to 
evolve. I argued that the Hamilton applied the concept of BA to eusocial insects because of the 
Sturtevant-Hamilton problem of sterility. Following Sturtevant, Hamilton argued that worker 
BA must evolve in order for eusociality to evolve. But the Sturtevant-Hamilton problem of 
sterility does not necessarily entail that BA is essential for the evolution of BA, it only entails 
that the non-reproductive castes evolve. This could occur due to worker BA or it could occur 
due to parental manipulation, for example. However, this point went relatively unnoticed due 
to the lack of reassessment into the original argument for the sterility problem by Sturtevant. 
As a consequence, the majority of authors conceptualised the evolution of eusociality as the 
evolution of BA. Alternatives to BA, such as the superorganism, dominance, etc., that were in 
use in pre-Hamiltonian eusociality research, declined as a result of the widespread use of BA. 
 
 In chapter 2, I argued that contrary to claim (3), Darwin did not discuss and/or develop 
the concept of BA. Darwin’s concept of morality, in the Descent of Man, was more similar to 
psychological altruism than BA. Eusocial insects did initially pose a serious problem for 
Darwin when he was developing his theory of natural selection, which he referred to as the 
“special difficulty”. But the “special difficulty” was not to do with BA but, rather, the fact that 
the non-reproductive castes have evolved to be different to the reproductives. Thus, I argued 
that Darwin did not discuss and/or develop the concept of BA. 
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 I challenged claim (1) in chapters 3, 4, and 5, which I will summarise below. 
Simultaneously, I will highlight how I addressed the two main questions of this thesis. I will 
then address some implications of the findings of this thesis. 
 
Has the widespread use of the concept of BA been problematic for eusociality 
research? 
 
Hamilton applied the concept of BA to eusociality due to the Sturtevant-Hamilton problem of 
sterility, and he used kin selection theory in order to explain the evolution of eusocial insects; 
i.e. he argued that eusociality evolved due to the evolution of biologically altruistic worker 
castes. Due to the fact that kin selection theory was so groundbreaking, Hamilton had an 
enormous influence on the field. As a consequence, the majority of authors conceptualised the 
evolution of eusociality as the evolution of BA, following Hamilton. But this conceptual 
monism of BA, post-Hamilton, was problematic for eusociality research. Firstly, the 
widespread use of BA led to inaccurate historiographies of eusociality research, e.g. claims (2) 
and (3). In chapter 2, I argued that authors have often viewed the history of eusociality research 
to be centred around the problem of BA, due to the current conceptual monism of BA in post-
Hamiltonian eusociality research. This led to the inaccurate historical claims (2) and (3), above. 
I argued that this is not only a problem for historical accuracy, however. Claims (2) and (3) 
have the effect of justifying the current widespread use of the concept of BA, by adding 
historical weight to the use of the concept. In other words, the claim that authors, including 
Darwin, have conceptualised the evolution of eusociality as the evolution of BA throughout 
history, supports the current conceptualisation of the problem in the same way.  
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 Moreover, the widespread use of the concept of BA, and the subsequent inaccurate 
historiographies of eusociality research, led to a lack of focus on possible alternatives. Some 
alternatives, such as the superorganism, dominance, trophallaxis, etc., were already in use prior 
to Hamilton, as I highlighted in chapter 1. Others, such as parental manipulation, were proposed 
after Hamilton introduced kin selection, but received relatively little attention compared to the 
concept of BA. This is extremely problematic because, as I highlighted in chapter 3, recent 
empirical data supports the view that parental coercion led to the evolution of the reproductive 
division of labour, not biological altruistic workers.  
 
 The conceptual monism of BA was also problematic because it resulted in multiple 
definitions of the concept in use, as I argued in chapter 3. Because of the view that BA was 
necessarily required for the evolution of eusociality, authors typically altered the concept to fit 
their theoretical models rather than seeking alternatives. Group selection theorists developed 
the concept of weak BA, but I argued that this is not true BA because it defines the fitness 
consequences relatively. Moreover, weak BA can only evolve by increasing the focal 
individuals absolute fitness. Kin selection theorists defined the fitness consequences in terms 
of absolute fitness. But the evidence for parental coercion has often been interpreted as 
evidence of worker BA by kin selection theorists due to the fitness consequences definition of 
BA (BAf) — a trait that cause negative selection to the focal individual and positive selection 
to the recipient individual(s). I argued that both worker BA and parental coercion can fit this 
definition; both traits cause negative selection to the focal individual (the worker). Thus, the 
evidence of coercion has either been interpreted as BA, or in some cases as “enforced BA”. 
Therefore, I proposed a definition of BA, closer to the original notion from Haldane, that 
stipulates that the cause of the fitness consequences is due to a trait possessed by the focal 
individual: BA = a trait possessed by the focal individual, that causes it to benefit others at a 
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long-term cost to itself, resulting in negative selection on the focal individual and positive 
selection on the recipient(s). 
 
Is the concept of BA a correct description of the behaviour of the non-
reproductive castes in eusocial insect colonies? 
 
In chapter 3, I assessed the role of BA within current evolutionary studies of eusocial insects. 
I argued that only kin selection is compatible with the concept of BA that I proposed; group 
selection is only compatible with weak BA, which is a form of mutualism not BA. However, I 
argued that there is a lack of evidence that eusociality evolved due to worker BA. Recent 
evidence supports the parental manipulation perspective; that eusociality evolved due to 
parental coercion. Therefore, there is a lack of empirical support for the claim that the non-
reproductive castes of eusocial insects are biologically altruistic. Thus, not only is it incorrect 
to claim that BA is a fundamental problem for eusociality research (claim (1)), it is likely that 
BA is not even the correct description of the behaviour of the non-reproductive castes. 
 
 In chapters 4 and 5, I explored the superorganism concept, in order to further highlight 
that, for many species, the concept of BA is an incorrect description of the behaviour of the 
non-reproductive castes. The superorganism argument was prevalent prior to Hamilton but 
underwent a radical decline due to the emergence of kin selection and the concept of BA. 
Research into complex eusociality led to a revival of the superorganism in the late 1980s. 
However, I argued in chapter 4, that today the superorganism is typically understood from an 
evolutionary perspective of biological individuality; colonies that are units of selection are 
evolutionary superorganisms. But, I argued, in pre-Hamiltonian eusociality research the 
superorganism was originally conceived from a physiological perspective; defining colonies 
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as emergent higher-level biological individuals. Currently, authors rarely employ the 
superorganism concept from a physiological perspective due to the presupposition that 
hierarchical control is not possible in the large colonies of complex eusocial insects. 
Consequently, colonies of complex eusocial insect species are typically conceived of as self-
organized groups that are units of selection. However, I argued that there is evidence that 
hierarchical control is not only possible but actually exhibited in some colonies. Thus, in 
chapter 5, I proposed an organizational approach, that whilst incorporating self-organization, 
does not presuppose that hierarchical control in not possible, namely the hierarchical-
organizational (HO) approach. The HO approach focuses on the coordinating signals that 
control and regulate the collective colony processes (e.g. caste determination, nest 
construction, etc.). Specifically, the HO approach assesses whether colony processes are 
controlled solely by first-order signals, thus self-organization, or by second-order signals, thus 
hierarchical control. 
 
 I applied the HO approach to three representative case studies in order to assess the 
types of colony individuality across species of eusocial insects. I argued that colonies of the 
most simple eusocial insect species (e.g. M. genalis), that exhibit facultative eusociality, are 
not superorganisms in any sense. Colonies of species in the mid-range of the complexity 
spectrum (e.g. V. vulgaris), are likely to be evolutionary superorganisms because they are units 
of selection, but not physiological-like superorganisms because they exhibit only a minimal 
form of hierarchical-organization. But colonies of the most complex species (e.g. A. mellifera) 
are likely to be superorganisms in the fullest sense, i.e. evolutionary and physiological-like 
individuals, due to their hierarchical-organization. Importantly, if a colony is a superorganism 
(in an evolutionary and/or physiological sense) then the concept of BA is not applicable to the 
members of the colony. This is because the concept of BA, is by definition, only applicable to 
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individuals that are (potentially) evolutionary individuals; i.e. individuals that are the targets 
of natural selection. If a colony is an evolutionary superorganism, the colony is the unit of 
selection and thus the members of the colony do not have personal fitness values that BA could 
have consequences on. Additionally, if a colony is also a physiological-like superorganism, the 
members of the colony are lower level parts in a higher-order system. Therefore, the workers 
are determined into their role via hierarchical control at the collective colony level. The concept 
of BA would not be applicable to the non-reproductive castes in those species in which colonies 
qualify as superorganisms. 
 
 By using the HO approach to assess the development and maintenance of the actual 
organization within colonies, it is clear that members of the colony develop into the non-
reproductive worker role due to coercion and/or hierarchical control; they do not do so because 
of a trait that they possess (i.e. BA) that causes them to attempt to increase their inclusive 
fitness by becoming non-reproductive workers. 
 
Eusociality without BA? Implications of the thesis 
 
In chapter 3, I argued that the evolution of eusociality likely involved two phases. Phase 1 is 
the evolutionary origins of eusocial insects. In this phase colony selection did not occur because 
eusociality evolved from solitary ancestors, thus kin selection likely drove the evolution of 
eusocial insects. As obligate eusociality emerged, colony selection likely occurred. Colony 
selection drove the evolution of further organizational complexity within colonies, resulting in 
the evolution of hierarchically-organized colonies. Thus, phase 2 is characterised as the 
evolution of the superorganism, via MLS. Crucially, worker BA is only possible in phase 1, 
prior to colony selection, but there is currently no evidence of worker BA. Instead, it is likely 
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that the reproductive division of labour evolved in phase 1 due to parental manipulation. In 
phase 2 colony selection occurs and thus BA is not applicable. This argument has potential 
implications for the debate over the evolution of eusociality. A prominent debate today persists 
over whether kin selection or group selection (MLS2) is the best explanation for the evolution 
of eusociality (Hölldobler and Wilson 2009; Nowak et al. 2010; Abbot et al. 2011). Instead of 
being viewed as competing theories, they should be seen as complementary processes in the 
different evolutionary phases of eusociality. 
 
 It cannot be assumed that eusocial insect workers are biologically altruistic simply 
because they do not reproduce but cooperate for the colony; this could occur due to BA or 
coercion, for example. The use of BA must be empirically supported; it must be shown that 
this behaviour is due to a trait that the focal individual possesses. Not only is there currently 
no empirical evidence for BA, but I have shown that the concept of BA is not necessarily 
required in the evolution of eusociality. Moreover, the conceptual monism of BA is not 
supported by historical claims; the concept only became widely used in the 1960s. Therefore, 
researchers should pay more attention to the alternatives to the concept of BA, such as the HO 
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